a series of acceptors of the same bill; it must either be accepted by the drawee, or failing him, by some one for the honour of the drawer (a). cepting su The method of accepting supra protest is said to be as follows: 2dly. Of the the acceptor must personally appear before a notary public with mode of acwitnesses, and declare that he accepts such protested bill in pra protest. honour of the drawer or indorser, and that he will satisfy the same at the appointed time; and then he must subscribe the bill with his own hand, thus-" accepted supra protest, in honour of J. B. b)," or, as is more usual, "accepts S. P." A general acceptance supra protest is considered as made for the honour of the drawer, unless otherwise expressed. Such acceptance, however, may be so worded, that though it be intended for the honour of the drawer, yet it may equally bind the indorser; but in this case, notice of such acceptance must be sent to the latter (c). The holder should always take care to have the bill protested for nonacceptance before the acceptance of honour is made, as otherwise, it is said, the drawer might allege that he did not draw on the person making the acceptance (d). acceptor su * An acceptance supra protest is as obligatory on the acceptor, Sdly. Of the as if no protest had intervened, it being immaterial to the holder liability of the of a bill, on whose account it is accepted (e). If the acceptance pra protest. were for the honour of the bill, or of the drawer, the acceptor is [313] liable to all the indorsers, as well as the holder: if in honour of a particular indorser, then to all subsequent indorsees. The acceptance supra protest, however, is only a conditional engagement, and to render such acceptor absolutely liable, the bill must be duly presented for payment to the drawee, and protested in case of refusal (f)(1). (e) Beawes, pl. 35. 45.-Mutford v. Walcot, Lord Raym. 575.-12 Mod. 410 S. C.-Gregory v. Walcot, Com. 76.-Pillans v. Mierop, Burr. 1672. 4.-Bayl. 42. n. b. (f) Hoare and another v. Cazenove and another, 16 East. 391. This was an action on a set of foreign bills of exchange drawn at Hambro', on Penn and Hanbury in London, at one hundred and thirty days after date; the bills were presented to Messrs. P. and H. for acceptance, and refused, and (1) When a bill of exchange is protested for non-acceptance, and afterwards is taken up and paid for the honour of an indorser, it has been held that the holder is still bound to cause the bill to be protested for non-acceptance and non-payment, and to give regular notice to the antecedent 4thly. Of the right of such acceptor. A person accepting a bill supra protest, either for the honour of a drawer or of an indorser, although without his order or knowledge, has, as it is said, his redress and remedy against such person, and to all other persons who are liable to that person, who must indemnify him from any damage he may have sustained, the same as if he had acted entirely by his direction (a). He who [* 314] accepts a bill in honour of the "drawer oply, has no remedy against any of the indorsers, because he accepts merely on the behalf of the drawer; but the acceptor for the honour of the drawer of a bill already accepted by the drawee, but protested by the holder for better security, may, when he has paid the bill, sue the drawer or drawee, though in the case of a bankruptcy of these parties, if the first acceptance were for the accommodation of the drawer, a court of equity will compel the acceptor supra protest first to resort to the drawer's estate (b). protest duly made for non-acceptance; the bills were afterwards accepted by the defendant under protest for the honour of the first indorsers. When the bill became due, it was not presented to the drawees for payment, nor protested for non-payment. The defendants refused to pay the bill, in consequence of orders from the first indorsers. At the trial the plaintiff had a verdict subject to the opinion of the court on the above case; and after two arguments, and time taken to consider, the court were of opinion, that a presentment to the original drawees for payment, and a protest for non-payment by them, was essential, as a previous requisite to maintaining an action against an acceptor, for the honour of a first indorser, and ordered the postea to the defendants. Lord Ellenborough said, "the reason of the thing, as well as the strict law of the case, scems to render a second resort to the drawee proper, when the unaccepted bill still remains with the holder, for effects often reach the drawee, who has refused acceptance in the first instance, out of which the bill may and would be satisfied, if presented to him again, when the period of payment had arrived; and the drawer is entitled to the chance of the benefit to arise from such second demand, or, at any rate, to the benefit of that evidence which the protest affords; that the demand has been made duly without effect, as far as such evidence may be available to him for purposes of ulterior resort. Great reliance was placed on Brunetti v. Lewin, 1 Lutw. 896. and Pothier on Bills, part 1. ch. 4. art. 7. sect. 122, &c, ch. 5. sect. 137. (a) Beawes, pl. 47.-Smith v. Nissen, 1 T. R. 269.-Bayl. 73, 4.-et vide post, of payment supra protest. (6) Ex parte Wackerbarth, 5 Ves. jun. 574. The acceptor of a bill having become bankrupt, and the holders having protested it for better security, Christian and Bowen accepted it for the honour of the drawers, and having paid it, now claimed to be entitled to dividends under the bankrupt's estate. The Chancellor said, he had spoken to persons in trade upon the subject, and the result was, that the person accepting for the ho parties in the same manner as if the bill had not been taken up. It is ma terial however to observe that this doctrine was delivered in a case where the action was brought by the indorser for whose honour the bill had been paid, against a prior indorser, and that the neglect to make the protest and give notice, was on the part of the persons who had taken up the bill for his honour. Lenox v. Leverett, 10 Mass. Rep. 1. An acceptor for the honour of an indorser, has no claim upon Sect. 5. Of acceptance any party to the bill subsequent to him for whose honour he ac- supra proter cepted; but the indorser, for whose honour he accepted, and all the prior parties, the drawer included, are obliged to make satisfaction to the acceptor (a). Dour of the drawer, had a right to come upon the acceptor. He said, however, that the justice of the case required, that they should go in the first place against the drawer, if the acceptor had no effects, and directed an enquiry to be made, whether the original acceptor, or Christian and Bowen, had effects of the drawer's in hand. (4) Beawes, pl. 49, 35. 44.-Poth. pl. 113.-Molloy, B. 2. c. 10, s. 24 * 315 J CHAPTER VI. and OF PRESENTMENT OF A BILL, &C. FOR PAYMENT OF PAYMENT~ OF THE CONDUCT WHICH THE HOLDER MUST PURSUE ON NON- Sect. 1.-Of IT would be extremely prejudicial to commerce, if the holder of presentment for payment; a bill or note, were suffered to give longer credit to the drawee than the instrument directs, and afterwards, in default of pay1st. When ment by the drawee, to resort to the drawer or indorsers, at a presentment is necessary. time when perhaps the accounts between them and the persons liable to them may have been adjusted, or those persons may have become insolvent (a); and the common law detests negligence and laches (b). On this principle, it is settled, that the holder of a bill must present it to the drawee for payment at the time when due, when a time of payment is specified; and when no time is expressed, within a reasonable period after receipt of the bill; (c); and that if he neglect to do so, he shall not afterwards resort to the drawer or indorsers, whose implied contracts are only to pay in default of the drawee, and not immediate or absolute, and who are always presumed to have sustained damage by the holder's laches (d) (1). An acceptor supra protest, we have seen, is also (a) Allen v. Dockwra, 1 Salk. 127.-Collins v. Butler, Stra. 1087.-Bul. Ni. Pri. 470.-2 Bla. Com. 470. (b) Per curiam, in Chamberlyn v. Delarive, 2 Wils. 354. (c) Poth. pl. 129.-Cowley v. Dunlop, 7 T. R. 581, 2. (d) Heyly v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 669.-Cowley v. Dunlop, 7 T. R. 581, 2 acc.-Cooper v. Le Blanc, Rep. Temp. Hardw. 295. semb. contra. (1) The drawer of a bill and the indorser of a note, are responsible only after a default of the acceptor or maker; and the holder must first demand payment of him, or use due diligence to demand it before he can resort to the drawer or indorser. Munroe v. Easton, 2 John. Cas. 75. Berry v. Ro binson, 9 John. Rep. 121. Griffin v. Goff, 12 John. Rep. 423. May v. Coffin, 4 Mass. Rep. 341. And if an indorser of a bill on its becoming due pay the amount to the indorsee, the latter never having demanded payment of the acceptor, he cannot recover the amount from the drawer. Munroe v. Easton, 2 John. Cas. 75. It is no excuse for not demanding payment of the drawee, that the drawer has no funds in the hands of the drawee. Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 John. Cas. 5. Notice to an indorser prior to a demand upon the acceptor of a bill or maker of a note, is a mere nullity. Jackson v. Rich is necessary. within this rule (a); and if a bill be accepted, or note made pay- 1st. When able a certain time after sight, a presentment is obviously essen- presentment tial, in order to complete the right to payment (b). And whenever it is incumbent on the holder to present a bill or note for payment at a "precise time, and he neglects to do so, he will lose [S16 ] his remedy, as well on the bill as upon the consideration rodebt, in respect of which it was given or transferred. It appears that a distinction was formerly taken between a bill of exchange given in payment of a precedent debt, and one given for a debt contracted at the time the bill was given (c): in the latter case, it was always holden, that the person who received it must have used due diligence to obtain the money from the drawee, and that in default of his so doing, he could not support any action against the party from whom he received it; but in the former case, the urda, 2 Caines' Rep. 343. Griffin v. Goff. And in respect to the necessity of a demand, there is no difference whether the note or bill be indorsed before, or after, it became due. Berry v. Robinson. But the want of a demand will be excused when the acceptor has absconded, or cannot be found. Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. Rep. 45. Widgery V. Monroe, 6 Mass. Rep. 449. Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines' Rep. 121. And such fact may be given in evidence under the common averment that the note was duly presented and refused payment. Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines' Rep. 121. Šaunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl. 510. contra Blakeley v. Grant, 6 Mass. Rep. 386. But an averment in such case that the holder had used due diligence, but could not find the acceptor, would seem to be more correct. Blakeley v. Grant. Note. If a notary go to the maker's house to demand payment and find it shut up, and that he is out of town, this is a sufficient demand. Ogden v. Cowley, 2 John. Rep. 274. Not only must a demand be made upon the drawee, but it must be made within a reasonable time, otherwise the drawer will be discharged, especially if prejudiced by the neglect. Therefore where a creditor received an order from his debtor on a third person, on the 9th of December, which the drawee agreed to pay in ten or fifteen days, and the order was not presented until the March following, or afterwards, when the drawee had become insolvent, the drawer was held discharged. Brower v. Jones, 3 John. Rep. 230.; and see Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 John. Cas. 5. and Conroy v. Warren, 3 John. Cas. 259. Stothart v. Lewis, Overt. Rep. 215. If at the time of the note's falling due, the holder is at a place distant from the place of abode of the maker, a reasonable time will be allowed to make the demand. Thus, where at the maturity of the bill, the holder was at 200 miles distance from the maker's place of abode, a demand six days after was held to be within reasonable time; but a demand thirty days after was held unreasonable. Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. Rep. 483. In order to make a demand good, it is necessary that the party making it should have a written or verbal authority from the holder; and should have with him the note itself, for the debtor has a right, upon payment, to receive and cancel it. Freeman v. Boynton, |