been greatly to increase the tendency to combination, and at the same time to give it a more clearly recognized place in our national economy.

It was inevitable that the advantages of collaboration and co-operation experienced under war-time pressure would make for concerted working in the future. More than ever before the whole trend of industry and commerce was directed towards combination. The whole situation had to be met somehow. Efforts to cope with it were not long in the making, but the method of approach was along novel lines. The new industrial and commercial position of the United States as a world power, the broadening-out of our commercial relations beyond national boundaries, called for a readjustment of our national trade policy to fit the new problems that arose in our foreign trade.

Question of Foreign Trade Involved.

As far as the American people were concerned, the "trust" question, prior to the war, was a domestic problem exclusively. It is that no longer. Our commercial relations with foreign nations have undergone a fundamental change during the past five years. Our preeminent position in international trade necessitates that much greater attention than heretofore be given to the foreign aspect of our commercial policy. One of the first things upon which public attention was focused, when the question of foreign trade was thrust into the foreground of national discussion, at the outbreak of the European war and prior to our entry into it, was the competitive conditions obtaining in world trade. It was felt that combinations of foreign producers and organized groups of foreign buyers, as well as concerted action on the part of foreign financial, insurance, shipping and other interests, affected American interests more closely than had been generally realized. Moreover, it was felt that under prevailing conditions the small, individual American manufacturer was at a disadvantage over against his foreign rivals in over-sea markets.

At the same time cognizance was taken of the fact that in the

course of centuries competition in over-sea markets had, as it were by common consent of the leading trading nations of the world, come to be regarded more and more as operating in a noman's land. Business practices considered unethical and unlawful at home, were not infrequently condoned when a foreigner was the victim or when a foreign country was the field of operation.

These were the principal underlying motives which prompted Congress to enact legislation to meet the needs growing out of our new position in international trade.. Two laws were passed to promote the export trade of the United States, the Export Trade Act (Webb-Pomerene Law) in 1918, and the Edge Act in 1920. The Webb law legalizes export associations or combinations which engage solely in exporting goods, wares or merchandise. The Edge Act provides for banking corporations organized for the purpose of engaging in international or foreign banking or other international foreign financial operations. The significant point is that both laws permit the formation of combinations for engaging in foreign trade, and to this extent amend the Sherman and the Clayton laws.

We therefore see here a distinct tendency towards expanding our "trust" policy in accordance with our broadened interests in world trade.

Trade Policy Retains Sherman Law.

Co-operation for selling, as well as for purely financial transactions in foreign markets has been legalized. It does not follow, however, that in so doing the bars of the anti-trust laws have been let down. On the contrary, it is expressly provided in the Webb-Pomerene Act that agreements in export trade which restrain the domestic trade, involve unfair competition, or artificially and intentionally enhance or depress prices within the United States shall not be exempt from the Sherman law. Congress even went much farther than that and extended the scope of the clause against unfair competition, contained in the Federal Trade Commission Act, so as to embrace unfair meth

ods of competition committed outside of the United States against American competitors by individual American exporters as well as by export associations. This provision of the WebbPomerene Act, which gives to that law extra-territorial jurisdiction in cases of unfair competition, represents one of the most noteworthy new departures in our own "trust" policy, if not in the entire realm of commercial legislation of the world. It constitutes a concrete effort to do away with the "doublestandard" in world trade and lays the foundation for a new and higher standard which is to govern the international trade practices of the future. It is America's contribution to an upward trend in commercial ethics where "the stranger within (and without) our gates" is the person particularly concerned,

American Export Trade Regulated.

The foregoing qualifications and limitations do not complete the safeguards thrown around export combinations by Congress in its efforts to protect the public interest. A further step was taken and it signifies an additional novelty in our trade policy. The Webb-Pomerene law requires that every export association shall file certain documents with the Federal Trade Commission, and that body is given wide powers of investigation and supervision. The Edge Act, in turn, provides that financial concerns intending to operate under it shall procure a charter from the Federal Reserve Board and operate in accordance with such rules and regulations as that agency may determine under the law. In the one case we have the requirement of a Federal charter, in both cases we find adoption of the principle of Federal supervision of combinations engaged in foreign trade.

At first glance it might appear that these new departures in our national policy towards "big business" were merely transitory measures occasioned by the exigencies of war or reconstruction. But on closer examination we observe essentially the same process of evolution taking place in our policy towards other lines of industrial and commercial enterprise not linked

up with foreign trade. All indications are to the effect that we are dealing with a permanent movement.

The clearest indication of a trend toward modification of our anti-trust policy may be observed in recent Federal legislation relating to transportation, both water and rail. The Act of September 7, 1916, establishing the United States Shipping Board specifically provides in Section 15 that every common carrier by water shall file with the board a statement of all rate, pooling and other agreements with other carriers. The board is authorized to approve or disapprove and cancel such agreements. All agreements shall be unlawful without the approval of the board, and agreements approved by the board shall be excepted from the provisions of the anti-trust laws.

Movement Permeates Transportation Laws.

In the more recent Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, Section 29(b), we find the same policy continued, for among other things this Act provides that associations, pools, combinations or other concerted action of marine insurance companies to transact a marine insurance and reinsurance business in the United States and in foreign countries and to reinsure or otherwise apportion among its membership the risks undertaken by such association or any of its component members,-shall be exempt from the Clayton Act.

Curiously enough, the whole movement has found its strongest expression in recent railway legislation. Railway transportation was the field in which nearly half a century ago the operation of pools, discriminatory rate agreements, etc., first aroused public sentiment and led to repressive legislation. The Federal Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, contains rather elaborate provisions for the consolidation and operation of the railroads of the country in groups, the co-ordination into some twenty systems. It further provides for the probable consolidation of the large express companies, and greatly enlarges the supervisory and controlling powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

If we now regard the Webb-Pomerene, the Edge, the Shipping Board, the Transportation and the Merchant Marine Acts as a whole; we cannot fail to recognize a consistent policy running through this whole body of recent commercial and industrial legislation. This policy, as we have observed, was first applied by Congress to our foreign trade. It has been continued in dealing with problems belonging more strictly to our domestic economy. Its essential features consist in a broadening of the Sherman anti-trust law so as to legalize combination within a limited sphere, placing, however, each alliance of formerly competing interests under strict government supervision and control.

Private Ownership Retained.

While nationalization has been suggested as a practicable recourse, it cannot be said that its advocates have succeeded in impressing their views upon our people in such a way as to make it an issue of national scope. In European countries and elsewhere, where the war and its consequences have accelerated this movement towards nationalization of industry and trade, certain motives, among them fiscal reasons which do not exist in this country, prompted such action.

While the aforementioned developments stand out with sufficient distinctness in our domestic and foreign trade to enable us to discern their essential characteristics, there are other forces at play which as yet are less clearly defined. Their probable bearing on our "trust" policy can only be conjectured at this stage.

International Combinations Affect Foreign Trade.

We observed above how some of our recent commercial legislation has been predicated on our newly extended foreign trade relations. We also noted how this new orientation of our national interests and aspirations left its impress on our antitrust laws. If appearances deceive not we are on the eve of