BOOK VII. Chapter III.

1857. August.

commander-in-chief of the expedition despatched in 1856 to the Persian Gulf. His success there had been prompt and complete. When, on the conclusion of peace with Persia, the regiments which had composed his expeditionary force had been detached rapidly to India, Sir James Outram had followed to Bombay. It would seem to have been the original intention of the Governor-General to re-employ him in the political post which had been bestowed upon him before the mutiny, that of agent to the Governor-General in Rájpútáná. The mutinies at Indúr, at Nasírábád, at Nímach, and the outbreaks in other parts of Central India had thrown that part of the country into disorder, and Lord Canning felt that a strong hand controlling a strong force would be required to re-establish authority. The state of the country, however, rendered it impossible for Sir James Outram to proceed alone from Bombay to his post in Rájpútáná; and he felt, moreover, that in the actual state of affairs his presence might be more useful to the Government in some other part of India. On arriving at Bombay, then, he at once telegraphed to the Governor-General for orders. Receiving no reply-for Lord Canning could not at the moment make up his mind-Outram cut the Gordian knot by steaming round to Calcutta. He arrived there, as already stated, on the 1st of August.

Meanwhile, Lord Canning had, on the 15th of July, determined to employ Sir James Outram in the command of an expeditionary force in Central India, and he telegraphed to Bombay to that

IS DESTINED TO RELIEVE LAKHNAO.

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effect. But again he changed his views, and resolved to use his services to restore order in the Chapter III. country between Patná and Kánhpúr. Sir James Outram's arrival in Calcutta on the 1st of August coincided then with the latest wishes of the Governor-General.

The reader must remember that, on the 1st day of August, the only information possessed by the Government regarding Bihár was that Captain Dunbar's detachment had been beaten, that Arah was besieged, that the grand trunk road was unsafe, and that the entire province might at any moment be lost to them. From Kánhpúr they had information that Havelock was about to cross the Ganges with his small force, and to march on Lakhnao. Having regard to the fact that an entire province was arrayed in arms against him, his attempt did not seem promising. Altogether the look-out on the 1st of August was gloomy in Calcutta.

No sooner, then, had Sir James Outram landed, than Lord Canning felt that the man for the occasion had arrived. Four days later he appointed him to command the united Dánápúr and Kánhpúr divisions of the army, thus placing him in supreme military command of the country between the first of those stations and Lakhnao. Outram eagerly clutched at the offer. Like every true soldier, he was of opinion that "action, not counsel," was required. He started to assume his command the very day after he had been nominated to it, taking with him a mountain train of artillery, but no gunners to work it.

August.

Is appointed

to command

the force de tied to relieve

Lakhnao.

BOOK VII. Chapter III.

1857. August.

appointed to administer the central dis

tricts.

134

MR. GRANT SENT TO THE NORTH-WEST.

The day prior to Sir James Outram's nomination, Lord Canning, feeling the extreme inconvenience of leaving the civil divisions of Banáras, Mr. Grant is Alláhábád, Kánhpúr, and other outlying districts, without a supreme administrative officer to control them-the Lieutenant-Governor of the NorthWest Provinces being at the time shut up in A'gra-had given effect to a resolution at which he had arrived, to detach one of his councillors to Banaras to take up the lapsed authority in that part of India. His selection had fallen upon Mr. J. P. Grant. I have already alluded to this gentleman as the ablest member of the Council of the Governor-General. Mr. Grant was, indeed, a man of very remarkable ability. He had a clear and sound understanding, a quick and subtle brain, great independence, and great decision of character. If he had a fault it may have been that he did not always make sufficient allowance for men whose intellect was less vast and whose views were less sound than his own. He failed thus to rate at their full influence on the multitude. opinions firmly advocated by others, but which he knew to be untenable. His prescience came thus to be mistaken for dogmatic assertion, his keen insight for conceit. But this slight defect, arising from want of European training, was overborne by the powerful intellect, the high and lofty ideas of one of the greatest members of the Indian Civil Service.

The despatch of an administrative officer of the first order to the civil districts north of Bengal had been further rendered advisable by the action

of the Government of India at the very end of July. On the 31st of that month there appeared in the Official Gazette a resolution of the Governor-General in Council directing the course to be pursued in dealing with mutineers who might be captured or who might surrender to the authorities. This resolution was much criticised at the time, and in England as well as in India it was very generally condemned. After a lapse of twenty years it is, perhaps, possible to bring to its consideration a calm and unbiassed judgment.

The avowed object of the resolution was to Its object. prevent the civil officers of the country from hastily resorting to and carrying too far measures of severity against the revolted sepoys, some of whom might, possibly, have been unable to withstand the influence of their comrades; some might have endeavoured to protect their officers; some might have merely revolted without murdering their officers; and some might have simply taken their way to their homes on the general revolt of their regiment.

To carry out this object, it was ruled in the Its provisions resolution, first, that no native officer or soldier belonging to a regiment which had not mutinied should be punished, even as a deserter, unless he were found with arms in his hand. Such men, it was directed, should be made over to the military authorities, or, when such a step were impossible, should be kept in prison pending the orders of Government.

The second section provided for native officers and soldiers, being mutineers or deserters, belong

1857.

July 31.

BOOK VII. ing to regiments which had mutinied, but who Chapter III. had not murdered their officers. Such native officers and soldiers, when apprehended without arms in their possession, were to be sent to a certain fixed place, to be dealt with by the military authorities.

Objections made to it at the time.

The third section dealt with mutineers or deserters who belonged to regiments which had killed a European officer, or who had committed some sanguinary outrage. Such offenders were to be judged by the civil power. In the event, however, of extenuating circumstances transpiring, the case was to be reported to the Government before the carrying out of the sentence.

These were the three principal provisions of the resolution. In the remaining portion of it Lord Canning dwelt very much upon the evil certain to arise by continuing to punish indiscriminately after a district or division had been brought into order, and after a sufficient impression had been made upon the rebellious and the disorderly.

It was objected to this resolution that it was ill-timed; that, issued when the struggle was still undecided, when the enemy still held Dehli, when our countrymen were besieged in Lakhnao, on the morrow, as it were, of the massacres of Fathgarh and Kánhpúr, and whilst the fate of Bihár was trembling in the balance, it was calculated to encourage the rebels, to show them that, through fear of them, we were anxious to entice them back to their allegiance. It is possible that the strong dislike with which the resolution was regarded at the time was in a great measure attributable to