162 THE TROOPS AT ETA'WA' REvolt. Chapter I. 1857. May 19. enemy. BOOK VIII. temple showed Mr. Hume the strength of the position. The approach to it was thoroughly commanded by the carbines of the The inhabitants of the neighbouring village showed likewise a strong disposition to aid the troopers, for they not only opened communications with them, but sent them a supply of food and ammunition. To storm the temple by a front attack was dangerous, but it was the only possible course, unless the honour of the day were to be conceded to the troopers. This was not to be thought of, so Mr. Hume and Mr. Daniell, summoning the police to follow them, advanced boldly to the assault. But one man answered to their call. He was killed, Mr. Daniell was shot through the face, and Mr. Hume thought it then advisable to renounce an undertaking which never had a chance of success. Supporting his wounded friend, he gained his carriage, and returned to Etáwá. That night, the troopers, fearing lest a more formidable attack should be made upon them, evacuated their position. but unsuccessfully. The mutineers, how. ever, retire. The detach. ment at nies, May 23. The fourth day subsequent to this event the Etáwá, muti- detachment of the 9th Native Infantry at Etáwá mutinied. The ladies and children, accompanied by the civilian officers, and by some native officers who had remained staunch, retired in safety to Barpúra, a police station on the road to Gwáliár. Etáwá was sacked, the treasury was plundered, the prisoners were released from the jail, anarchy was inaugurated. The reign of terror, however, was not of long duration. On the evening of the 24th, a regiment of the Gwáliár contingent, the 1st BOOK VIII. Grenadiers, reached Barpúra. The following morning this regiment marched on Etáwá, and restored order. For the moment, British authority 1857. May 25. was again supreme, though no one dared conjecture but order is how soon or how late the restorer might become soon restored. the persecutor ! determines to bridge to the Whilst the spirit of disaffection was thus spread- Mr. Colvin ing from station to station Mr. Colvin was cherish- offer a golden ing the hope that even a majority of the sepoys well-disposed might still be amenable to reason. He believed sepoys. that whilst the ringleaders had deliberately set the Government at defiance, others had been induced to follow them solely by fear of the consequence of not following them; that to inaugurate a policy of general severity towards all, because of the misconduct of a few, would precipitate a general insurrection of the native army. But if, he argued, means of escape, by a proclamation. of pardon, should be opened to all who could properly be admitted to mercy, it would gladly be seized by those who had no heart in the business. Impressed with these views, which, it would appear, were shared by all about him, by soldiers as well as by civilians, Mr. Colvin, without awaiting the sanction, for which he applied, of the Supreme Government, issued, on the 25th Issues a proof May, a proclamation giving effect to the views giving effect just stated. He was catching at a straw, but, in to his views. the sea of difficulties in which he was struggling, there was positively nothing more tangible at which the hand could grasp! Mr. Colvin's proclamation was disapproved of, on several grounds, by the Government of India, clamation BOOK VIII. 1857. May 25. It has no effect. Events which followed on its issue. The Bharat. púr troops mutiny, 164 THE SEPOYS ANSWER THE PROCLAMATION. who substituted for it another of their own composition. There was really little substantial difference between the two, and both were useless. In point of fact, the time had not arrived to issue proclamations of pardon. Mr. Colvin's offer was well meant, but, though the proclamation was sown broad-cast over the province it failed to bring in a single penitent sepoy. The straw at which he had clutched crumbled in his hand. Mr. Colvin's proclamation was issued on the 25th of May. On the 30th, three companies of native infantry which happened to be at Mathurá, only thirty-five miles from A'gra, belonging to the two regiments stationed at A'gra, suddenly mutinied, shot down one officer, wounded another, plundered the treasury, fired the houses of the English, released the prisoners from the jail, and went off to Dehlí. This was the first practical answer given by the sepoys to Mr. Colvin's proclamation. But the Rájá of Bharatpúr had, as I have shown, despatched a detachment of his troops, under Captain Nixon, to aid the British at Mathura. When the three companies at that station mutinied on the 30th, the Bharatpúr detachment was occupying a position at Hódal, a small town lying between Mathurá and Dehlí, thirty-seven miles north of the former and only sixty from the latter. Being on the high road, it was the place of all others to be occupied with advantage by a body of men wishing to intercept troops marching from Mathurá on Dehlí. So at least reasoned, on the morning of the 31st, Mr. BOOK VIII. 1857. May 31. HOW THE ANSWER AFFECTED MR. COLVIN. 165 Harvey, the Commissioner of A'gra, who was with the Bharatpur troops; so reasoned Captain Chapter I. Nixon, who commanded them. A position was accordingly marked out and the troops were ordered to take it up. But here occurred an unexpected difficulty. The sepoys of the Rájá of Bharatpur not only refused to obey, but they warned the British officers to depart. The rebellion, then, was not confined to sepoys in British pay. It was becoming hourly more national. Remonstrances, threats, entreaties, were alike useless. It was not, however, until the guns were turned upon the group of some thirty Englishmen, who were present, that these yielded reluctantly to the mutineers. A few minutes after their departure, the shouts of the sepoys, and huge bonfires caused by the burning of their tents and the few bungalows built for Europeans, showed that the mutiny had been consummated. The officers escaped with difficulty and after many perils to Bharatpúr. The intelligence of the mutiny at Mathurá disturbed the calculations and destroyed the hopes of Mr. Colvin. That mutiny had been the act of the men whom he had harangued on the 14th, and amongst whom his proclamation had been most freely circulated. It had been their own unadulterated work; conceived by their own brains, neither prompted from outside, nor produced by contact with other regiments. It became evident then, even to Mr. Colvin, that other means than those which he had employed and drive British away their officers. Effects of the mutiny at 166 HE RESOLVES TO DISARM THE SEPOYS. Book VIII. 1857. May 31. He resolves to disarm the A'gra bri gade. would be necessary to put down "this daring mutiny." The intelligence of the mutiny at Mathurá reached Mr. Colvin at midnight of the same day on which it occurred. The bearer of it was Mr. Drummond, the magistrate. At the time when the first "general council" was held at A'gra Mr. Drummond had been of opinion that the disaffection was partial, and that our policy should be to appear to trust everyone. It was Mr. Drummond who had most strenuously opposed Mr. Colvin's policy of retiring within the fort. But Mr. Drummond's views were altered now. Far from endeavouring to restrain the action of the Lieutenant-Governor he had now to stimulate it. Mr. Drummond, then, when he woke Mr. Colvin with the news of the Mathurá disaster, pointed out to him the necessity it had created of at once disarming the regiments at A'gra. And when Mr. Colvin, only half-convinced, seemed inclined to hesitate, the magistrate called attention to the fact that any sudden outbreak on the part of the sepoys would probably result in the liberation of the prisoners from the jail, with its consequent disorder and possible disaster. Then Mr. Colvin hesitated no longer. The order was at once issued for a general parade the following morning. At dawn of day on the 31st of May the troops were drawn up on the A'gra parade-ground. There was Captain D'Oyley's battery, the 3rd Europeans, and the two native regiments—these so posted as to be under the fire of the Euro |