offensive weapon, called a pistol, with a felonious intent to rob him. It appeared in evidence that the prisoners rushed out of a hedge on the prosecutor, the driver of a returned chaise, as he was passing along the road; and one of them presenting a pistol to him bid him stop, which the boy did, but called out for assistance to some persons whom he had met just before. On this one of the prisoners threatened to blow out his brains if he called out any more, which the prosecutor nevertheless continued to do; and presently he obtained assistance and took the men who had made no demand of money. They were convicted and transported. So in R. v. Sharwin, Oakham Sum. Ass. 1785. The prisoner was indicted for having with force and arms, with a certain offensive weapon called a wooden staff, unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously made an assault on J. Gough, with a felonious intent to rob him, against the statute, &c. It appeared that while Gough and one Jenkinson were riding together on the highway, Gough received a violent blow from a great stone which was thrown by the prisoner from the hedge. Going towards the spot, Gough asked him how he could be such a villain as to throw the stone; on which the prisoner threatened Gough, and struck him violently with a staff; but at length he was overcome and secured. The prisoner's face was blacked, and he denied his name: but on being afterwards questioned as to his motive, he said he was very poor, and wanted half-a-guinea to pay his brewer. He did not ask for money or goods. After conviction, the question was submitted to the judges, whether this evidence were sufficient to maintain the charge in the indictment? In Michaelmas term following the judges (ten being present) held the conviction proper, for here the weapon laid in the indictment and the weapon proved produce the same sort of mischief, namely, by blows and bruises; and this description would have been sufficient upon an indictment for murder. From the two preceding cases it appears that the offence may be complete within the former part of the first section of the act, though there be no demand of money or goods, notwithstanding a prior case of R. v. Parfait, which was supposed to establish a R. v. Parfait, contrary rule. And on adverting to the statute, it is evident O. B. Dec. that the felonious intent to rob may be manifested, either by the offender making a malicious assault on the prosecutor with an offensive weapon or instrument, without also demanding money, or by his demanding money by menaces or in a violent manner, &c. Or by menaces, &c.] The indictment in the case of R. v. Jack son and Randall charged, that the prisoners unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously made an assault on A. Gillespie, and him the said A. G. unlawfully and maliciously did menace, by menacing to blow his brains out, with a felonious intent the monies of the said A. G. from his person and against his will feloniously to steal, take, and carry away, against the statute, &c. The Recorder thought the indictment insufficient: but the prisoner was convicted; and on a reference to the judges, they held that the indictment should either have stated that the assault was made with an offensive weapon, Or that a demand was made. So in the case of Remnant, who was committed, for "that with 1748. 1 East's P. C. 416. R. v. Jackson and Randall. O. B. April, 1783. 1 East's P. C. 419. R. v. Remnant, 5 T. R. 169. Pegge's Case. 1789. cor. Thomson B. 420. force and arms he made an assault on the prosecutor with intent feloniously to steal, take, and carry away from his person, &c." The court of King's Bench ordered that he should be bailed, being of opinion that this was not a charge of any offence within the statute. Demand any money.] From the two cases before mentioned, R. v. Trusty, and R. v. Sharwin, it appears that where the offence consists in making the assault with intent to rob, it is not necessary that there should be any demand of money. In the case of R. v. Pegge the indictment charged that the prisoner with a certain offensive weapon or instrument called a stick in and upon J. R. feloniously did make an assault, and did then and there in a forcible and violent manner feloniously de1 East's P. C. mand the goods, &c. of him the said J. R. with a felonious intent to rob him, &c. and his goods, &c. from his person and against his will feloniously to steal, take, and carry away, against the statute. The prisoner was convicted on clear evidence of the fact to support the charge. But the words of the statute not being pursued in that part of the indictment which charged the prisoner with assaulting the prosecutor with an offensive weapon, it not being said to be done unlawfully and maliciously, judgment was respited that the opinion of the judges might be taken upon it: In Trinity term 1789 they held the conviction right, the statute being in the disjunctive, and an offence well charged within the act in the latter part of the indictment without the words unlawfully and maliciously. Intent to rob. Monteth's case. 420. 2 Leach, 702. Killing a per to rob. From the above it seems to be admitted, that where the assault is the only offence charged within the act, it must be stated to be done unlawfully and maliciously as well as feloniously; and that where the offence is that of demanding money, &c. by menaces or in a violent manner, the word "feloniously" is sufficient without the others "unlawfully and maliciously." Intent to rob.] This intent must be alleged in the indictment. Therefore where the indictment only charged that the prisoner with force and arms, i. e. with a certain offensive weapon, &c. unlawfully, maliciously, and feloniously made an assault on W. the prosecutor, "with a felonious intent the goods, chattels, and monies of him the said W. from the person and against the will of the said W. then and there feloniously to steal, take, and carry away," &c., the Court held that this was not a sufficient description of the offence within the statute, namely, an attempt to rob, which always includes force and violence. The prisoner was accordingly discharged from this indictment and tried upon a new one, in which the assault was alleged to be "with a felonious intent the monies of the said W. from the person and against the will of the said W. then and there feloniously and violently to steal, take, and carry away, &c. ;" and on this indictment he was convicted. By 24 H. 8. c. 5. If any person be indicted, or appealed, for son attempting killing any person attempting to rob, he shall be acquitted. III. Levying Hue and Cry on a Robbery committed. By 13 Ed. 1. st. 2. c. 1. Immediately upon robberies committed, fresh suit shall be made from town to town, and from county to county. 13 Ed. 1. st. 2. How hue and cry shall be made, see Vol. II. tit. Hue and Cry. IV. Hundred when liable to answer Damages. [For the statutes on this subject, see tit. Hundred, Vol. II.] By 13 Ed. 1. st. 2. c. 2. 28 Ed. 3. c. 11. The hundred where Hundred shall the offence was committed, shall be answerable for the robberies answer. and for the damages, if the offender be not taken. But by 27 Eliz. c. 13. § 2. Such hundred may recover half the damages from any other hundred where fresh suit after hue and cry shall not be made. And by 8 G. 2. c. 16. § 3. The hundred shall not be chargeable, if one robber be apprehended in 40 days from the publication in the Gazette; as is hereafter mentioned. A new highway changed for an ancient one without legal authority, is said not to be such a highway in which the inhabitants are bound to watch, nor to make amends for a robbery therein committed. 1 Haw. c. 76. § 3. Likewise by 29 C. 2. c. 7. § 7. If any person, which shall travel upon the Lord's day, shall be then robbed, the hundred shall not be liable: nevertheless they shall make hue and cry, on pain of forfeiting to the king as much as might have been recovered against the hundred, if the robbery had not been on the Lord's day. Which shall travel.] Tashmaker v. the Hundred of Edmonton, 1 Str. 406. Com. 345. The plaintiff lived a mile or two from the church, and going thither with his lady in his coach upon a Sunday was robbed; and he brought his action against the hundred, and recovered; for the statute extends only to the case of travelling: But Pratt Ch. J. said if they had been going to make visits, it might have been otherwise. Also, if any man be robbed in his house, the hundred shall not be charged therewith, whether it be done by day or night; because every man's house is his castle, which he ought to defend; and if any one be robbed in his house, it shall be esteemed his own fault. Dalt. c. 84. Hundred neg. lecting hue and cry, shall contribute. Hundred not answerable, if robber is appre hended. Except when going to church. Nor if it be in an house. Also a robbery done in the night shall not charge the hundred; Nor if it be in but yet if it be in the day-time, or there be so much day-light as the night. that one may see a man's face, so that the robber may be known, though it be before the sun-rising or after the sun-setting, the hundred shall answer for it. Dalt. c. 84. By the 22 G. 2. c. 24. No person shall recover against the hundred more than the value of 2001. unless the persons robbed shall at the time of the robbery be together in company, and be in number two at the least, to attest the truth of his or their being so robbed. 22 G. 2. c. 24. In what case there must be two in com pany. And by the yearly land tax acts, no receiver-general, or any of In what case his agents employed for carrying any money on account of the three in comsaid tax, shall maintain an action against the hundred for being pany. robbed, unless the persons carrying such money be together in company, and be in number three at the least. V. Manner of bringing the Action against the Hundred. [For the statutes on this subject, see Vol. II. title Hundred.] In order to make the hundred liable, these things following must be done; 27 Eliz. c. 15. Notice to the inhabitants. Cro. Car. 41. 379. 3 Salk. 184. 8 G. 2. c. 16. stable. By 27 Eliz. c. 13. § 11. The person robbed shall with as much convenient speed as may be, give notice thereof unto some of the inhabitants near the place. And though that place, where notice is given, be in another hundred or county, yet it is good enough; for a stranger may not know the confines of the hundred or county; and that hundred where notice is given must make hue and cry, and by that means the hundred where the robbery was committed will soon know thereof. By 8 Geo. 2. c. 16. § 1. He shall also give notice, with as much Notice to a con- convenient speed as may be, to a constable of the hundred, that is, the high constable or to a constable of some place near; or leave notice in writing at his house, describing therein the felon, and the time and place of the robbery. What is a good Bull. N. P. 8 G. 2. c. 16. Notice in the gazette. Ball v. the Hundred of Wymersley, 2 Str. 1170. Upon a case made at the assizes, it was stated that soon after six in the morning the plaintiff was robbed at two miles and a half distance from Northampton, and the highwayman cut his bridle and stirrups, threw them into a ditch, and turned his horse loose; that the plaintiff recovered them, remounted, rode through a village called Cotton, where he gave no notice, met three men on the road, whom he informed of the robbery, and arrived at Northampton by seven o'clock, and gave notice to an innkeeper there, from whence he went to Rotherthorpe, three miles off, where the high constable lived, and between eight and nine gave notice. And whether this notice was sufficient to maintain the action, was the question. And the Court, on argument, held it to be good notice, for the high constable is the properest person to go to, and it is not required that he go to the next constable. It appears that the plaintiff lost no time, considering the circumstances he was in; and Rotherthorpe is not at such a distance, but that it may come within the meaning of the word near. So the plaintiff had judg ment. By 8 Geo. 2. c. 16. § 11. 12. Every constable to whom such notice shall be given, and every high and petty constable within the hundred, as soon as the same shall come to his knowledge, by the party robbed, or by any to whom such notice hath been given, shall, with the utmost expedition, make or cause to be made fresh suit and hue and cry after the felons, on pain of 57, with full costs, half to the king, and half to him who shall sue in six months. Note; the penalty here is but small; but as the not pursuing hue and cry was also an offence at the common law, the offender may he indicted at the common law, and thereupon fined and impri soned. § 1. The party robbed shall also within twenty days cause notice to be given in the gazette, describing therein the felon, and the time and place of the robbery, and the goods and effects whereof he was robbed. Describing therein the felon.] Whitworth v. the Hundred of Grimshoe, 2 Wils. 109. The plaintiff, Whitworth, on the trial at the assizes, gave evidence that one of the robbers was tall and lusty, had on a brown woollen cap or bonnet, and a blue jacket, was of a fresh complexion, had particular large red eye-brows, and full ruddy cheeks, by either of which the plaintiff thought he could have known the robber from any other person. The notice in the gazette was, that the robber was a "tall lusty man, of a fresh complexion, had on a brown woollen cap or bonnet, and a blue jacket." It was objected, that this description in the gazette was insufficient, a very material circumstance, as to the eye-brows and countenance, being omitted. And of that opinion was the Court; and the defendant had judgment. on oath. By 27 Eliz. c. 13. § 11. He shall also be examined on oath within 27 Eliz. c. 13. twenty days next before the action brought before a justice in or near To be examined the hundred, whether he knows any of the robbers; and if he confesses that he does, he shall, before the action brought, be bound over by the said justice effectually to prosecute the person or persons so known to have committed the said robbery. He shall also be examined.] That is, the party robbed, who is to bring the action, shall be examined. But here note a diversity. Raymond v. the hundred of Oking, Cro. Car. 37. The servant was robbed of his master's goods, and the servant made oath before a justice, and the master brought the action against the hundred. By the Court: the action well lies for the master; and the servant's oath is sufficient, for it was properly in his notice that he was robbed, and did not know any of the robbers, and the master knows it not that he was robbed, or who were the persons, but by report of his servant; and it would be inconvenient, if the master should not bring the action, but the servant only; for the servant might release, or compound, or discontinue the suit, and so the master should have the loss by his falsehood; therefore the master shall bring the action, and have his servant who was robbed to be his witness. Within twenty days next before.] The time of making such 3 Salk. 184. oath must be laid in the declaration; for that is traversable. Before a justice.] And if the justice shall refuse upon his re- Cro. Car. 211, quest to examine him, an action will lie against the justice, because he doth not act therein as a judge of record, but as a minister appointed for the examination by the statute. good reason to suspect that the fact was done by A. and B." is an insufficient affidavit in an action against the hundred under 9 G. 1. c. 22. Whether he know any of the robbers.] William King v. the "That he hath Hundred of Bishop's Sutton, 2 Str. 1247. In an action brought against the hundred, the oath proved was, that he had good reason to suspect the fact was done by Robert Gibbs and William Langford, both of such a parish. And a doubt arising at the assizes, whether this were sufficient or not, a case was made, and twice argued at the bar. And upon the second argument, the Court were of opinion that the examination did not maintain the action. The oath required is a condition precedent, and for the sake of the hundred, and to prevent screening the offenders. There is a great deal of difference between suspecting and knowing: a man who knows the offender may purposely stop at the word suspect; to avoid being bound to prosecute: and though it would be equivocating, yet it would hardly be perjury assignable; it being only a suppression of part of the truth. He should have said, I suspect them to be the men, but I do not know it. It would be dangerous to let them go out of the words of the act, and therefore the plaintiff failed in the action, and paid the costs of a nonsuit. Also, by 8 Geo. 2. c. 16. § 1. Before the action be commenced, he shall go before the chief clerk, or secondary, or the filazer of the county, or the clerk of the pleas of that court wherein such |