BOOK VIII. Chapter III. 1857. July 1. It is clear that he protected European fugi. tives, at the risk of his life. His further conduct on the day of the mutiny. 232 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF HOLKAR. the theory that he had lost control over his troops, and that they acted without his orders and in spite of him. It is, too, in my opinion, clearly made out that the Mahárájá, on the day following the assault, refused the threatening demands of the mutineers from Máu to deliver up the Europeans and other Christians who had taken refuge in his palace.* He states himself that he offered to them his own person rather than the heads of those under his protection. It may be said that this proves only that Holkar had not fully decided to go against us, that he was aware that the European battery held Máu. But in judging his conduct as a person accused of complicity with the mutineers this action is a strong point in his favour. Another point, not less strong, perhaps even stronger, is the fact, that on the 1st of July, the very day of the mutiny, Holkar sent in to Máu, by the hands of Ganpat Rao, his agent at the Residency, a letter addressed to Colonel Platt to inform him of the mutiny, and stating that his own troops had refused to act against the mutineers. On the same day he wrote also to the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, telling him of what had occurred. He wrote also that evening to Durand, protesting his innocence, and begging that the march of General Woodburn's force might be hastened as much as possible. It deserves further to be stated that none of the The members influential members of the Darbár, none of of his Darbár * This protection was ac- peans, seven Eurasians, and knowledged by three Euro- some native Christians. DURAND'S DISTRUST AT THE TIME JUSTIFIED. 233 the Mahárájá's kinsmen or associates, joined in BOOK VIII. the attack on the Residency. Looking at the question as a whole, I am Chapter III. 1857. July 1. sion must be of opinion that Holkar was free from com- are free from plicity with the mutineers; that his soldiers had complicity. slipped out of his hands; that his presence The deci amongst them on the 1st of July would have been favourable misinterpreted; and that subsequently he did his to Holkar. best to serve the British interests. But it must be admitted that, at the time, his conduct bore a very suspicious appearance. It must not be forgotten that, although Durand sent him a letter by the hands of a messenger, that messenger never appeared at the Palace; that his own troops, led by his own officer, Bans Gopál, attacked the Residency; that Durand had reason to believe that his retreat on Mandlésar was prevented by the occupation by Holkar's troops of the Simrol pass. These circumstances could not but seem most suspicious to the Agent on the spot, thus attacked and thwarted. Whilst, then, Holkar must be acquitted of complicity Though the facts justified with the rebels, the conduct of Durand in re- the conduct fusing to hold confidential intercourse with him of Durand at until the Government of India should clear him from the suspicions attaching to his conduct must be upheld and justified. the time. It is time now to turn to Máu. Colonel Máu. Durand's letter to Colonel Platt, the commandant of the 23rd Native Infantry and of the station, despatched from Indúr at a quarter to 9, reached Colonel Platt about 10 o'clock. Colonel Platt Captain instantly gave orders to Captain Hungerford, battery, Hungerford's 1857. July 1. leaves at noon. 234 CAPTAIN HUNGERFORD'S BATTERY. BOOK VIII. commanding the battery, to set out for the relief Chapter III. of the Residency at Indúr. The battery,—why, has not been explained,—was not ready to leave Máu before noon. It then advanced on the Indúr road at a trot. It had reached the village of Rao, half-way between the two stations,* when Captain Hungerford Hungerford learned that Colonel Durand and the British residents had left Indúr, and had not taken the road to Máu. Hungerford at once turned about, and galloped or cantered back to Máu, arriving there at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.t hears of the evacuation, and returns. Futility of its proceeding further. It is clear from this statement that Captain Hungerford's battery could not have reached Indúr, if it had continued the journey at the rate at which it was going, before 3 P.M.-equally clear from the narrative I have given of the events at Indúr, that Colonel Durand and the garrison could not have held out for the four and a half hours which would have elapsed between his departure and the arrival of Captain Hungerford. Further, it is tolerably certain that Captain Hungerford's battery, arriving at any hour after the complete investment of the Residency, driven by native drivers, unsupported by cavalry or infantry, would have been unable to hold its own against the large force of all arms, which it would have found at Indúr. However, Captain Hungerford The same evening he took his returned to Máu. The troops at battery within the fort. Máu mutiny. *Major Evans Bell speaks of the distance between the Residency and Indúr as being ten miles. It is so now by the new road. But by the That night, the regular road which existed in 1857, it was more nearly fourteen than thirteen miles. + Colonel Durand to Lord Canning's Private Secretary. troops in Máu, in conformity with the arrangement made with their brethren in the service of Holkar, broke out into revolt. They began, as usual, by firing the mess-house. Their colonel, Colonel Platt, and their adjutant, Captain Fagan, having gone down to the lines to reason with them, they shot them both dead. The cavalry troopers, likewise, killed their commandant, Major Harris. The other officers escaped with their lives. BOOK VIII. Chapter III. 1857. July 1. drives the On the first sound of the mutiny, Colonel Platt Hungerford had called upon Captain Hungerford to turn out mutineers with his battery. Captain Hungerford proceeded from Máu, to respond to the call, but by the time he arrived on the parade-ground the mischief had been done and no enemy was to be seen. Nothing fell upon his vision but the blazing bungalows till then occupied by the officers. In this perplexity Hungerford directed fire to be opened on the lines. Then poured forth the sepoys, liberated from restraint. They pushed on to Indúr, effected a junction with the mutineers at that place, and subsequently made their way to Dehlí. Hungerford then held the chief authority at the station. Occupying the fort which commands the military road from Bombay and the low country to the highlands of Central India, he was able to render excellent service. During the absence of Durand, he assumed the post of representative of the Government of India at the court of Holkar. The real authority, however, still remained with Durand whose course I now propose to follow. and assumes Central In charge of the dian Agency. BOOK VIII. Chapter III. 1857. July 1. The evacuation of the Residency. Consider ations regard. Insurmountable diffi culties in the way of a re treat on Máu, 236 WHY DURAND DID NOT RETREAT ON MA'C. We left Durand with the garrison, the women, and children, evacuating the Residency at halfpast 10, on the memorable 1st of July. Travers made a last effort to induce the infantry of the two Contingents to make but one charge. These men, however, had by this time become so infused with the mutinous spirit that the attempt proved dangerous and useless. He managed, however, to collect the greater portion of the Bhopál cavalry, and though these refused to charge, they assumed an attitude sufficiently threatening to prevent pursuit. The next point to be considered was the direction in which they were to retire. The natural line of retreat was on Máu. By that road alone was it likely that assistance could come. A letter had been despatched for that assistance at a quarter to 9. That letter could scarcely have reached Colonel Platt before 10. It was just possible that Hungerford might be starting. But it was equally possible, and more probable, that the letter might not have reached Máu. At a time when the native cavalry all over India were falling away by hundreds, it would have been hazardous to carry out a military manœuvre, the safe execution of which depended on the fidelity of one solitary trooper. Still in war something must be risked, and Durand and Travers were alike prepared to accept the chance that Hungerford had started to meet them. But there was an insurmountable diffi culty to the retreat on Máu. In my description of the Residency, I have shown that the road *In point of fact he did not leave Máu till noon. |