sideration, and the Jury found the following special verdict, 1779. which was drawn up by the Counsel on each side. THE Jurors find, That the deceased went, in company with one David Prothero, who was a constable of the parish of Saint Martin in the Fields, to the house of one Ward, in Castle-street, in that parish, in whose house the prisoner cohabited with a man of the name of Farmello; that Prothero went to the house of Ward, accompanied by Barnet, for the purpose of apprehending Farmello as an idle and disorderly person, under the statute of 19 Geo. III. c. 10; that Prothero had a general search-warrant for that purpose; that upon Prothero's coming to the house of Ward, he, together with Barnet and others, went up stairs to the lodging-room of Farmello, in which Farmello and the prisoner cohabited at that time; that Prothero did not know Farmello; that Prothero knocked at the door, and demanded to be admitted; that a male voice called out from within, "Who's there?" that Prothero answered, "It is me:" upon which a servantmaid belonging to the house said, "there is another door by which you may enter," the bolt of which was on the inside of a room not belonging to Farmello's lodgings; that this door was unbolted, and opened by two men of the name of Ellis and Stephens; that Prothero and Barnet then entered Farmello's room; that Prothero said to Farmello, "You must 66 come along with us." Farmello said, "For what;" that Barnet said, " Come, come, you must go;" that before Prothero could answer Farmello, the prisoner stepped past Prothero, and struck Barnet under the left arm with a knife which she then had in her hand, saying, " By God, he shall not go;" that the knife was left sticking in the side of Barnet, who turned round, saying he was a dead man; that Barnet died of that wound about four o'clock the next day; and that Farmello was not an object of the said Act of Parliament. THE QUESTION was, Whether the offence amounted to murder or manslaughter? THIS case was argued in the Exchequer Chamber on the 19th April 1780, by HOWARTH for the Crown, and ERS ADEY'S CASE. 1779. ADEY'S CASE. 1) Ld. Mansfield, L. C. B. Skinner, Mr. J. Willes, Mr. Mr. J. Buller, KINE for the prisoner, before ten of the Judges (1), and the cases in the note (a) were cited and relied on. THE prisoner laid eighteen months in gaol, and was then discharged (b). (a) The Queen v. Tooley, 2. Ld. Ray. 1296. Holt, 485. 11 Mod. 242. Huggin's Case, Fitzg. 177. 2. Strange, 882. 2. Ld. Ray. 1574. 9. State Trials, 112. Bucknal's Case, Styles 469. Mawgridge's Case, Kely. 136. Foster, 135. 312. 314. 1. Hale, 465. (b) It is said, that the Judges held it to be manslaughter only; but no opinion was ever publicly given; and quere, whether the prisoner did not escape, pending the opinion of the Judges, when the gaol was burnt down in 1780, and was never retaken. See note, East's C. L. ch. 5. s. 89. CASE CV. Obtaining a horse under the pretence of hiring it for a day, and immediately selling it, is felony, if the Jury find the hiring was animo furandi. S. C. 2 East, 685, 697. THE KING against PEAR. THIS case was reserved by MR. JUSTICE ASHHURST, at the THE prisoner was indicted for stealing a black horse, the property of Samuel Finch. It appeared in evidence that Samuel Finch was a Livery-Stable-keeper in the Borough; and that the prisoner, on the 2d of July 1779, hired the horse of him to go to Sutton, in the county of Surry, and back again, saying on being asked where he lived, that he lodged at No. 25 in King-street, and should return about eight o'clock the same evening. He did not return; and it was proved that he had sold the horse on the very day he had hired it, to one William Hollist, in Smithfield Market; and that he had no lodging at the place to which he had given the prosecutor directions. THE learned JUDGE said: There had been different opinions on the law of this class of cases; that the general doctrine then was that if a horse be let for a particular portion of time, and after that time is expired, the party hiring, instead of returning the horse to its owner, sell it and convert the money to his own use, it is felony, because there is then no privity of contract subsisting between the parties; PEAR'S CASE. that in the present case the horse was hired to take a journey 1779. into Surry, and the prisoner sold him the same day, without taking any such journey; that there were also other circumstances which imported that at the time of the hiring the prisoner had it in intention to sell the horse, as his saying that he lodged at a place where in fact he was not known. He therefore left it with the Jury to consider, Whether the prisoner meant at the time of the hiring to take such journey, but was afterwards tempted to sell the horse? for if so he must be acquitted; but that if they were of opinion that at the time of the hiring the journey was a mere pretence to get the horse into his possession, and he had no intention to take such journey but intended to sell the horse, they would find that fact specially for the opinion of the JUDGES. THE Jury found that the facts above stated were true; and also that the prisoner had hired the horse with a fraudulent view and intention of selling it immediately. THE question was referred to the JUDGES, Whether the delivery of the horse by the prosecutor to the prisoner, had so far changed the possession of the property, as to render the subsequent conversion of it a mere breach of trust, or whether the conversion was felonious? THE JUDGES differed greatly in opinion on this case; and delivered their opinions seriatim upon it at LORD CHIEF JUSTICE DE GRAY's house on 4th February 1780 and on the 22nd of the same month MR. BARON PERRYN delivered their opinion on it (a). The majority of them thought, That the question, as to the original intention of the prisoner in hiring the horse, had been properly left to the jury; and as they had found, that his view in so doing was fraudulent, the parting with the property had not changed the nature of the possession, but that it remained unaltered in the pro (a) This Judgment it seems was settled, and approved by several of the Judges before it was delivered, and it is stated at large by Mr. East, 2 vol. 686.689. See the case of Sharpless and another, ante, page 92, case 52. 1779. PEAR'S CASE. secutor at the time of the conversion; and that the prisoner was therefore guilty of felony (a). (a) At the Old Bailey in October Session, 1729, John Tunnard was tried before Lord Chief Justice RAYMOND, present Mr. Baron HALE and Mr.Justice DENTON, for stealing a brown mare, the property of Henry Smith. It appeared in evidence, that the prosecutor lived in the Isle of Ely; that he lent the prisoner the mare to ride to a place three miles distant; but that instead of riding the three miles according to the agreement, the prisoner rode her up to London, and sold her. Lord Chief Justice RAYMOND left it with the Jury quo animo he had ridden the mare to London, and they found him guilty.-THE COURT. The finding of the Jury will make this case felony, because he rode the mare farther than he had agreed to do; for if there had been no special agreement the privity would have remained, and it could not have been felony. M. S. And see S. C. stated 2 East, 687. See also Kelynge, 24.81. Shower, 50. 57. Aikles's Case, O. B. January Session 1784. Charleswood's Case, O. B. February Session 1786. and Major Semple's Case, July Session 1786, accordant. CASE CVI. of a bill is not compe THE KING against JOHN TAYLOR. The drawee AT the Old Bailey in October Session 1779, John Taylor was tried before MR. JUSTICE WILLES, present MR. BARON EYRE, for that he having in his possession a bill of exchange in the words and figures following: tent to prove that a receipt indorsed for the value of it is forged, without he has a release from the indorsee. S. C. 2 East, 960 S. P. Rex v. ante p. 150, " SIR, TAMWORTH, 2d August, 1779. "ONE MONTH after date please to pay to my order the sum of Twenty Pounds, value received as per advice from THOMAS HARPER." "To Mr. JOSEPH CUFF, "LONDON." feloniously did make, forge, and counterfeit a receipt and acquittance for the said sum of Twenty Pounds, as followeth, "Recd. W. Wilson," with intention to defraud the said Joseph Cuff. THERE was a second count for uttering with the like intention; and a third and fourth count for forging and utter ing it with intention to defraud John Briggs and Henry Sutton. UPON the bill being produced, it appeared that "Thomas "Harper," the drawer and payee, had indorsed it over by a special indorsement, to "Bird and Jones, or order," who had indorsed it in blank, and paid it away to Mr. Sutton, a London tradesman then at Birmingham, who inclosed it with five other bills, in the presence of the prisoner, in a letter directed to Messrs. Briggs and Sutton, on Garlick-hill; and which letter was put into the post-house at Birmingham; but it never arrived as directed in London. Mr. Briggs, on receiving advice of these bills having been sent, applied to Mr. Cuff to stop payment of the bill in question; but it appeared that Mr. Cuff had paid the bill to the prisoner though it then wanted three days of being due, on his allowing him one shilling for the discount on it, for the three days it had to run. 1779. TAYLOR'S CASE. To prove that it was the prisoner who had received the 201. and witnessed the receipt in the name of " W. Wilson," Davy, Serjeant, for the prosecution called Mr. Cuff; but the Court concurred with MORGAN, the prisoner's Counsel, that he was not a competent witness; for he had, by paying the bill before it became due, opened a question, whether he was not liable to repay the money. On receiving a release however from (1) It was doubted Sutton and Briggs, the indorsers of the bill, his evidence was whether Mr. received (1), by which it appeared that when he paid the Cuff ought money to the prisoner he desired him to write a receipt on released the the back of the bill, which he did, by writing thereon the drawer. fictitious name W. Wilson. not to have THE EVIDENCE for the prosecution being closed, the pri- dorsed on a bill A receipt insoner's Counsel submitted to the Court, that this receipt was not a receipt for money, within the meaning of the statute; for that it was essential to the commission of forgery that the act should be done in the name of another (2); but that in the present case, for any thing that had appeared to the (2) See 3 Institute 169. of exchange in a fictitious name, is a forgery, although it do not purport to be the name of any particular per son. |