We can find nothing in the legislative history of the statute to indicate that appellee's construction of the statute is out of harmony with the congressional intent. The original enactment in 1948 made an annuity payable to "an unmarried child, including a dependent stepchild or an adopted child, under the age of eighteen years, or such unmarried child who because of physical or mental disability is incapable of selfsupport." Act of Feb. 28, 1948, § 11, 62 Stat. 55. The amount of the annuity depended on whether another parent survived. Although children born out of wedlock were not expressly included, the provision was seemingly broad enough to cover them.5 The Government argues that, in granting annuities to surviving children, Congress intended to provide funds to replace support lost by the wage earner's dependents. The Government views the statutory scheme as designed to pay benefits only to those children Congress thought most likely to have been dependent on the wage earner, and to take account of the likelihood of supplementary support from the other parent. We note, however, that only stepchildren were required to show dependency."

In 1956, Congress amended the definition of an entitled child to include "an unmarried child, including (1) an adopted child, and (2) a stepchild or recognized natural child who received more than one-half his support from and lived with the... employee in a regular parent-child relationship." Act of July 31, 1956, Title IV, § 1 (j), 70 Stat. 744. For the

5 See Visor v. United States, Civ. No. 9922 (2) (ED Mo., Feb. 12, 1955).

By authorizing the payment of benefits to an "unmarried child who because of physical or mental disability is incapable of self-support," Act of Feb. 28, 1948, 62 Stat. 55, Congress apparently intended that, though disabled children over 18 years of age had to show they were unable to support themselves, they did not have to show they were dependent on the deceased parent.

The 1956 amendments also provided that a survivors' annuity was payable to a legitimate child with a surviving parent only if the child proved that he had received more than one-half his support from the

first time children born out of wedlock were explicitly included, but their eligibility was made subject both to the "lived with" requirement and to the dependency requirement originally applicable only to stepchildren.

The legislative history is devoid of any indication whether Congress intended that annuities could be recovered by all recognized natural children who had once lived with the employee in a familial relationship, or only by such children who were living with the employee at the time of death. Nor do the congressional materials illuminate the purpose of the "lived with" requirement. The Government defends the provision as a rational indicator of both dependency and parentage. An illegitimate child who lived with the natural parent, according to this view, is both more likely to have received support from the parent and more likely to be the true issue of that parent than is any illegitimate child who lived apart from the natural parent. It seems unlikely that Congress viewed the requirement as a means of ascertaining either dependency or parentage, however, since the statute also required the child to prove both that he had received more than one-half of his support from the deceased employee and that he was the employee's "recognized natural child." Those provisions speak directly to the concerns raised by the Government, and the additional requirement that the child must have lived with the parent would therefore be superfluous regardless of whether it mandated that the child must have lived with the parent at the time of the parent's death rather than at some other time.

The Government also urges that Congress intended the "lived with" requirement to serve as a means of thwarting fraudulent claims of dependency or parentage, and to promote efficient administration by facilitating the prompt identification of eligible annuitants. It is evident from the facts

deceased employee. Act of July 31, 1956, amending Title IV, § 10 (d), 70 Stat. 754.

of this case, however, that the classification is not narrowly tailored as a means of furthering either goal. As we recognized in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 636 (1974), the prevention of fraud is a legitimate goal, but it does not necessarily follow "that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of [appellee's] subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims." Thus, even if the "lived with" requirement is assumed to serve as a device to prevent fraud or to promote efficient administration, it raises serious equal protection problems that this Court must seek to avoid by adopting a saving statutory construction not at odds with fundamental legislative purposes.

In sum, the legislative history of the 1956 amendments provides no direct guidance on the purpose of the "lived with" provision or on whether it was intended to be restricted to children living with the parent at a particular time. The less restrictive construction proposed by the appellee appears fair and reasonable in light of the language, purpose, and history of the enactment, and it avoids a serious constitutional question. Before we conclude our inquiry, however, we must consider whether a 1966 amendment to the statute affected the children's right to recovery.

Congress enacted the 1966 amendments to the Act upon the request of the Executive Branch's Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems. One of these amendments removed the requirement that children must prove they received one-half of their support from the deceased employee in order to recover survivors' annuities. Act of July 18, 1966, Title V, § 502, 80 Stat. 300. Congress deleted the dependency requirement in order to ensure recovery for the children of female civil servants, who typically earned less than their husbands and accordingly contributed less than half of the support of their children. Congress also deleted the require

See S. Rep. No. 1187, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1966); The Federal Salary and Fringe Benefits Act of 1966: Hearings on H. R. 14122 before

ment of proof of dependency for stepchildren and "recognized natural" children, but retained the "lived with" requirement for those claimants. The reason for retaining the requirement was not clearly explained in the Cabinet Committee report, which simply stated:

"Stepchildren and natural children are eligible for benefits at present only when they have been dependent on the deceased parent and living with the parent in a regular parent-child relationship. The latter requirement should be retained; but, if it is fulfilled, the benefits should be paid as for any other child, without regard to the dependency requirement." H. R. Doc. No. 402, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1966).

The Government views the 1966 amendment as evidence that Congress intended the "lived with" requirement to serve as a convenient method of determining whether the child received support from the deceased employee. This proposition appears implausible, since in the same sentence the Committee recommended that if the "lived with" requirement were met benefits should be paid "as for any other child, without regard to the dependency requirement." The Committee's use of the word "retained" is a further indication that Congress did not intend the "lived with" provision to assume a new function previously performed by the dependency requirement. Moreover, the Government's position again unnecessarily raises the equal protection question, because legitimate children and adopted children were not required to demonstrate that they had received support from the decedent. In the absence of any persuasive evidence to the contrary, therefore, we assume that Congress' failure to alter the "lived

the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1966); Joint Annual Report of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and the Report of the Cabinet Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems, H. R. Doc. No. 402, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1966).

with" requirement likewise failed to modify the purpose of that provision as envisioned by the Congress that enacted it.9

We conclude that the "lived with" requirement is satisfied when a recognized natural child has lived with the deceased employee in a "regular parent-child relationship," regardless of whether the child was living with the employee at the time of the employee's death. Our consideration of the language and purpose of the statute and of the available legislative history convinces us that this construction is a fair and reasonable reading of the congressional enactment.10 Furthermore,

• Two Committees of Congress, in passing on requests for legislation by the Civil Service Commission, have referred to the "lived with" requirement as a "living with" requirement. S. Rep. No. 92–527, p. 1 (1971); S. Rep. No. 1070, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1966). See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-811, p. 3 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 33, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). We read the Committees' statements as nothing more than acknowledgments of the Commission's interpretation of the requirement, which was made known to each Committee by letters from the Commission. S. Rep. No. 92-527, supra, at 2-3; S. Rep. No. 1070, supra, at 3-4. In any event, the views of some Congressmen as to the construction of a statute adopted years before by another Congress have "very little, if any, significance.'" United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 170 (1968) (quoting Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 593 (1958)).

The 1966 recommendation of the Cabinet Committee on Federal Staff Retirement Systems referred to the "lived with" requirement as allowing benefits to recognized natural children "when they have been . . . living with the parent in a regular parent-child relationship." H. R. Doc. No. 402, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1966). This language might appear to be inconsistent with our construction of the "lived with" requirement. The language was formulated by the Executive Branch, however, not by Congress, and at most simply reflects the Civil Service Commission's interpretation of the statute.

10 We recognize that the Civil Service Commission has interpreted the "lived with" requirement to be a "living with" requirement, although the Government does not inform us whether the agency interpretation was contemporaneous with the 1956 enactment. We do not disregard this evidence of the meaning of the statute. See, c. g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425, n. 9 (1977). In view of our analysis of the statute and its legislative history, and considering the need to avoid unnecessary con