been brought (in the language of the President) " to an issue of some sort:" that is, every subject of dispute remains as far, probably farther from adjustment, than when the negotiations were begun. It is this disastrous issue which now enters into our deliberations. According to the statements of the Administration, we are brought into a situation from which we cannot advance without war, nor retreat without dishonor. Their negotiations with France have also terminated in mortification and defeat. On the two questions of the impressment of seamen on board our merchant vessels, and a trade with the enemies of Great Britain prohibited in time of peace, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) was pleased to read some parts of a letter written by me last Winter to the Governor of Massachusetts, to be laid before the Legislature; and on the latter (neutral trade) he also read the Journal of the Senate, which exhibited a unanimous vote declaratory of our right to that trade; and then the names of the Senators (mine being one) who voted to request the President to demand and insist on reparation for the injuries done us in violation of that right, and for this purpose to enter into amicable arrangements with the British Government. On these two questions, I should add nothing to the observations made yesterday by the gentleman from Connecticut, but for the apparent intention of the gentleman from Maryland, to exhibit an inconsistency between my votes in the Senate and the observation of my letter on the same subject. It is sufficient for me to remark, that in the passages recited by the gentleman from my letter, my object was to show, by exhibiting in a few words, to the view of my immediate constituents, and through them to the people of Massachusetts, some of the reasons which might have influenced Great Britain not to relinquish her ancient usage of impressing her own seamen; nor to consent that neutrals should carry on (as we and other neutrals were carrying on) the whole trade between the countries of her enemies in Europe and their colonies; to show, I say, that as much was to be said on both sides, those rights, as claimed by the United States, were not to be considered so clear and indisputable as to justify a war with Great Britain; into which the proceedings of the Executive, in a variety of ways, seemed calculated to plunge us. Before I quit this subject, I will make one more observation. It appears to be generally supposed that the rule respecting the colonial trade adopted by Great Britain, and usually called the Rule of 1756, which it seems she has considered as "the ancient and established principle of maritime law."* was peculiar to Great Britain: and Mr. Madison says, "it is well known that Great Britain is the only nation that has acted upon or otherwise given a sanction to it." He also mentions this • Mr. Madison's letter of March 25, 1808, to Mr. Erskine. † Same letter. SENATE. rule as having been introduced, for the first time, in the war of 1756; as having been in operation only a few years in that war; and net afterwards acted upon until 1793. Let us examine the subject. In Valin's celebrated work on maritime law (a book in the Secretary of State's office) is a regulation of Louis the Fourteenth, in 1704, from which I will recite some passages. The title of the regulation is remarkable: it is, "Concerning Prizes made at Sea; to secure the navigation of neutral States and allies during war;" implying that this regulation was intended to abate the rigor of maritime law before that time practised towards neutral commerce. After observing that propositions had been made to him by the Deputies of the Council of Commerce, the French King expresses his approbation of them, "seeing he finds in them the means which he has always sought of procuring equally the advantages of the subjects of neutral : Princes and French cruisers." He adds: "The subjects of neutral Princes will thus find the care which His Majesty has taken to preserve for them the same extent and the same liberty of commerce which they have been accustomed to enjoy during peace." I will now read such of the articles of this French regulation as relate to the question under examination. "Article 1. His Majesty forbids French privateers to stop, or bring into the ports of His Kingdom, vessels belonging to subjects of neutral Princes, going from the ports of their dominion, and laden on account of the owners or other subjects of the said neutral Princes with merchandise of the growth or manufacture of their own country, to carry the same directly into any other States, whatsoever, even those with which His Majesty is at war; provided nevertheless, that there be not in the said vessels any contraband goods. "Article 2. They are in like manner forbidden to stop vessels belonging to subjects of neutral Princes, going from the ports of any State whatsoever, even of those with which His Majesty is at war, and laden on account of the owners or other subjects of the said neutral Princes, with merchandise which they shall have received in the same country or State whence they shall have departed, to return directly into the ports of the dominion of their sovereign. "Article 3. He also forbids them to stop vessels belonging to the subjects of neutral Provinces, departing, from the ports of one of the States neutral or allied to His Majesty, to go into another State alike neutral or allied to His Majesty; provided they are not laden with merchandise of the growth or manufacture of his enemies; in which case the merchandise shall be good prize, and the vessels shall be released. "Article 4. In like manner His Majesty forbids privateers to stop vessels belonging to subjects of neutral Princes departing from a State, allied to His Majesty or neutral, to go to a State the enemy of His Majesty ; provided there be not on board said vessel any merchandise contraband, nor of the growth or manufacture of the enemies of His Majesty; in which cases, the merchandise shall be good prize and the vessels shall be released. "Article 6. Vessels belonging to subjects of neutral States which shall depart from the ports of a State the The regulation of Louis XIV. in 1704, (he being then at war with England and Holland,) was re-enacted by Louis XV. in 1744. (France being again at war with England,) with some exceptions in regard to those neutral nations with whom France had formed treaty-stipulations incompatible with that regulation. In these five articles we have, if I mistake not, the whole doctrine of the British rule of 1756. The direct trade to and from neutral ports and the enemy's ports being permitted, but not the trade to and from the ports of one allied or neutral State, with the ports of another allied or neutral State, if the lading of the neutral vessel consists of merchandise, the productions of the enemy's country; much less to carry the same from one port of the enemy to another port of the enemy. The principle of the British rule, and of the French regulation, appears to be to prevent neutrals coming in to aid the enemy in the commerce of one part of his dominions with any other part thereof, or in procuring a market for the enemy's productions in any other country than that of the neutral actually transporting the same, and for its own use and consumption. NOVEMBER, 1808. On the subject of blockade, when vessels of war were not so stationed before the port declared to be blockaded as to constitute what is called an actual blockade, undoubtedly abuses have taken place. To form an actual blockade of a port, ships destined for that object must be "sufficiently near to produce an evident danger in entering." But these words by no means imply a certainty of capture, by the blockading ships, of the vessel so attempting to enter. What degree of risk from blockading ships will amount to a lawful blockade, may sometimes be a disputable question. Would the chance of capturing three vessels out of four, or seven out of eight, exhibit such an evident danger in entering," as would constitute an actual blockade-that is, when to insure their entering in safety would be worth a premium of from seventy-five to ninety per cent.? This must remain a question of some difficulty to adjust. On these points, sir, and all others in dispute with Great Britain, my opinion remains unchanged, that they are yet proper subjects of negotiation, to be undertaken in the real spirit of conciliation and adjustment. That the embargo will not induce her to yield to our demands we have ample proof, not only in the answer of the British Government to our Minister in London, but in the certain ability of that nation and her colonies to supply all their own wants. That she possesses the means, I think, has been demonstrated by gentlemen who have spoken before me. We have heard much of the patriotism and patient endurance of our fellow-citizens under the distresses It appears, moreover, by the preamble to the of the embargo, and, gentlemen speak confidently, French regulation, that the restrictions on neutral that this patience will hold out until Great Britcommerce, which we are now examining, instead ain shall be brought to our feet. At the same of commencing in 1756, were in exercise by the time they calculate on the distresses which they English and Dutch antecedent to that regulation, fondly imagine the embargo will inflict on the and with greater rigor; the French King profess-people of Great Britain and her colonies, to excite ing to ameliorate the condition of neutral commerce by that regulation.* discontents and insurrections sufficiently alarming to induce that Government to abandon usages on which she relies to maintain her maritime ascend* But, Great Britain has admitted that the vessels of ency, and, at this time, her independence as a nathe United States might carry on an indirect trade from tion. But, why should it be supposed that the the European dominions of her enemies to their colo- people of Great Britain will be less patient under nies, and from those colonies to their parent countries sufferings than the people of the United States? in Europe; and in both cases, the trade has been con- Theirs would arise from causes beyond their considered indirect when carried on through the United States-that is, when the cargoes laden on board Ameri- be considered indirect, when the articles of the growth, can vessels, in the ports of the enemies of Great Brit-produce, or manufacture of Europe, were first carried ain, have been first imported into the United States, to the United States, and, on re-exportation remained, and carried thence in the same, or other American ves- after the drawback, subject to a duty of one per cent. sels, to the enemy's countries or colonies respectively. on their value. In like manner, all articles of the But the facts which should constitute an indirect trade growth and produce of the enemy's colonies, being first not having been definitively declared on the contrary, brought to the United States, and there entered and as they have been several times varied, either by the landed, and on re-exportation remaining subject to a orders of the British Government, or by the decisions duty of two per cent. on their value, might be re-laden of her Courts of Admiralty-much vexation and injury and freely exported to any country in Europe. The have thence accrued to the commerce of the United duties, in both cases, to be paid into the Treasury of States. the United States. But the treaty negotiated by the President's Ministers, (Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney,) and signed by them, with the British Commissioners on the 31st of December, 1806, comprehended a definitive provision on this head. Such trade, between the parent countries and colonies of the enemies of Great Britain, was to This arrangement was calculated to prevent any further dispute between the United States and Great Britain, about the trade between the countries of her enemies in Europe and their colonics. But the President thought fit to reject this treaty, without laying it before the Senate. NOVEMBER, 1808. The Embargo. SENATB. to Boston, captured and condemned at Gibraltar, for violating the blockade declared by the British Orders in Council. 37 arrived safely. In all 43. It is stated, that there were three policies on the Neutrality; and that possibly there might be more than one policy on one vessel among the 37 safe arrivals. At another office in Boston, out of 75 risks, principally to the West Indies, 3 vessels were captured by the French, of which the British re-captured 2. trol; ours from some cause or causes operating Mr. President, the gentleman from Maryland mentioned the extreme danger to which our commerce would be exposed, while the French decrees and British orders remain unrepealed. It has been often said, and perhaps oftener insinuated, in newspapers and pamphlets, that if our vessels were permitted to go to sea, all would be taken. What escaped the French, would be cap tured by the English; and what escaped the latter. would fall a prey to the former. There is a want of truth in all this. The same gentleman quoted a statement made by an eminent merchant of Massachusetts, [Mr. Gray, of Salem,] that of eight or ten vessels which sailed about the time the embargo was laid, only one had reached the place of her destination. I remember seeing a statement of that sort; and I think, also, that I saw a detection of its fallacy. If they had not reached their destined ports, it did not follow that they were captured and condemned. 1 captured by the British, supposed to be French property. 16-about this number are undetermined; and the rest, about 55, have ended safely. In all 75. At another office in Boston, out of somewhat more than 100 risks, 4 vessels were captured by the British, of which 2 were condemned for breach of Orders in Coun1 probably enemy's property, and 1 remained under adjudication. 1 captured and condemned by the French; and, 1 seized by them at Alicant, while they had the power there. 25 risks were undetermined; and the remainder ended safely. The premiums of insurance have been about eleven per cent. to and from the West Indies, for the whole voyage. 7 per cent. from the West Indies, with cargo on board. 9 to 10 per cent. from Europe, if not violating British orders. 4 to 5 per cent. from Europe against French capture only. By a statement received from Salem, on the correctness of which I can rely, I find that in the district of Salem and Beverly, 22 vessels sailed, by the President's permission, between the 5th of April and the 10th of August. Of these vessels, 1 sailed to Sumatra, 1 to Senegal, and the rest to different ports in the West Indies. Of the whole number, The same merchant has expressed his decided 1 returned leaky, and remained at home. 9 remained undetermined; but it was not known that any of them had been detained or condemn But, without resting the question on opinions, we may appeal to facts. I have sought information of the risks which have attended our foreign trade, within the present year, from the two principal districts of Massachusetts. By the statement in my hand, lately received, and which is of unquestionable authority, I find, that at one insurance office in Boston, 43 policies have been written, on vessels engaged in foreign voyages, since the first of January, 1808. these, 5 were undetermined. Of The insurance on the Sumatra voyage, out and home, was 14 per cent. Martinico, Havana, and Surinam-the voyage out and home, 9 to 10 per cent. Havana, at and from, 54 per cent. The premium of insurance from Calcutta to the United States, the last Summer and Autumn, has been 8 per cent. Thus, Mr. President, we see that the risk on our foreign trade has been very little increased since the issuing the French Decree of Berlin, and the British Orders in Council. The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) asks, What would have been the insurance on an American vessel bound to France? I am not in 1 vessel (the Neutrality) bound from Marseilles formed. Perhaps 75 to 90 per cent., though it is not probable that our merchants would hazard their vessels on such a voyage, or that the underwriters would insure them. But what does this prove? Why, that the risk, under the British Orders, is so great, in attempting to enter a port in France, as perhaps to amount to an actual blockade. I now beg leave, sir, to communicate the information I have recently received from the latter of the two merchants before referred to.* Having requested of him the data on which his opinion before-mentioned was founded, he has sent me an answer, dated the 23d instant, from which I will read the material parts. He says: "Respecting the comparative trade of profound peace, and the present moment, if the embargo should be removed, and the decrees and Orders of Council remain, it is a subject about which it is difficult to go into that detail which will show satisfactorily an exact result; because, if you resort to the exports of a year in time of profound peace, and compare the aggregate with a year in war, the prices being so different, the difference in amount will not give the exact data we want. And to take the quantity of each article of export will not be satisfactory; because in different years we export more of the same article to the same market, and in proportion to the quantity raised, or goodness or badness of the crop. But of the fact I have no doubt, that our trade would be much greater and more productive, if the embargo were removed, than it can be in time of peace; because when the colonial trade of the European Powers is confined as usual, we cannot carry any kind of provisions to the colonies of any of them, without being subject to a heavy duty, nearly equal to a prohibition. And we are not allowed to bring away anything but rum and molasses; and of course we lose the whole of the colonial trade, so far as respects importing any articles with a view of exporting them again; excepting only from the Isle of France, and Bourbon, which has generally been free. But we may be shut out there. The trade to the colonies is now free for all exports and imports with small duties. And if the largest and most natural European markets for the sale of colonial produce are occluded, still we have open to us, all that the British have, and we can carry those articles to Sweden, Spain, Portugal, coast of Barbary, Turkey, Sicily, Sardinia, and Malta; the three last of which are ports at which the articles sell high, and are bought for the purpose of smuggling over to the Continent, where they are sent in great quantities." The following statement is then given, of the amount of our exports from the 30th of September, 1806, to September 30, 1807, (taken from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury) to countries and places other than those in Europe, which are under the government or control, or in alliance with the French Emperor; all which are considered as shut up by the British Orders of Council: "Domestic exports (or of articles of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States Foreign goods exported Mr. Thorndike. $36,109,991 24,140,495 60,250,486 NOVEMBER, 1808. "This amount may be exported without being subject to the British Orders of Council, and the extra prefollowing rates, viz: miums against French captures would not exceed the "To Sweden, 2 per cent.; Swedish and other West Indies, and the Spanish Main, 5 do.; Cape of Good Hope, 4 do.; England, Scotland, without the Channel, say Liverpool, Greenock, Ireland, &c., &c., 4 do.; and within the Channel, 6 do.; Guernsey, Jersey, &c., 5 do.; Gibraltar, 3 do.; Spanish ports in the Bay of Biscay, 6 do. ; Spanish ports on the Atlantic, 3 do.; Spanish ports on the Mediterranean, 5 do.; Madeira, the Canaries, Fayal, and other Azores, 3 do; Portugal, 3 do.; Cape de Verd, 3 do.; Sicily, 5 do; Malta, 6 do.; China, 4 do.; Sumatra, 3 do.; Spanish and Portuguese America, 3 do.; Calcutta and the coast of Coromandel and Malabar, 8 do.; Africa, 4 do.; Arabia, and Red Sea, including Mocha and Muscat, 4 do.; Manilla, 4 do.; Northwest coast of America, 2 do; Halifax and Newfoundland, I do. "In time of profound peace, our trade might be fairly estimated thus: Domestic exports $48,699,592 To which may be added specie to China and India 6,000,000 54,699,592 Leaving $66,250,846 54,699,592 11,550,894 less export trade in time of peace than we might now enjoy, and which amount is to be twice water borne, once in importing it from the places of growth, and again carrying it to the consumers; and of course would employ shipping appertaining to the carriage of one freight, equal in amount to more than twentythree millions one hundred thousand dollars. "As an evidence of the correctness of this statement, it will be seen by a recurrence to the statement that the exports had fallen, in that short peace, from of the Secretary of the Treasury, for the year 1803, $93,020,513, to $55,800,032. "It is to be observed, that we might now enjoy & trade to South America and the Spanish Main, which might be estimated at least at from four to five millions of dollars, a considerable part of which would be again exported to Spain and Portugal, and which has never NOVEMBER, 1808. The Embargo. made any part of the Secretary's report; because the trade to those countries has been prohibited until lately. It may also be remembered, that the export trade does not show the whole advantage of the colonial trade which we might now enjoy; because all we import for our own consumption ought to be added." SENATE. they will turn to the Declaration of Independence, they will find one of the reasons for the Colonies separating themselves from Great Britain, and renouncing the Government of the King, was, their enacting laws "for cutting off our trade with all parts of the world." [Here Mr. LLOYD stated that, in his opinion, Mr. President, in a public document on our the value of the trade which might now be pros- tables, we are told, that "after a period of twenecuted from the United States, considering the ty-five years of peace, hardly interrupted by present circumstances of the great nations of transient hostilities, and of prosperity unparal Europe, would be as extensive as could be carried'leled in the history of nations, the United States on after a general peace, and the adoption, by the European Powers, of their restrictive colonial systems.] On this clear and interesting view of the commerce which the United States might carry on, were the embargo out of the way, no comments are necessary. The observations of the writer of the letter are evidences of his being master of the subject. are for the first time, since the treaty which terminated the Revolutionary war, placed in a sit'uation equally difficult, critical, and dangerous." That our country has enjoyed such unexampled prosperity, I readily agree: but the present is not the first time that these States have been placed in a difficult, critical, and dangerous situation. In 1794, the same steadiness, the same undeviating pursuit of the public welfare, in spite of popular clamor and formal opposition, were necessary to institute a mission to Great Britain, to negotiate and settle with that Government questions of the highest moment to these States, and which, if they remained much longer unsettled, might endanger the peace of the nation. That negotiation, committed to the conduct of a statesman, than whom our country has produced not one more firm, more wise, or more upright, was, by his candor, ability, and decision, brought to a happy conclusion, in fewer months, than some more modern negotiations have occupied years, without being brought to any conclusion; unless their utter failure may be called a conclusion. The gentleman from Connecticut yesterday noticed the most difficult crisis. In 1793, it reMr. President, the gentleman from Virginia quired all the firmness and immense popularity (Mr. GILES) has been pleased to attribute the of President WASHINGTON, to stem the torrent of discontents, in New England, especially in Mas-popular delusion, that was hurrying the United sachusetts, relative to the embargo, solely to the States into the vortex of the French Revolution. arts of demagogues, who wish to get into office. The gentleman from Connecticut noticed this reproach; but as it appeared to be levelled chiefly at leading citizens in Massachusetts, I feel it to be my duty further to remark, that of all the citizens of the United States, none stand more aloof from, none more detest the character of demagogues, than those to whom the gentleman referred. I know those men who reprobate the embargo, and who, in conversation, and in newspapers, express their sentiments about it, or patronize those who do. They are not seeking for offices-many of them could not be persuaded to accept the best office in the President's gift-but to save their country from the effects of measures, in their view, alike ruinous and disgraceful. They are men, sir, whose age, whose experience, In 1795, the United States were agitated to whose knowledge, whose wisdom, whose virtue, their centre, by the opposition to the British place them in the first rank of citizens. They Treaty. Artful and aspiring demagogues seized are men, sir, ten of whom, had they been in Sod-upon the known prejudices of the people in regard om, would have saved that city from destruction. to the two great contending nations; and exertAmong them was the immortal Ames, than whom ing all their faculties to keep up the popular delua purer spirit never left the earth. He wrote sion, hoped that, by the loud and extended clamor, while he had strength to hold a pen. He died on the President would be deterred from ratifying the anniversary morning of the nation's birth- the treaty which Mr. Jay had so happily concluday-and this was among his last prayers: "Oh, ded. Here again were displayed the firmness and save my country!” patriotism of WASHINGTON. Always determined to pursue the true interests of the people, although at the hazard of his popularity, he ratified the treaty. Here it was presumed, all opposition would cease. But it again appeared, and with a more formidable aspect, in the National Legislature. But I will not dwell upon it. The treaty was finally carried into execution. It had, however, one more enemy to encounter. Gentlemen have said much about insurrection and rebellion; and, in language not very conciljatory, pointed all their allusions to the people of New England. Other rulers pronounced them rebels, more than thirty years ago; while many then unborn now wish to cover themselves with their mantle, and to share the honors of the patriots of 1776. But, why should gentlemen be surprised that Revolutionary France, wishing to involve us great discontents prevail in that country; and in a war with Great Britain, which this treaty, that the Legislatures, with a deliberation and so- merely of amity and commerce, had prevented, lemnity which should command attention, have pretended that it was equivalent to a Treaty of pronounced their opinions of the embargo ? Gen-Alliance with Great Britain. And seizing on ilemen will recollect that there the Revolution this pretence, at once to vent her resentment, and began, of which Boston was the cradle. And if gratify the rapacity of her rulers with the plun |