of the day where no usage limited the business hours, unless there had been previously an actual and positive refusal to pay the paper, and notice or knowledge thereof on the part of the taker.

It is obvious, however, that cases of this kind might differ much in their facts, and in the legal inferences from them. Thus, if the holder of a note offers it for sale at nine o'clock of the day of its maturity, on the ground that he needs the money at once, and shall not otherwise have it until the banks close, or until they open next morning, and the buyer believes him, he would not be affected by the fact of a previous refusal to pay on that morning, even if he gave less than the face, because he might calculate the chances of the promisor's solvency. But if he bought it ten minutes before the last minute when it could be paid, his conduct would be much more open to the inference that he knew the paper had been refused, or would be unpaid, and took his risk of getting the money; and if the paper had then been refused, he must be regarded as the taker of dishonored paper. Perhaps, however, the simpler and better rule may be this. As the payer has all the business hours of the last day in which he may pay the paper, all other persons may suppose it unpaid, and purchase it in that belief, until the close of those hours.(x)

Bills on

3. Of the dishonor of paper payable on demand. sight, and bills or notes payable on demand, have no definite time at which non-payment at once operates dishonor. Of this kind of paper three things must be said.

One is, that a reasonable time must elapse before mere non payment dishonors the bill or note. What this time is, has not been, and cannot be, fixed by any definite and precise rule. One day's delay of paper on demand certainly would not dishonor it; five years certainly would. And in each case, how many days, or weeks, or months, are requisite for this effect, must depend upon the test, whether so long a time has elapsed, that it must be inferred from the particular circumstances and the general conduct

(x) In Crosby v. Grant, 36 N. H. 273, it was held that a note payable generally, and not at any particular place, might be bought from a bank where it had been discounted, on the last day of grace, and the holder protected. But in Pine v. Smith, 11 Gray, the same point was decided the other way, on grounds of the sufficiency of which we have some doubt.

of business men, both of which should be considered, that the paper in question must have been intended to be paid within this period, and, if not paid, must have been refused. (y) There are

(y) Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bl. 565; Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. 46, 28 Eng. L. & Eq 86; Shute v. Robins, Moody & M. 133; Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416; Martin v. Winslow, 2 Mason, 241; Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336, 5 Mason, 118; Aymar . Beers, 7 Cowen, 705; Robinson v. Ames, 20 Johns. 140; Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176; Dumont v. Pope, 7 Blackf. 367; Lord v. Chadbourne, 8 Greenl. 198; Perry v. Green, 4 Harrison, 61; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn 361; Culver v. Parish, 21 Conn. 408; Atlantic DeLaine Co. v. Tredick, 5 R. I. 171; Carll v. Brown, 2 Mich. 401; M'Kinney v. Crawford, 8 S. & R. 351; Emerson v. Crocker, 5 N. H. 159; Odiorne v. Howard, 10 N. H. 343; Carlton v. Bailey, 7 Foster, 230; Parker v. Tuttle, 44 Maine, 459; Dennen v. Haskell, 45 Maine, 431; Jerome v. Stebbins, 14 Calif. 457; Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass. 370; Thurston v. M'Kown, 6 Mass. 428; Hemmenway v. Stone, 7 Mass. 58; Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131; Stockbridge v. Damon, 5 Pick. 225; Thompson v. Hale, 6 Pick. 259; Sylvester v. Crapo, 15 Pick. 93; Stevens v. Bruce, 21 Pick. 193. American Bank v. Jenness, 2 Met. 288; Ranger v. Cary, 1 Met. 369; Knowles v. Parker, 7 Met. 30; Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267; Weeks v. Pryor, 27 Barb. 79.

In Furman v. Haskin, 2 Caines, 369, a note payable on demand was considered dishonored after eighteen months from the time when it was given; in Sice v. Cunningham, 1 Cowen, 397, after five months; in Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131, after eight months; in Losee v. Dunkin, 7 Johns. 70, after two months; in Martin v. Winslow, 2 Mason, 241, after seven months; in Camp Scott, 14 Vt. 387, after two months; in Atlantic DeLaine Co. v. Tredick, 5 R. I. 171, after thirteen months; in Emerson v. Crocker, 5 N. H. 159, after ten months; in Carlton v. Bailey, 7 Foster, 230, after seven months and a half; in Parker z. Tuttle, 44 Maine, 459, after four months; in Jerome v. Stebbins, 14 Calif. 457, after thirteen months; in Loomis v. Pulver, 9 Johns. 244, after two years; in American Bank v. Jenness, 2 Met. 288, after eight months.

In Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cowen, 705, a delay of twenty-nine days was not considered unreasonable under the circumstances of the case; so in Van Hoesen v. Van Alstyne, 3 Wend. 75, a delay of two or three months; in Robinson v. Ames, 20 Johns. 146, a delay of seventy-five days; in Wethey v. Andrews, 3 Hill, 582, a delay of four or five weeks; in Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn 361, a delay of sixty days; in Dennett v. Wyman, 13 Vt. 485, a delay of two days; in Sanford v. Mickles, 4 Johns. 224, a delay of five months; in Carll v. Brown, 2 Mich. 401, a delay of twenty-five days; in Dennen v. Haskell, 45 Maine, 430, a delay of thirty days; in Ranger v. Cary, 1 Met. 369, a delay of one month.

The question of reasonable time is well stated by Parker, C. J., in Field . Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131. After referring to the analogy generally recognized in this respect between a note payable on demand and a bill payable at sight, so that, as in the latter case the holder must present his bill for acceptance within a reasonable time, in order to charge the drawer, so in the former, the indorsee must make demand of payment on the promisor within a reasonable time, in order to charge the indorser, the learned judge says: "And we are of opinion that this is the correct doctrine on the subject. For as, on the one hand, it can hardly be supposed that the indorser and indorsee, when they make their contract, contemplate a liability on the indorser, unless reasonable pains should be taken to procure payment of the actual debtor; so, on the otner, we do not think it enters into their calculations that, as between them, the note should be considered due when drawn in such manner as to require, in all cases, a demand

two classes of cases in which this question of reasonable time has arisen; the one, as to what is a reasonable time to make a demand on a note payable on demand, or a presentment of a bill

the instant, or the same day, it may have been indorsed. As it respects the promisor himself, he is answerable immediately to the promisee or indorsee; and he may be sued the instant he has given his signature, even without a previous demand. But the condition on which the indorser is liable is, that payment shall be demanded within a reasonable time, and the earliest notice possible given of refusal. This time may, therefore, vary according to the circumstances and situation of the parties, to be determined by the jury under the direction of the court. It is impossible to fix any precise period, each case depending upon its own circumstances, as in the case of a bill payable at sight, which must be presented to the drawer as soon as can conveniently be done, taking into view all the circumstances of the holder and the drawer." In Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267, Shaw, C. J. said, that "one of the most difficult questions presented for the decision of a court of law is, what shall be deemed a reasonable time within which to demand payment of the maker of a note payable on demand, in order to charge the indorser. It depends upon so many circumstances to determine what is a reasonable time in a particular case, that one decision goes but little way in establishing a precedent for another."

In Massachusetts it is provided by statute that, upon a promissory note payable on demand, a demand made at the expiration of sixty days from the date thereof, without grace, or at any time within that term, shall be deemed to be made within a reasonable time; but no subsequent presentment and demand shall charge the indorser. Gen. Stats. 1860, c. 53, § 8. This statute does not apply to the case of such a note indorsed after this term of sixty days from its date has elapsed, but in such case it seems that a demand on the maker is within a reasonable time, if made within a like term of sixty days from the indorsement of the note. Rice v. Wesson, 11 Met. 400.

And in respect to bills of exchange payable on or after sight, in some foreign nations there are positive enactments fixing the times of presentment with reference to the places where the bill is drawn, and where the drawee resides, as in the French Code de Commerce, Lib. 1, pt. 8, § 11.

In England it has been held that a negotiable note payable on demand is not dishonored by mere lapse of time. Something more must be brought to the knowledge of the indorser to charge him with the equities of the original parties. Barough v. White, 4 B. & C. 325; Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 M. & W. 15. In the latter case it was held that a note, payable on demand with interest, made in 1824, and indorsed in 1838, and upon which no interest had been paid for three years immediately preceding the indorsement, was not subject to an equitable defence as between the original parties. It was urged in that case, that the non-payment of interest for three years was sufficient to put the indorsee upon inquiry. But Parke, B., expressing the opinion of the court, said: "I cannot assent to the arguments urged in behalf of the plaintiffs. If a promissory note payable on demand, is after a certain time to be treated as over-due, although payment has not been demanded, it is no longer a negotiable instrument; but a promissory note, payable on demand, is intended to be a continuing security."

A promissory note payable on demand is probably a species of security rarely used in England; and when it is used, it is regarded as a continuing security until the holder snall see fit to render it due by a demand. Here it has long been in use, and the rules applicable to it have been fixed after the analogy of bills payable at sight. See reDarks of Shaw, C. J., in Sylvester v. Crapo, 15 Pick. 92, 94.

drawn payable on or after sight, in order to charge an indorser; and the other as to the length of time in which such a note or bill would be held to be dishonored, and subject to those grounds of defence which would have been open to the maker of the note or the drawer of the bill in a suit by the payee.(z)

The rule requiring the presentment of the bill or note within a reasonable time applies in the same way, though the drawer or indorser has sustained no actual loss by the delay, and has continued solvent up to the time of the presentment. (a) In determining this question of reasonable time, it is proper to look to the interests of the holder of the paper, as well as of the drawer; and accordingly, in case of a foreign bill, the rate of exchange is a circumstance that may be considered in determining whether the holder has delayed unreasonably to put it in circulation or to send it forward to the drawee; for it cannot be required of him to part with it instantly under all disadvantages.(b) A delay

(z) See Ranger v. Cary, 1 Met. 369, 373, per Dewey, J.

(a) Carter v. Flower, 16 M. & W. 743; Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. 46, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 86. In the latter case, Baron Parke said, on this point: "The court below decided, that the solvency of the drawers and the want of proof of actual loss by laches constituted no answer to the objection of laches. We think they were right. There is no trace of such a qualification in the elaborate judgment of Lord Chief Justice Tindal, in Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 417, in which the circumstances which constitute a reasonable delay are fully discussed; no mention is made of the insolvency of the drawer, subsequent to the drawing, although it did occur in that case, or some loss by the drawer, being an essential condition to the application of the rule laid down; and in Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bl. 565, it was clear that the failure of the drawer caused no damage to the plaintiff, being before the time that the bill could possibly have been presented in India; yet that circumstance was not mentioned as dispensing with the obligation to present in a reasonable time; and, with respect to all bills of exchange payable after date, it is fully settled, that neither the want of presentment at the time the bill is due, nor the want of due notice, are excused because the drawer has continued solvent, or the holder incurred no loss by non-presentment or want of regular notice. This point was fully considered in the case of Carter v. Flower, 16 M. & W. 743, and we believe admits of no doubt; and we agree with the court below, that the continued solvency of the drawers does not prevent the application of the rule that the bill must be presented in a reasonable time, with reference to the interest of the drawer to put the bill into circulation, or the interest of the drawee to have the bill speedily presented In this respect a check differs from a bill of exchange, and the doctrine that the drawer of a check continues liable unless he has actually sustained a loss from the delay of presentment has no application in the case of a bill of exchange.

(b) Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416 Tindal, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, in referring to the expression used by Buller, J., in Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bl. 565, that "if, instead of putting it in circulation, the holder were to lock it up for any length of time, I should say that he was guilty of laches," said: “ To lock the

arising from the sickness of the holder, or from other accident, may be properly considered. (c) If the bill be kept in circulation, its final presentment may be delayed as long as the reasonable

bill up for any length of time' does not and cannot mean, that keeping it in his hands for any time, however short, would make him guilty of laches. It never can be required of him, instantly on the receipt of it, under all disadvantages, either to put it into circulation, or to send it forward to the drawee for acceptance. To hold the purchaser bound by such an obligation would greatly impede, if not altogether destroy, the market for buying and selling foreign bills, to the great injury, no less than to the inconvenience, of the drawer himself. For, if he has no opportunity to realize his bill by sale at home, he can only obtain the amount by sending it out to a correspondent at the place upon which it is drawn, incurring thereby delay, expense, and risk; and if the buyer is not to be allowed a reasonable discretion as to the time of parting with the bill, how can the drawer expect to find a ready sale? The meaning of the expression above referred to is, and indeed the very form of expression denotes it, that he must not lock the bill up for an indefinite time; that there must be some limit to its being kept from circulation; and what limit can there be, except that the time during which it is locked up must be reasonable? But what is or is not reasonable for that purpose, a jury must, with the assistance of the judge, under all the circumstances of the particular case, determine.' Like considerations were entertained by the Court of the Privy Council in the case of Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. 46, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 86, on appeal from the Supreme Court at Calcutta. In this case, a bill of exchange was drawn at Calcutta, on the 16th of February, 1848, by the respondents, on Dent & Co., at Hong Kong, payable sixty days after sight, and indorsed by the respondents to Muttyloll Seal or order. Muttyloll Seal, in consequence of the depressed state of the money market at Calcutta and the unsalableness of bills on China at that time at Calcutta, kept the bill for five months and nine days, and then sold it to the appellant, who did not present it for acceptance at Hong Kong till the 24th of October in that year, when Dent & Co. refused to accept it. It was held that the presentation of the bill for acceptance was not made within a reasonable time, and that the respondents, the drawers, were discharged. Baron Parke, pronouncing the judgment of the court, said: "The court (at Calcutta) assumed, that the correct principle was laid down fully in the cases of Mellish Rawdon, 9 Bing. 416, which is in accordance with the prior cases of Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bl. 565, and Fry v. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397, that in determining the question of reasonable time' for presentment, not the interests of the drawer only, but those of the holder, must be taken into account; that the reasonable time expended in putting the bill into circulation, which is for the interest of the holder, is to be allowed; and that the bill need not be sent for acceptance by the very earliest opportunity, though it must be sent without improper delay. The court, in acting upon that principle, concluded from the evidence that the bill was improperly detained for a portion at least of the time which elapsed between the 16th of February, 1848, when it was drawn, and the 26th of July, when it was indorsed over by Muttyloll Seal, the then holder, to the plaintiff. They thought that the evidence proved, that for the whole of that time, a period of more than five months, bills on China were altogether ansalable in Calcutta ; that such was the permanent and regular state of the market; and that although, if there was a reasonable prospect of the state of things being better m a short time, the holder would have had a right, with a view to his own interests,

(c) Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cowen, 705.