with malice and bad faith when they covered up their fraudulent acts. And these would not have been possible without the indispensable cooperation of all of them.12

On motion for reconsideration, however, the City Prosecutor issued another resolution dated November 7, 2002,13 reversing its previous one. It now held that Zamora's transactions with East Asia "are undeniably money market placements which the Supreme Court has ruled to be in the nature of a loan." East Asia and respondent officers had no obligation to return the very same money that she delivered to it. She is merely entitled to a return of the amount invested plus the interest agreed on. Since there was no obligation to return the exact same thing delivered, no probable cause for estafa can be said to exist.

One. Zamora asserts that the CA erred in characterizing her transaction with East Asia as a sale or loan of money, where ownership of the money changed hands. Zamora insists that her relationship with East Asia was that of principal and agent and that its officers received her money in trust with an obligation to acquire with it commercial papers that MPC had issued. When these papers matured, East Asia also received the proceeds which they had the obligation to deliver to her. But respondents neither bought MPC commercial papers for her nor delivered to her the proceeds that MPC paid to East Asia.

This is not the first time that Eduque, Binamira, Delgado, and Joson have been sued for estafa under the same circumstances. In Cruzvale, Inc. vs. Eduque, 16 the CA caused the dismissal of the same charge for lack of probable cause upon a finding that the transaction was a loan that could not give rise to estafa by misappropriation. The CA ruled that East Asia did not receive Cruzvale's money in trust for it. On appeal to this Court, however, it reversed the CA ruling. The Court held that Sesbreno was not applicable because that case involved a money market placement under short-term credit instrument, not commercial papers. Sesbreno also dealt with the liability of respondent, not as middleman or dealer, but as petitioner's debtor.

[G.R. Nos. 186659-710 February 1, 2012]

FIRST DIVISION

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ABAS A. CANDAO and ISRAEL B. HARON, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

of the Ruling of the Court

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS; MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS; CORRECTION OF THE MAXIMUM OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE, PROPER._ [T]he suggestion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to correct the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, which our decision erroneously fixed at 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium, is well-taken. Justice Bersamin explained the matter as follows: The penalty of imprisonment prescribed for malversation when the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Such penalty is not composed of three periods. Pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the court shall apply the rules contained in the articles of the Revised Penal Code preceding Article 65, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions. Accordingly, reclusion perpetua being indivisible, is at once the maximum period, while reclusion temporal in its maximum period is divided into two to determine the medium and minimum periods of the penalty. Conformably with Article 65, therefore, the periods of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua are the following:⚫ Minimum period – 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 18 years, 8 months; • Medium period - 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 20 years; • Maximum period Reclusion perpetua With the Court having found no modifying circumstances - whether aggravating or modifying - to be present, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from the medium period of the penalty, I,e., from 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 20 years.

OPINION OF THE COURT

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated October 19, 2011 filed by

the petitioners, the Court finds no compelling reason to warrant reversal of the said decision which affirmed with modifications the conviction of petitioners for malversation of public funds.

However, the suggestion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to correct the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, which our decision erroneously fixed at 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium, is well-taken. Justice Bersamin explained the matter as follows:

The penalty of imprisonment prescribed for malversation when the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Such penalty is not composed of three periods. Pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the court shall apply the rules contained in the articles of the Revised Penal Code preceding Article 65, dividing into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each three portions. Accordingly, reclusion perpetua being indivisible, is at once the maximum period, while reclusion temporal in its maximum period is divided into two determine the medium and minimum periods of the penalty.

Conformably with Article 65, therefore, the periods of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua are the following: