volved in the appropriation process and strongly urges Congress to enact appropriate legislation to this end. A primary requirement for Congress to effectively exercise oversight is adequate information from the executive branch. Without access to relevant information Congress cannot perform its historic function. This matter, of course, has been an issue of long standing between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. It recently came to a head in connection with efforts by a House Judiciary subcommittee to obtain material on the FBI's domestic intelligence operations. The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Rodino, had asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the FBI's domestic intelligence operations. The Comptroller General of the GAO, Elmer Staats, presented an interim report.6 The review was to determine how the FBI was carrying out its domestic intelligence responsibilities. Cases acted on in calendar year 1974 at 10 selected field offices were examined. Staats said that GAO was concerned with protecting the integrity of the FBI's operations. Thus its need for access was tempered by its desire to protect certain information in the files. FBI officials were advised that they could delete the names of all informants from the files before the GAO review. FBI officials were also assured that GAO would not disclose certain sensitive information in the files outside GAO, and within GAO only to those who had a need to know. Initially GAO agreed to have the FBI prepare summaries on the cases selected. The staff of GAO reviewed the summaries and held follow-up interviews with FBI agents associated with the cases or who prepared summaries. But Staats said that to assure Congress of the accuracy and completeness of these summaries GAO felt it was necessary to select certain documents and compare them with the summaries on a random basis. A verification proposal was made to the FBI. Both the Attorney General and the FBI Director rejected these proposals. The Attorney General rejected verification proposals on the grounds of avoiding disclosure, protecting informants and preventing release of unevaluated, unverified data. Representative Rodino noted that GAO's proposed verification procedures presented none of the dangers ex60 pressed because access to verification was limited to pre scribed GAO personnel (no Congressmen or their staff would have access) and informants' names were deleted. Staats also concluded that the GAO's statutory authority to investigate the administration and operation of the FBI was explicit and implied GAO's right to access to the FBI's files. The Department disputed this contention, stating that GAO had no statutory authority to investigate the Department. In any event Staats clearly pointed out the key conflict as to access and the need to resolve it. "We must, as a matter of fundamental policy, We proposed the verification procedure not be- The conflict between the need to know and the The issue could not be stated more clearly. The Special Committee believes it is essential for Congress to consider 1 29 this question on a more systematic basis than the periodic confrontations with executive agencies followed by ad hoc solutions or threats of contempt citations. Until Congress, through legislation, sets forth the need for information and procedures for obtaining it, through court action if necessary, it will have only two options-to do nothing or to hold the individual refusing to come forward with the requested information in contempt of Congress. The undoubted power of Congress to cite a person for contempt does not solve the problem because of the length of time and procedural clumsiness in obtaining the contempt citation. It is not a viable mechanism for general use.62 An area which might be fruitfully considered by Congress is a recommendation found in Section 102 of S. 495. It creates a congressional legal service which would supply a variety of services to Congress on a coordinated basis. Upon request of any standing committee or a certain number of Representatives or Senators the legal service would be required to render legal opinions where a request for information was denied by an agency of the government; whether a nomination or agreement with a foreign power should have been submitted for Senate advice and consent; whether an activity of the executive branch violates the law or Constitution; whether executive privilege exists in a particular matter and has been properly asserted; and whether deferrals of budget authority have been made in accordance with law. One scholar has characterized this proposal in the following way: "A permanent well-staffed legal office charged The Committee believes the approach in this section of S. 495 is a start towards providing Congress with standards, services and procedures through which the conflict concerning congressional access to information can be resolved on a more rational basis than in the past. The proposal points up a lack in congressional support services. Congress does not have its own legal counsel to provide it with advice on such matters or represent it in court should the need arise. The Committee believes it to be essential for Congress to provide itself with the capabilities necessary for adequate oversight over a federal law enforcement bureaucracy which has in the past run out of control. The presence of such capabilities will do much to prevent many of the practices which this report documents. In a number of places in this report the Special Committee has referred to the interrelationships of its findings and recommendations. This key concept in preventing improper influence from being exercised upon federal law enforcement agencies is important. No one recommendation stands alone and no one recommendation is aimed at solving the host of problems present in preventing such improper influence. It is therefore essential for all problems to be looked at as part of a whole and for their relationships to be understood. Since so many of the recommendations of this Committee require legislation or continual congressional oversight as part of preventing improper influence, it is essential for Congress to structure its jurisdiction in a manner which will make it possible for the problems and alternative solutions to be considered together. Some have suggested a joint committee with specific jurisdiction in this area; yet others believe it is healthy for more than one committee to consider the problems. The Special Committee takes no position as to which committees should consider these issues, but it urges Congress to limit the number of committees and assign jurisdiction in a manner which encourages a comprehensive and systematic approach. G. Logging Communications on Matters Under Investigation The Attorney General should promulgate regulations governing the logging and recording of contacts initiated from outside the Department of Justice on criminal matters under investigation or before the courts. Congress should enact legislation mandating such regulations and providing guidelines for the Attorney General which cover the following: 1) Personnel required to keep logs;" 2) Information to be included in the log; 3) The reporting process within the Department; 63 64 4) Personnel action following a failure to log a con- 5) Restrictions on disclosure to protect the integrity of Disclosure of logs should be made directly to an A former special counsel to a President recommended that all divisions of the Department of Justice be required to keep records and disclose all requests and contacts they receive fron non-involved third parties, including the White House, Congress and others. This recommendation was based on his experience in the early 1960's. He described his functions as special counsel as being wholly unlike those performed by John Dean and Charles Colson, both of whom were heavily involved in law enforcement and intelligence activities.64 The panel of the National Academy of Public Administration found numerous abuses of government power in a host of activities engaged in by White House personnel. To the panel this was a violation of equal treatment under the laws as to individuals against whom or for whom certain activities were directed. The panel felt that legislation alone cannot guarantee against such occurrences. It concluded: "The essential ingredients lie in the integrity and "The panel recommends that generally the Presi- |