which hold that a special messenger should sometimes be used; (p) and where the nearest post-office is unknown, a notice directed to that which, on proper inquiry, is supposed to be the nearest, will suffice.(q) But it is held, that notice may be sent to the postoffice to which the indorser usually resorts, although there are other offices nearer his place of residence,(r) and although this office is in a different town from the one in which the party to be notified lives. (s). And in conformity with the same principle it is held, that where the indorser is in the habit of receiving his letters at either one of three post-offices, the notice may be sent to either of the three.(t)

Humph. 53, notice was sent to the one designated as the nearest; but on proof being offered that it had been discontinued for a year, the notice was held insufficient. In Davis v. Williams, Peck, 191, the plaintiff, knowing where the defendant lived, sent the notice to a place sixteen miles distant, although there was a post-office within five miles. The indorser was discharged. In Moore v. Hardcastle, 11 Md. 486, notice was sent to the shire town of the county, when the indorser lived twelve miles distant. His usual post-office was four miles from his residence. There was no proof of any inquiry by the notary for the nearest post-office. Held insufficient.

(p) Supra, pp. 478, 479.

(9) Marsh v. Barr, Meigs, 68, 9 Yerg. 253.

(r) Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Thompson, J., Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, I id. 578, 583; Bank of Geneva Howlett, 4 Wend. 328; Whittlesey, J., Seneca Co. Bank r. Neass, 5 Denio, 329, 338; Mercer v. Lancaster, 5 Penn State, 160; Sherman v. Clark, 3 McLean, 91; Bank of Louisiana v. Watson, 15 La. 38; Mead v Carnal, 6 Rob. La. 73; New Orleans, &c. Co. v. Robert, 9 id. 130; Grand Gulf, &c. Co. v. Barnes, 12 id. 127; New Orleans, &c. Co. v. Barrow, 2 La. Ann 326; Hepburn v. Ratliff, id. 331; New Orleans, &c. Co. v. Patton, id. 352; Citizens' Bank v. Walker, id. 791; Bank of Louisiana Tournillon, 9 id. 132; Farmers', &c. Bank v. Battle, 4 Humph. 86; Hazelton Coal Co. v. Ryerson, Spencer, 129; Walker . Bank of Augusta, 3 Ga. 486; Moore v. Hardcastle, 11 Md. 486; Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307; Glasscock v. Bank of Mo., 8 Misso. 443.

(s) Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Pet. 578; Reid v. Payne, 16 Johns. 218; Bank of Geneva v. Howlett, 4 Wend 328; Ransom v. Mack, 2 Hill, 587; Morris v. Husson, 4 Sandf. 93; Whittlesey, J, Seneca Co. Bank v. Neass, 5 Denio, 329, 338. See Montgomery Co. Bank v. Marsh, 3 Seld. 481; Shaw, C. J., Chouteau v. Webster, 6 Met. 1.6: Bank of Columbia v. Magruder, 6 Harris & J. 172; Grand Gulf, &c Co v. Barnes, 12 Rob. La. 127; Bird v. McCalop, 2 La. Ann. 351; New Orleans, &c. Co. v. Patton, id. 352; Glasscock v. Bank of Mo., 8 Misso. 443.

(t) Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543. The earlier cases on this point in Louisiana held that the notice must be sent to the nearest. Mechanics', &c. Bank v. Compton, 3 Rob La. 4; Nicholson v. Marders, id. 242; Mead v. Carnal, 6 id. 73. In Follain v. Dupre, 11 id. 454, it was held that, where there was only a difference of a mile or two in the distances of the offices from the indorser's residence, the notice might be sent to either. And in the later cases New Orleans, &c. Co. v. Briggs, 12 id. 175; Bank of Louisiana ". Tournillon, 9 La. Ann 132 -- it is held that, where there are two or more usual offices, notice may be sent to either.

SECTION IV.

TO WHOM NOTICE SHOULD BE GIVEN.

UPON the question to whom notice must be given, although the practice is sufficiently uniform, it is not easy to state a rule which meets all the cases. We think, however, that the true rule, although it may not reconcile all the authorities, and indeed must be open to some exceptions, should be this: Every person who, by and immediately upon the dishonor of the note or bill, and only upon such dishonor, becomes liable to an action, either on the paper, or on the consideration for which the paper was given, is entitled to immediate notice.

Notice should certainly be given to all the parties, but the holder is bound to give notice only to the indorser whom he intends to hold liable, and he may charge a subsequent indorser without notifying a prior,(u) or a prior without notifying a subsequent one, (v) provided the party whom he notifies exercises his right to secure himself by giving notice further. Notice may certainly be given to the agent of the party to be notified. (w) It has been said that strict proof of authority to receive notice is required,(x) but this cannot apply where notice is properly left at the place of business or of abode of the party to be notified, because a notice left there with any one who is found on the

(u) Baker v. Morris, 25 Barb. 138; Morgan v. Van Ingen, 2 Johns. 204; Morgan v. Woodworth, 3 Johns. Cas. 89; Carter v. Bradley, 19 Maine, 62; State Bank v. Hennen, 16 Mart. La. 226; Peyroux v Dubertrand, 11 La. 32; McCullock v. Commercial Bank, 16 id. 566; Union Bank v. Lea, 7 Rob. La. 76; Union Bank v. Hyde, id. 418; Grand Gulf, &c. Co. v. Barnes, 12 id. 127; Watson v. Templeton, 11 La. Ann. 137; Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, 1 Ohio State, 206; Wilcox v. Mitchell, 4 How. Miss. 272; Valk v. Bank of South Carolina, 1 McMullan, Eq. 414; Mathews v. Fogg, 1 Rich. 369; Whitman v. Farmers' Bank, 8 Port. Ala 258.

(v) Harrison v. Ruscoe, 15 M. & W. 231.

(w) Hestres v. Petrovie, 1 Rob. La. 119; Wilkins v. Commercial Bank, 6 How. Miss. 217. An attorney at law is not authorized to receive notices for his client unless by special authority. Louisiana State Bank v. Ellery, 16 Mart. La. 87. In Fortner v. Parham, 2 Smedes & M. 151, delivery of a notice to the indorser's clerk in the street, without proof of its reception, or of the clerk's authority to receive it, was held insufficient. In Paterson Bank v. Butler, 7 Halst. 268, notice delivered to a stranger, who said he was the indorser's brother, was held insufficient.

(x, Montillet v. Duncan, 11 Mart. La 534.

premises would ordinarily be sufficient. (y) We have seen that a presentment to any one there would be sufficient,(z) and if this is true where something is expected to be done by the party of whom the demand is made, it certainly is true where nothing is to be done except to receive a notice.

Authority to indorse negotiable paper has been held not to carry with it authority to receive notice of dishonor,(a) but an opinion to the contrary has been expressed. (b)

If an agent draws a bill in his own name, notice must be given to him, and if given to his principal, who is no party to the paper, it will not be sufficient.(c)

If a person entitled to notice be bankrupt, notice should be given to him, if his assignees are not yet appointed. (d) If they are, notice should perhaps be given to them, if the fact of their appointment is known to the holder, or might be known by him by the exercise of due diligence, (e) but notice might perhaps even then be sufficient if given to the bankrupt. Under our State insolvent laws, and wherever the point has not been settled by decision or a positive usage, it would seem to be the safest course to give notice both to the insolvent and to the assignees also.

If the insolvent has absconded, notice should be given to the assignees; (f) and if they are not appointed, we should suppose that a delay until their appointment would not discharge any one; and although notice may be given to any one holding or representing the estate,(g) we should think it better to notify the assignees when appointed.

If the indorser is dead at the time the note matures, and this

(y) Cromwell v. Hynson, 2 Esp. 511; Housego v. Cowne, 2 M. & W. 348, where notices left at the indorser's house with his wife were held sufficient.

(z) Supra, p. 489, note x.

(a) Valk v. Gaillard, 4 Strob. 99; Sharkey, C. J., Wilcox v. Routh, 9 Smedes & M. 476, 483.

(b) Lord Tenterden, C. J., Firth v. Thrush, 8 B. & C. 387.

(c) Grosvenor v. Stone, 8 Pick. 79. In Clay v Oakley, 17 Mart. La. 137, it was held. that, where the agent indorses in the principal's name, notice to the latter is sufficient. Whether it might be safely given to the agent in such case may depend upon the question whether an authority to indorse carries with it an authority to receive notice. (d) See Ex parte Moline, 19 Ves. 216.

(e) See Rohde v. Proctor, 4 B. & C. 517, 6 Dow. & R. 610; Ex parte Johnson, 3 Deac. & C. 433, 1 Mont & A. 622; Ex parte Chappel, 3 Mont. & A. 490, 3 Deac. 218. (f) Rohde v. Proctor, 4 B. & C. 517, 6 Dow. & R. 610.

(g) See Rohde v. Proctor, 4 B & C. 517, 6 Dow. & R. 610.

fact is known to the holder, notice must be sent to his adminis trators or executors, if it can be ascertained by reasonable inquiries who and where they are,(h) and a notice directed to the deceased by name will, under such circumstances, be insufficient to charge the estate. If the death is not known, and nothing appears to show that the sender ought to have known this fact, notice addressed to the deceased indorser will be sufficient, (i) and the same would be true where the holder cannot by reasonable diligence ascertain whether there is an administrator or executor, or who he is or where he resides.(j)

It may not always be necessary to designate the administrator or executor by name. Thus, where the notary, being ignorant as to who the administrator or executor was, sent the notice directed to the "legal representative" of the indorser, but mailed to his last place of residence, this was held sufficient, although the notary might have ascertained the name without much trouble, on the ground that "legal representative" and "administrator" or "executor" are synonymous terms.(k)

(h) Oriental Bank v. Blake, 22 Pick. 206, where the holder, knowing that the indorser was dead, left the notice at his last place of residence. Held insufficient. So Cayuga Co. Bank v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 236, where the holder knew of the indorser's death, that his will had been proved, and that it was in the surrogate's office, in the village where the holder lived. In Barnes ». Reynolds, 4 How. Miss. 114, the notice was sent to the indorser's last residence. The judge charged the jury, that if the holder knew of the death of the indorser, and could by ordinary diligence have ascertained who his executors were, it was incumbent on him to give them notice; but if the holder did not know of the death, or by ordinary diligence could not have ascertained who were the executors, the notice directed to the intestate was sufficient. Held correct, and a verdict for the plaintiff was sustained. Where an indorser died eight months before the note matured, notice directed to him was held bad, in the absence of proof by the plaintiff of due diligence in ascertaining who were the representatives. Bank of Louisiana v. Smith, 4 Rob. La. 276. But where the heir has been put in possession of the estate before maturity, notice directed to the indorser's legal representative is not suf ficient. Christmas v. Fluker, 7 id. 13. But notice should be sent to the executor, although the heir had been recognized, had given security, and taken possession, if the executor has not rendered any account, nor received from the heir the money necessary to pay the debts. New Orleans, &c. Co. v. Kerr, 9 Rob. La. 122. See the cases cited infra, chapter on Excuses for Want of Notice.

(i) Merchants' Bank v. Birch, 17 Johns, 25; Planters' Bank v. White, 2 Humph. 112. See Beals v. Peck, 12 Barb. 245; Barnes v. Reynolds. 4 How. Miss. 114, supra note h. Lapse of time may have the effect of requiring the plaintiff to prove due dili gence. See Bank of Louisiana v. Smith, 4 Rob. La. 276, supra, note h.

(j) Metcalf, J., Mass. Bank v. Oliver, 10 Cush. 557; Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines, 121; Barnes v. Reynolds, 4 How. Miss. 114, supra, note h.

(k) Pillow v. Hardemán, 3 Humph. 538.

But a notice sent to the "estate" of a deceased was held insufficient, where the name of the administrator could have been ascertained without much difficulty.() The reason given was, that the word "estate" was too ambiguous, comprehending the heir-at-law equally with the administrator or executor. In all these cases, as in many others, if it reaches the administrator or executor seasonably, the notice will be good, and proof of its reception will supply any defects in the sending.(m) Notice to one of several administrators or executors has been held sufficient, on the ground that they, like partners, all represent one and the same interest.(n)

Notice to one member of a partnership which indorses a note or bill is notice to all, because each partner represents the interests of the other partners and of the partnership, (o) and the same has been held where the notice has been given after dissolution and publication.(p) So if one of the firm dies before maturity, notice to the surviving partner is sufficient to hold the estate and the legal representative of the deceased. (q) If a bill be drawn on the firm by one partner, and accepted by him, notice of dishonor need not be given to the firm.(r)

But the interests of each joint indorser are not so far similar that notice to one is notice to all; they should all be notified; (s) nor should a notice to any mere member of a joint-stock com

(1) Mass. Bank v. Oliver, 10 Cush. 557.

(m) Cowen, J., Cayuga Co. Bank v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 236. See Beals v. Peck, 12 Barb. 245; Mass Bank v. Oliver, 10 Cush. 557.

(n) Beals v. Peck, 12 Barb. 245; Lewis v. Bakewell, 6 La. Ann. 359, where notice was given to the maker, one of three executors of the indorser.

(0) Nott v. Douming, 6 La 680, 684; Magee v. Dunbar, 10 id. 546. See Beals v Peck, 12 Barb. 245, 251; Willis v. Green, 5 Hill, 232; and cases cited infra, note r. (p) Coster v. Thomason, 19 Ala. 717.

(q) Cocke v. Bank of Tenn, 6 Humph. 51; Dabney v. Stidger, 4 Smedes & M. 749. (r) Rhett v. Poe, 2 How. 457; Fuller v. Hooper, 3 Gray, 334; Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176; Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Camp. 82; Bignold v. Waterhouse, 1 Maule & S. 255.

(s) Shepard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 367; Willis v. Green, 5 Hill, 232; Beals v. Peck, 12 Barb. 245. See Bank of Chenango v. Root, 4 Cowen, 126; Sayre v. Frick, 7 Watts & S. 383; Miser v. Trovinger, 7 Ohio State, 281; State Bank v. Slaughter, 7 Blackf. 133; Dabney v. Stidger, 4 Smedes & M. 749; Wood v. Wood, 1 Harrison, 429. Contra, Dodge v. Bank of Ky., 2 A. K. Marsh. 610, 615; Higgins v. Morrison, 4 Dana, 100, 105; Byles on Bills, p. 229, citing Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Camp. 82. In this case, however, by the head note, it appears that the drawers were

partners.