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whole society. I say, that such a state of things might exist, but it is manifest that it is not essential to society; and that, being not essential, it is by no means to be sumed; and that it cannot exist justly, unless this right have been expressly conceded by the individual to society. If society exert such a power when it has not been expressly conceded to it, it is tyranny. The common fact has been, that society has presumed upon such powers, and has exercised them without reflection, and very greatly to social and individual injury.

3. Men have very generally been disposed to take for granted these accidental powers, and to question or limit the essential powers of society. An instance in point occurs in the question of war. The very idea of war supposes the society to have the right of determining the moral relations in which the individuals of one nation shall stand to the individuals of another nation. Now, this power of society over the individual has never, that I know of, been questioned. And yet, I think it would be very difficult to establish it. The moral precept is, "If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink." And I do not see that society has a right to abrogate this command, or to render void this obligation; or that any moral agent has the right to commit to other individuals the power of changing his moral relations to any creature of God. giveness and charity to men are dispositions which we owe to God. And I do not see that society has any more right to interfere with the manifestation of these dispositions, than with the liberty to inculcate them and to teach them.

For

To conclude. Whatever concessions on the part of the individual, and whatever powers on the part of society, are necessary to the existence of society, must, by the very fact of the existence of society, be taken for granted. Whatever is not thus necessary is a matter of concession and mutual adjustment; and has no right to be presumed, unless it can be shown to have actually been surrendered. That is, in general, a man is bound by what he has agreed to; but he is not bound by any thing else.

I think no one can reflect upon the above considerations without being led to the conclusion, that the cultivation of

the moral nature of man is the grand means for the im provement of society. This alone teaches man, whether as an individual or as a society, to respect the rights of man, as an individual or as a society. This teaches every one to observe inviolate the contract into which, as a member of society, he has entered. Now, since, as we have before shown, the light of conscience and the dictates of natural religion are insufficient to exert the requisite moral power over man, our only hope is in that revelation of his will which God has made in the Holy Scriptures. In these books we are taught that all our duties to man are taken under the immediate protection of Almighty God. On pain of his eternal displeasure, he commands us to love every man as ourselves. Here he holds forth the strongest inducements to obedience, and here he presents the strongest motives, not merely to reciprocity, but also to benevolence. It is lamentable to hear the levity with which some politicians, and, as they would persuade us to believe them to be, statesmen, speak of the religion of Jesus Christ; to observe how complacently they talk of using it as an instrument, convenient enough for directing the weak, but which a man of sense can well enough do without; and which is a mere appendage to the forces that, by his constitution, are destined to act upon man. A more profound acquaintance with the moral and social nature of man, would, as it seems to me, work a very important change in their views of this subject.

CHAPTER SECOND.

OF THE MODE IN WHICH THE OBJECTS OF SOCIETY ARE ACCOMPLISHED.

We have thus far treated merely of the constitution of a society, of the contract entered into between the individual and society, and of the obligations hence devolving upon each. The obligations of society are to protect the individual from infractions of the law of reciprocity, and to redress his wrongs if he have been injured.

But it is manifest that this obligation cannot be discharged by the whole of society as a body. If a man steal from his neighbor, the whole community cannot leave their occupations, to detect, to try, and to punish the thief. Or, if a law is to be enacted respecting the punishment of theft, it cannot be done by the whole community, but must of necessity be intrusted to delegates. On the principle of division of labor, it is manifest that this service will be both more cheaply and more perfectly done, by those who devote themselves to it, than by those who are, for the greater part of the time, engaged in other occupations.

Now I suppose a government to be that system of delegated agencies, by which these obligations of society to the individual are fulfilled.

And, moreover, as every society may have various engagements to form with other independent societies, it is convenient, in general, that this business should be transacted by this same system of agencies. These two offices of government, though generally united, are in their nature distinct. Thus we see, in our own country, the State Governments are, to a considerable degree, intrusted with the first, while a part of the former, and all the latter power, vest in the general government.

A government thus understood is naturally divided mto three parts.

1. An individual may from ignorance violate the rights of his neighbor, and thus innocently expose himself to punishment. Or, if he violate his neighbor's rights maliciously, and justly merit punishment, a punishment may be inflicted more severe than the nature of the case demands. To avoid this, it is necessary that the various forms of violation be as clearly as possible defined, and also that the penalty be plainly and explicitly attached to each. This is a law. This, as we have shown, must be done by delegates. These delegates are called a legislature, and the individual members of it are legislators.

From what we have said, their power is manifestly limited. They have no power except to execute the obligations which society has undertaken to fulfil towards the individual. This is all that society has conferred, for it is all that society had to confer.

If legislators originate any power in themselves, or exercise any power conferred, for any purpose different from that for which it was conferred, they violate right, and are guilty of tyranny.

2. But suppose a law to be enacted, that is, a crime to be defined, and the penalty to be affixed. It has reference to no particular case, for, when enacted, no case existed to be affected by it. Suppose now an individual to be accused of violating this law. Here it is necessary to apply the law to this particular case. In order to do this, we must ascertain, first, whether the accused did commit the act laid to his charge; secondly, whether the act, if it be proved to have been done, is a violation of the law; that is, whether it come within the description of actions which the law forbids; and, thirdly, if this be proved, it is necessary to declare the punishment which the law assigns to this particular violation. This is the judicial branch of the gov

ernment.

3. After the law has been thus applied to this particular case, it is necessary that it be carried into effect. This devolves upon the third, or the executive branch of a gov

ernment.

Respecting all of these three branches of government, it may be remarked in general, that they are essentially independent of each other; that each one has its specific duties marked out by society, within the sphere of which duties it is responsible to society, and to society alone. Nor is this independence at all affected by the mode of its appointment. Society may choose a way of appointing an agent, but that is by no means a surrender of the claim which it has upon the agent. Thus, society may impose upon a legislature, or an executive, the duty of appointing a judiciary; but the judiciary is just as much independent of the executive, or of the legislature, as though it were appointed in some other way. Society, by conferring upon one branch the right of appointment, has conferred upon it no other right. The judge, although appointed by the legislator, is as independent of him, as the legislator would be if appointed by the judge. Each, within his own sphere, is under obligation to perform precisely those duties assigned by society, and no other. And hence arises the propriety of establishing the tenure of office, in each several branch, independently of the other.

The two first of these departments are frequently subdivided.

Thus, the legislative department is commonly divided into two branches, chosen under dissimilar conditions, for the purpose of exerting a check upon each other, by representing society under different aspects, and thus preventing partial and hasty legislation.

The judiciary is also generally divided. The judges explain and interpret the law; while it is the province of the jury to ascertain the facts.

The executive is generally sole, and executes the law by means of subordinate agents. Sometimes, however, a council is added, for the sake of advice, without whose concurrence the executive cannot act.

Sometimes the fundamental principles of the social compact are expressed, and the respective powers of the different branches of the government are defined, and the mode of their appointment described in a written document. Such is the case in the United States. At other times, these