THE ENEMY'S PURSUIT IS CHECKED. 427 our little BOOK IX. Chapter II. 1857. June 30. Gúmtí. Immediately after crossing the Kúkrail bridge Sir Henry Lawrence made over the command to Colonel Inglis, and, followed by his staff officer, Captain Wilson, and by his secretary, Mr. Couper, -who, acting throughout the day as his aide-decamp, had displayed equal coolness and courage again at the galloped, unattended by any escort, through the city to the Residency. Arriving there, Sir Henry ordered out fifty men of the 32nd, under an officer, Lieutenant Edmonstone, to the iron bridge over the Gúmtí, in view to their being posted in the two houses on either side of the bridge, to defend it. Towards this bridge the elated enemy surged in crowds, but they never forced it. The fifty Englishmen, covered by a fire from two 18pounders in the Redan battery, held it successfully, though not without loss, till noon. The enemy then desisted, and crossed the river by another bridge. Our men were then finally withdrawn. This defence was a very gallant affair. That the loss of the battle of Chinhat should precipitate the crisis was certain. But the crisis * These two field-pieces Bonham of the Artillery to were, however, spiked by save the howitzer would Captain Wilson, the Assist- most assuredly, had Sir ant Adjutant-General, before Henry Lawrence lived, have they were left. The heroic gained for that officer the efforts made by Lieutenant Victoria Cross. Advantages derived by the loss of the battle. BOOK IX. Chapter II. 1857. June 30. Calmness in combat of Sir Henry. The Machhí Báwan is abandoned. 428 THE DECISION TO FIGHT VINDICATED. would have equally come had there been no battle. And the battle, unfortunate in its immediate results though it proved to be, had at least this advantage, it removed from Sir Henry's mind. any doubt he might have had as to his ability to hold two positions. Brigadier Inglis states, in his despatch, that, had both posts been held, both must have fallen; and he ascribes the concentration of the troops on the better position of the two to Chinhat. Of the behaviour of Sir Henry Lawrence on that day but one opinion has been recorded. That opinion is ably summarised in the record of a gallant soldier, the Assistant AdjutantGeneral throughout the siege. "Throughout that terrible day, during the conflict," records Captain Wilson, "and when all was lost, and retreat became all but a rout, and men were falling fast, he displayed the utmost calmness and decision; and as, with hat in hand, he sat on his horse on the Kúkrail bridge, rallying our men for a last stand, himself a distinct mark for the enemy's skirmishers, he seemed to bear a charmed life." The first consequence of the defeat was the occupation of the city by the rebels and the uprising of the discontented spirits within it. That very night they began to loop-hole many of the houses in the vicinity of and commanding the Machhí Báwan and the Residency. The following morning they opened a heavy musketry fire upon both. Sir Henry had foreseen this action and had prepared for it. Resolved to con THE MACHHI BA'WAN EVAcuated. 429 centrate all his defensive efforts on the Residency he signalled the following night to the garrison of the Machhí Báwan to evacuate and blow up that fortress. These orders were admirably carried out by Captain Francis, 13th Native Infantry, then commanding at that post. A quarter of an hour past midnight the garrison of the Machhí Báwan entered the Residency with their guns and treasure, without the loss of a man. Shortly afterwards the explosion of two hundred and forty barrels of gunpowder and of five hundred and ninety-four thousand rounds of ball and gun ammunition announced the complete destruction of that post. A singularly good fortune attended the time chosen for this operation. The enemy had determined, before they commenced in earnest to besiege the Residency, to devote a preliminary night to the plunder of the shops of the town. They were engaged in this congenial work when the explosion of the Machhí Báwan signified to them that they had missed a great chance. BOOK IX. Chapter II. 1857. July 1. The time for the evacua tion fortu nately chosen. The troops of the garrison, consisting of nine The garrison. hundred and twenty-seven Europeans* and seven hundred and sixty-five natives, were now concentrated in the Residency. To all appearances the situation was desperate. Not only were the The weakfortifications incomplete, but the enemy had at defences. once occupied and loop-holed the houses which had been left standing outside and close to those These were composed as officers, not with English regifollows:-32nd Foot, 535; ments or Artillery, 100; Civil 84th Foot, 50; Artillery, 89; and Uncovenanted, 153. ness of the 430 THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENCES. BOOK IX. Chapter II. 1857. July 2. The mode in which they might have fortifications. The west and south faces of the enclosure were practically undefended, the bastion which had been commenced at the angle of the two faces having been left unfinished. Looking at the weakness of our resources and the comparative numbers of the besiegers and the besieged it is not wonderful that Sir Henry himself, at the first moment, scarcely expected to hold out, without relief, for more than ten or fifteen days.* And if the enemy had possessed as leader a real soldier, such was the advantage of their been forced. position, so great was their superiority in point of numbers, it is possible that the earlier forebodings of Sir Henry might have been realised. A general who would have freely sacrificed his men, and whose men would not have flinched from his summons, might well have taken advantage of the disaster of Chinhat. The Residency was not, in a military sense, defensible, and must have succumbed to the determined onslaught of determined men, vastly superior in numbers to the garrison. Comparison between the Asiatic soldier. But it is a remarkable fact that the mutiny English and produced no general amongst the mutineers— not a single man who understood the importance of time, of opportunity, of dash, in war. It is, too, worthy to be noted, that whilst no men in the world have a greater contempt of death than the natives of India, they yet almost always shrink from a hand to hand encounter with Europeans. Still more are they averse from an attack on a fortified position defended by Europeans. If carelessness His letter to General Havelock, dated 30th of June. THE ENGLISH AND ASIATIC. SOLDIER. 431 of life be courage no people in the world are braver than the natives of India. But the courage which is required to make a man a real soldier is something more than mere carelessness of life. Such a man must be anxious to affront death, to court it. He must be indifferent to pain; must be capable of enjoying the delirium of battle; must be animated by a love of glory, and above all by a confidence in his superiority to his enemy. None of these qualities are possessed by the native soldier to the same extent as by our own countrymen; whilst, with respect to the last, it is conspicuous by its absence. Perhaps it is mainly because the native soldier opposed to the British soldier, far from feeling the confidence I have referred to, is imbued with the conviction of the enormous superiority of his enemy, that his moral nature is cowed, and he cannot fight him as he can and does fight a fellow Asiatic. BOOK IX. Chapter II. 1857. July 2. Certainly in the case of Lakhnao this moral power was a strong factor on the side of the British. There they were, few in numbers, occupying a position, not, in a military sense, defensible; two sides of it, indeed, practically undefended. To attack them came an army enormously superior in numbers, flushed with victory, and occupying positions which commanded a great portion of the defences. To all appearance Effect of the victory of the attacking party was assured. morale of the It was not gained, simply because the inferior English. moral nature of the Asiatic, shrinking involuntarily from actual contact with the European the superior |