A. D. 1316,

recovering the national fortresses from the English. This may have been owing to the inadequacy of the Scots public finances for incurring the expence of constructing the machinery necessary to force an entry into strong fortifications. Accordingly, no means appear to have been adopted on the present occasion, for getting possession of Carrickfergus castle by force of arms; a rigid blockade seems alone to have been employed.

Although unable, immediately after their 10 April. repeated defeats, to collect a sufficient army in the field, to attempt raising the siege, a considerable body of troops, under the command of Thomas lord Mandeville, hastened to its relief, and found means to enter the castle in safety. According to Barbour, a truce had been entered into between Bruce and the garrison, commenceing upon Palm Sunday, 4th of April, and to continue until the Tuesday after Easter, that the hostile troops might have an opportunity to employ the holy season of Easter in penance and devotion *. It has been formerly mentioned, that Easter day that year fell upon the 11th of April, consequently the truce or armistice

• Barbour, XV. 101-104.

A. D. 1316. 10 April.

ought to have subsisted until the 13th of that month, Whether the admission of these succours were considered as an infraction of the truce, does not appear; but the subsequent attack by Mandeville on the besiegers, during its subsistance, is stigmatized by Barbour, as a flagrant breach of good faith, and a most impious infraction of a truce entered into for holy purposes. It is affirmed by Barbour, that these succours under Mandeville got into the castle on Easter-eve, or Saturday the 10th of April, as already stated; and he adds, that they came by sea from Dublin in fifteen vessels, and consisted of four thousand men *. This number is incredibly large for the purpose of reinforcing the garrison of a castle in those days; and is more likely to have been only four hundred, augmented ten-fold by mistaken transcription, or erroneous recital.

The success of Mandeville, in getting into the castle, with this reinforcement, unopposed by the Scots army, was most probably owing to a relaxation of discipline in the beseigers, in consequence of the truce. Yet it is not easy to account for the apparent continuance of that inattention after the arrival of the

Barb. XV. 105-112.

succours, which seems to have been the case from the events of the succeeding day, to be immediately noticed. It is not to be supposed that so large a reinforcement could have got into the castle unobserved; and it surely was an instance of extreme disregard to the security of his troops, in Edward Bruce, that only sixty men appear to have been appointed by him, as the regular guard, on the night immediately succeeding the arrival of Mandeville*. Bruce ought to have learnt a better lesson from the discomfiture of Methven, than to have confided the safety of his army, and the cause in which he was engaged, to the weak ties of a point of honour. True bravery does not less consist in prudent foresight, and wise precautions against approaching or possible danger, than in meeting it with undaunted courage when it arrives. In the latter quality, Edward Bruce appears to have been complete; but in the former qualification of a consummate warrior, he seems to have been often extremely defective.

A. D. 1316. 10 April.

Observing the careless security of the Scots 11 April, cantonments in the town of Carrickfergus, VOL. II.

E

Barb. XV. 129.

1316.

A. D. and notwithstanding the truce, which he per14 April, haps considered as binding only on the ori

ginal garrison, by whom it had been agreed to, Mandeville resolved to attempt beating up the Scots quarters. Accordingly, early in the morning immediately after his arrival, he made a desperate sally from the castle, at the head of all the troops which he had conducted for its succour. The only guard of the Scots in readiness to oppose this enterprise, consisted of sixty chosen men under the command of Neil Fleming, who seems to have been posted in the principal street of the town, leading directly to the main-gate of the

Considering that the Scots army, thus unexpectedly assailed, might be totally routed, unless time were gained for its being armed and arrayed, Fleming generously resolved to devote himself and his companions to almost inevitable destruction, for the preservation of the rest of the army. He immediately drew up his men to the best advantage for making a resolute and firm defence; and, having dispatched a messenger to communicate the alarm to Edward Bruce, he addressed his small but gallant band, in the following emphatic manner: "Now shall all "men see who of us dares to die for his lord. "Bear yourselves therefore manfully, for I

am resolved to fight against this great "odds, that our general may have time to " arm and come to our assistance *." Fleming accordingly resisted the assault of Mandeville and checked him for sometime: But, in the unequal contest, he and all his men were at length slain, after having sold their lives dear, both by a considerable slaughter of the assailants, and by gaining much precious time for the Scots army to get into

order.

Elated by this first success, Mandeville sent off two detachments, with orders to march along the skirts of the town on both sides, to prevent the escape of the Scots, while he proceeded along the principal street with the main force of his troops, towards the head quarters of Edward Bruce; fondiy imagining that the final issue of his enterprise was to be equally fortunate with this first effort of his arms. But so much time had been expended in the encounter with Fleming, that the Scots, now alarmed, were assembling in all haste from their quarters to their alarm posts; Mandeville was soon encountered by

E2

• Barb. XV. 139-144.

A. D. 1316. 11 April.