the subject of reasonableness of time would seem to be of itself sufficiently difficult, without burdening it with unnecessary distinctions and uncertainties, which can only serve to render it more difficult and obscure.(n)

A bill payable at or after sight must, as has been seen, be presented for acceptance within a reasonable time,(o) and also, if accepted, at maturity for payment; (p) and a note so payable must likewise be presented for payment within such time, before the maker's liability can accrue.(q)

(n) The tendency to create confusion by introducing distinctions on this point may well be illustrated by the decisions in South Carolina, which are almost as numerous as those of all the other States together, and many of them cannot be reconciled one with another. It has been held in that State, that the question of reasonableness of time, in case of notes indorsed after maturity, is one which the jury are to decide; Hall v. Smith, 1 Bay, 330; Eccles v. Ballard, 2 McCord, 388; Benton v. Gibson, 1 Hill, S. Car. 56; Brock ". Thompson, 1 Bailey, 322; Chadwick v. Jeffers, 1 Rich. 397; Gray v. Bell, 2 id. 67, 3 id. 71. In Gray v. Bell, 2 Rich. 67, Butler, J. said, in speaking of the diligence in respect to demand and notice where the note is indorsed after it is due: This diligence does not admit of such exact definition as always to be a question of law, but must, as it would seem from our decisions, be left, under all the circumstances of the case, to the decision of a jury. The kind of diligence that should be observed and pursued by an indorsee, in respect to the collection of a note indorsed before due, is well settled by certain and acknowledged rules, and is such as always to make it a question of law for the court." It is difficult to see any good reason for such a distinction as this. In Brock v. Thompson, 1 Bailey, 322, it was held that parol evidence of a stipulation by the indorser, at the time of the transfer, that the maker should be indulged as to time by the holder, is admissible to show the degree of diligence to which the holder was bound. In this case the agreement was that the maker should not be called on for one half the amount of the note till the next win- · ter, and for the other half till the spring following. A demand was made in November, a second during the winter, and a third on March 1st. No notice appears to have been given, except of the last demand. Held sufficient evidence of due diligence to go to a jury, and a verdict for the plaintiffs was sustained. In Benton v. Gibson, 1 Hill, S. Car. 56; Chadwick ». Jeffers, 1 Rich. 397; Gray v. Bell, 3 id. 71, 2 id. 67, it was held that service of a writ on the maker was sufficient, if known to the indorser at the beginning of the suit or immediately after; and in Gray v. Bell, 3 Rich. 71, 2 id. 67, where the maker and indorser were sued by separate writs served simultaneously, it was held that the mere fact that the suits were commenced at the same time was sufficient to carry with it a presumption of knowledge on the part of the indorser, and to justify a verdict of the jury in favor of the holder. In Chadwick v. Jeffers, 1 Rich. 397, Frost, J. said that the duty of the holder in respect to demand and notice “is limited to the use of such diligence, according to the circumstances of the case, that the indorser suffer no injury through his remissness or neglect." And finally, as has already been stated, in Gray v. Bell, 3 Rich. 71, supra, p. 381, note j, O'Neall, J. said, that in his opinion no presentment at all to the maker was necessary.

(0) Supra, p. 338, note c.

(p) See supra, p. 375.

to) See supra, v. 376.

A note on demand at sight" is the same as if payable at sight.(7)

If a note or bill be payable on time, whether that time begins to run from the date, or from sight or demand, the question sometimes arises as to how the time is to be computed. The word "month" means in the law merchant a calendar month, and has always been so interpreted in relation to notes and bills.(s)

A note or bill is usually payable at a certain number of days "after" sight, demand, or date, and this word certainly excludes the day of the presentment; (t) or, in the case of a bill presented on one day, but accepted on another, the day of acceptance, (u)

(r) Dixon v. Nuttall, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 307.

(s) Leffingwell v. White, Johns. Cas. 99; Thomas v. Shoemaker, 6 Watts & S 179; Wagner v. Kenner, 2 Rob. La. 120; McMurchey v. Robinson, 10 Ohio, 496. See Cockell v. Gray, 3 Brod. & B. 186; Jolly ". Young, 1 Esp. 186.

(t) In Coleman v. Sayer, 1 Barnard. 303, an action against the indorser of a bill payable at six days after sight, "the Chief Justice said that the day of sight is to be taken exclusive, for the law will not allow of fractions in a day." In Bellasis v. Hes ter, 1 Ld. Raym. 280, the plaintiff declared upon a bill payable at ten days after sight, seen and accepted May 5th. The teste was dated May 15th. The defendant prayed that the writ might abate, and the plaintiff demurred. The defendant contended that the day should be excluded, "because it is always so understood among merchants." The court were of opinion that the custom should have been pleaded specially. Pow ell and Nerill, JJ. decided that the day should be included, but Treby, C. J. held that it should be excluded. "1. Because the bill may be seen the last minute of the day, and that may be intended as reasonable as that it was seen the first minute; 2. the party may have the whole day to view the bill, and that is allowed him by the law; 3. because the contrary construction seems absurd; for then, if a bill be payable one day after sight, it must be paid the same day that it is seen, which is not the day after the sight, as the bill requires." In Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248, Sir Wm. Grant, M. R. said: "It is now settled that the day upon which a bill is presented is to be excluded, though it had been ruled otherwise by three judges of the Court of Common Pleas against the opinion of Treby, C. J." See Blanchard v. Hilliard, 11 Mass. 85, where it is said that the usage of banks in Massachusetts had formerly been to include the day of date; Woodbridge v. Brigham, 12 id. 403, 13 id. 556; Presbrey v. Williams, 15 id. 193, by Jackson, J, who said, "because otherwise a note payable in one day would be the same as a note payable on demand."

(u) Mitchell v. DeGrand, 1 Mason, 176, Story, J.: “A bill payable in so many days after sight, means after so many days' legal sight. Now it is not merely the fact of having seen the bill, or known of its existence, that constitutes a presentment to the drawee in legal contemplation. It must be presented to him for acceptance, and the time of the bill begins to run, not from the mere presentment, but from the presentment and acceptance." "The doctrine of relation cannot apply to cases of this nature."

demand, or date, (v) and includes the day on which the note is mature.(w)

If it be payable at sight,(x) or after any particular event, the rule is the same. The same construction is put upon the words "in,"(y) "from,"(z) "from date," and "from the day of the date," and they are held to be synonymous. (a)

A question has arisen with reference to notes payable on demand, as to whether the Statute of Limitations is to be construed as excluding the date, or including it, and the authorities on this point are conflicting.(b)

(v) Fisher v. State Bank, 7 Blackf. 610; Taylor v. Jacoby, 2 Penn. State, 495; Barlow v. Planters' Bank, 7 How. Miss. 129; Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. 453; Homes v. Smyth, 16 Maine, 181; Ammidown v. Woodman, 31 id. 580; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69, where the note was not negotiable.

(w) Ripley v. Greenleaf, 2 Vt. 129, 132. It is, in fact, always so computed. Thus in May v. Cooper, Fortes. 376, the defendant pleaded a tender on Aug. 1st of a note dated July 21st, payable in ten days, and it was held to be a day too late. In Cram lington. Evans, 2 Vent. 307, a bill drawn Nov. 10th, at twenty-five days from date, was presented Dec. 5, and it was alleged for error that "there were, as appears by the bill of exchange, twenty-five days given for the payment of it after the date of the bill; whereas here the request and refusal is upon the twenty-fifth day after the date Sd non allocatur, for, as the bill is set forth, it is to pay the money ad viginti et quinque dies post datum, and this can't be if not paid at the five-and-twentieth day." In Hartford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. 94, where a note dated May 20th, at four months with grace, was demanded Sept. 23d, a point reserved at the trial at Nisi Prius, that the demand was a day too early, was abandoned by the counsel for the defendant.

(x) This would seem to depend upon the question whether days of grace are allowed on bills at sight. If they are, the date would be excluded; otherwise the bill would become, it is conceived, payable immediately. See this subject treated of infra, Pp. 404-406.

(y) Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. 453, where the court said: "In the case at bar, the note was made payable in sixty days, without adding, as is customary, from the date. But the intention is apparent, and the court will supply the omission. The meaning must be the same as in sixty days from the date, otherwise a note payable in one day would be payable immediately, which would be an absurdity." Leavitt v. Simes, 3 N. H. 14; Blake . Crowninshield, 9 id. 304. See the remarks of Howard, J., cited infra, note z. The date was excluded in case of a note payable in nine months without grace, in Hill v. Norvell, 3 McLean, 583.

(z) Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. 453; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69. In Ammidown v. Woodman, 31 Maine, 580, Howard, J. said: "If there be several notes of the same date, some payable in six months, some in six months from date, and some in six months after date, they all have the same pay-day. In all of them the day of the date

is excluded."

"

(a) Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. 453. Where a note is payable in a certain number of days from the date, or from the day of the date, the day of the date is to be excluded." So Gibson, C. J., Taylor v. Jacoby, 2 Penn. State, 495.

(b) In Preshrey v. Williams, 15 Mass 193, the note was dated Feb. 16th, 1810. On VOL. I.-Z

If a note or bill has no date, or a void or impossible one, the time must be computed from the day on which it was delivered or issued ; (c) because there would seem to be " no other certain indicium of the time of its taking effect."(d) Where no date or delivery is shown, the date is to be considered, it would seem, as

Nov. 1st, 1811, a payment had been made and indorsed upon the note. The action was commenced Nov. 1st, 1817. Jackson, J. said: "By the Statute of Limitations it was intended that the plaintiff should have six full years, and no more, within which to bring his action. In this case he might have brought his action on the 1st of November, 1811, as upon a new promise then made, supposing that the action had been previously barred by the statute; and if he may also commence it on the 1st day of November, 1817, it would make seven first days of November in the six years prescribed by the statute. In the construction of a promissory note, payable in a certain number of days, the day of the date is excluded; because, otherwise, a note payable in one day would be the same as a note payable on demand, and this is the reason given in the case of Henry v. Jones," 8 Mass. 453, supra, note y.

The contrary was held in Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Denio, 12, where Bronson, C. J said: "Our cases all go to establish one uniform rule, whether the question arises upon the practice of the court, or the construction of a statute, and the rule is to exclude the first day from the computation."

(c) In De la Courtier v. Bellamy, 2 Show. 422, "the fact was alleged to be, that a party drew such a bill such a day, and the same was afterwards presented to, and accepted by, the defendant. An exception was taken, that the date of the bill was not set forth, and the court held it was well enough, and they would intend it dated at the time of drawing it." In Hague v. French, 3 Bos. & P. 173, the first count in the declaration stated that the defendant, on the 15th day of September, 1800, drew a bill of exchange bearing date the day and year aforesaid, payable two months after date. The second count stated that afterwards, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, the defendant drew a certain other bill of exchange, payable two months after date. No express date was mentioned in either count, but they were both held to be good. In Giles v. Bourne, 6 Maule & S. 73, 2 Chitty, 300, the plaintiff declared, that "on February 22d, 1816, A made his bill of exchange, and thereby required the defendant, four months after date. to pay at Messrs. V. & Co." &c. On demurrer because no date was assigned to the bill, it was held that the declaration was good, for it might "be intended that the date of the bill was the day on which it was alleged to have been made." A distinction attempted to be taken between Hague v. French, 3 Bos. & P. 173, and this case, that the former came before the court on a writ of error, and the latter on demurrer, was overruled. In Mechanics' Bank v. Schuyler, 7 Cowen, 337, note a, Sutherland, J. said: "Where they (a note or bill) have no date, the time, if necessary, may be inquired into, and will be computed from the day they were issued." Where an award has no date, the time must be computed from the delivery. Armitt v. Breame, 2 Ld. Raym. 1076. So where a deed has no date, or an impossible or void one. Com. Dig. Fait, (B. 3); Styles v Wardle, 4 B. & C 908. So in a lease; Bac. Abr. Leases, (E) 2, Rule 2, 1; and in a bond; Goddard's case, 2 Rep. 5. (d) Bac. Abr. Leascs, (E) 2, Rule 2, 1. This was said with reference to leases, but there seems to be no good reason why it should not apply to notes. The language sometimes used is, that a note without a date takes effect from the time of its making but this, it would seem, is inaccurate.

that time when the note or bill can first be proved to have a legal existence. (e)

We have seen that, although a note does not take effect until delivery, (f) and is said to be considered as made on the day it is delivered, (g) yet this must be so only as regards the title or the validity of the contract; but in respect to the question of computation of time,() the note takes effect from its date, by relation in case it is ante-dated, and prospectively where it is post-dated. (i) One reason of this is, that it would otherwise be

(e) Thus, in Mahier v. Le Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 207, the case turned upon the point whether a draft was accepted prior to, or subsequent to, certain judgments. Buchanan, J. said: " The draft purports to be dated November 30th, 1849, but being a writing sous seing privé, it has, per se, no date as against third persons. The acceptance of the draft bears no date, and for the determination of the antiquity of the claim of plaintiff, as compared with the contracts and judgments which she seeks to annul, the only date which can be assigned to that claim is the date of the protest, to wit, November 4th, 1850; for no other proof has been adduced of the existence of the draft, or of any other legal consideration for the same, at a previous date to that protest." Chitty (p. 370, 10th ed., London) says: "In general, the date of a bill or note should be stated, and if there be no date, then the day it was made; and if that cannot be ascertained, then the first day it can be proved to have existed." Quare, whether a note where no date or delivery can be ascertained might not in some cases be considered as payable on demand?

(f) Supra, p. 48, et seq.

(g) In Lansing v. Gaine, 2 Johns. 300, Kent, C. J. said: "The date of the notes then becomes immaterial, as they were valid only from the time of their delivery; and unless the contrary be shown, the presumption will be that they were then actually drawn, and were antedated by mistake or design. If they had been previously drawn, they had no force while in the possession, and under the control, of the maker. To all legal purposes, the notes are to be considered as made or drawn when they were delivered.” But this language, which is rather too broad, was used with respect to the question whether a partnership note, dated before dissolution, but not issued till afterwards by one of the partners, bound the others, and it was held that it did not.

(h) In Brewster v. McCardel, Wend. 478, Sutherland, J. said: "The date of a note is in no respect material, except for the purpose of determining when it is paynble."

(i) The time from which the Statute of Limitations begins to run on a note is reckoned from the date, not from the delivery. Bumpass v. Timms, 3 Sneed, 459. So on an acceptance Montague v. Perkins, C. B. 1853, 22 Eng. L. & Eq. 516. In Styles v. Wardle, 4 B. & C. 908, Bayley, J. said: “When there is no date, or an impossible date, that word must mean delivery. But where there is a sensible date, that word in other parts of the deed means the day of date, and not of the delivery. . . . The question here is, What, in this covenant, is the meaning of datus? I consider that a party executing a deed agrees that the day therein mentioned shall be the date for the purposes of computation. It would be very dangerous to allow a different construction of the word date; for then, if a lease were executed on March 30th, to hold from the date, that being the 25th, and the tenant were to enter and hold as if from that day, yet, after the expiration of the lease, he might defeat an ejectment on the ground that the lease