drawer's usual course of business, and be what it would have been had he not happened to be at the time in New York. The converse of this has been decided.()

If a bill be signed in one place in blank, and sent to another to have the date, the names of the drawee and payee, and the amount and the place where payable, inserted, or if all these are written in, and the bill then sent to the drawer in another place for his signature, the bill will be taken to be made where it is signed, and will be held to be inland or foreign accordingly.(i) Every bill of exchange is, prima facie, an inland bill; and a party who would hold it as a foreign bill must allege and prove it to be so.(j)

SECTION IV.

OF THE SETS OF FOREIGN BILLS.

OF inland bills, usually, but one copy is made; but of foreign bills, usually, three copies are made, which together form what is called a set of exchange. The reason of this is, to guard against loss or question in case of miscarriage, the chances of

(h) In Strawbridge v. Robinson, 5 Gilman, 470, it appeared that the bill was dated at a place in Illinois, where the parties resided, but was actually drawn in Wisconsin, where the parties happened to be at the time. Held, that it was an inland bill.

(i) Thus, where partners resident in Ireland signed and indorsed a copperplate impression of a bill of exchange, leaving blanks for the date, sum, time when payable, and name of the drawee, and transmitted it to B in England for his use, who filled up the blanks and negotiated it; it was held, that this was to be considered as a bill of ex change by relation, from the time of the signing and indorsing in Ireland, and conse. quently that an English stamp was not necessary. And Bayley, J. said: "Suppose the person subscribing his name as drawer had died whilst the bill was on its passage, and afterwards the blanks had been filled up and the bill negotiated to an innocent indorsee; I should think that in that case the representatives of the party signing the bill would have been liable. This shows that when the whole is filled up, it has reference to the time of the signature, which in this case was made in Ireland." Snaith v. Mingay, 1 Maule & S. 87. And see, to the same effect, Lennig v. Ralston, 23 Penn. State, 137. So where a bill of exchange was written, and the acceptance of it made, in England, and it was afterwards transmitted to the drawer abroad for his signature, and was there signed, it was held, that the bill was a foreign one. Boehm v. Campbell, Gow, 55. And see Crutchly v. Mann, 5 Taunt. 529.

(j) Armani v. Castrique, 13 M. & W. 443.

the bill reaching in due season the party to whom it is transmitted being thus increased threefold. And the facility for presentment thus afforded has been held to hasten the time within which a bill should be presented for acceptance.(k) Usually, perhaps always, each copy of the set is designated on the face of it, the order being, "Pay this first of exchange, the second and third being unpaid," or, "Pay this second of exchange, the first and third being unpaid." But for this precaution the drawer might be held by an innocent purchaser of one copy, without notice that another existed.(1) Hence the custom, said to prevail, or to have prevailed, in Europe, of having no such caution on the first of exchange, and on the second saying only" the first being unpaid," (m) seems unsafe, for the first then gives no notice of the second and third, and the second gives no notice of the third. But an omission to name other parts, obviously by mistake, might not affect the rights of any party. (n)

The whole of the set constitutes, in law, but one bill, and therefore payment or cancelling of either copy of the set is a discharge of all. (o) A holder of either copy of the set is entitled

(k) Straker v. Graham, 4 M & W. 721.

(1) In Wright v. McFall, 8 La. Ann. 120, where the first and second of a bill of exchange were both accepted, with the knowledge and consent of the drawers, and without fraud or collusion between the holders and acceptors, it was held, that the drawers were liable on both.

(m) Marius (4th ed.), p. 7.

(n) Bayley on Bills (2d Am. ed.), p 24.

(0) Durkin v. Cranston, 7 Johns. 442; Ingraham v. Gibbs, 2 Dallas, 134; Miller v. Hackley, Anthon, N. P. 68; Perreira v. Jopp, 10 B. & C. 450, n. (a). The case of Holdsworth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C. 449, was decided upon special circumstances. The drawee (who was also payee) of a foreign bill of exchange drawn in three parts, accepted and indorsed one part to a creditor to remain in his hands until some other security was given for it; and afterwards accepted and indorsed another part for value to a third person. The acceptor substituted another security for the part first accepted, whereupon it was given up to him. Held, that under these circumstances the holder of the part secondly accepted was entitled to recover on the bill against the acceptor. Held, also, by Lord Tenterden, C. J. and Parke, J., that the acceptor would have been liable on the part secondly accepted, even if the first part had been indorsed and circulated unconditionally. Lord Tenterden said: "According to the verdict of the jury, the delivery of the bills to the defendant's father was not absolute, but conditional, and I think that the facts of the case justified that finding. The parts first accepted cannot, therefore, be said to have been paid, for they were redeemed by the substitution of other securities. That being so, what was there to prevent the defendant from putting in circulation another part of the bills? But I am inclined to go further, and to say that the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover, even if the transfer to the father

to recover thereon, without producing the other copies, or accounting for their non-production. If another copy of the set has already been paid, and another person is the proper holder, and has given notice of his title to the party sued, or if any other ground of defence exists, which displaces the prima facie title of the plaintiff, the defendant must show it.(p)

On the continent of Europe, it seems to be not unusual for an original bill to be forwarded for acceptance, and in the mean time a copy of it negotiated; and it is said to be necessary that this copy should be marked as such, stating also where the original is; but we have no practice of this kind in this country, and it is said not to exist in England. (q) A protest may sometimes be made on the copy of a bill.(r)

SECTION V.

OF THE CERTAINTY REQUISITE IN A BILL OF EXCHANGE.

As a bill of exchange is intended to operate and be used as an instrument of business and as a representative of money, even more than a promissory note, and in order to do this it must be precise and definite in the facts which it states and the obligations which it imposes; therefore, all that was said, in the previous chapter, of the various certainties essential to a legal promissory negotiable note applies to a negotiable bill of exchange, always with as great, and in some respects with even greater, force. Although on these points, as on all others, the law merchant seeks to be reasonable rather than technical, yet here it is but reasonable to be very exact. It will be seen, therefore, as we go on presenting the law of negotiable paper,

had been absolute and unconditional. For suppose two parts of a foreign bill come to the hands of the drawee, he accepts both, and indorses first one part to A and afterwards the other part to B. In any question as to property between them, A might be entitled to both. But the question here is, whether the acceptor and indorser shall be allowed to defend himself against the holder of the one part, on account of the previous circulation of the other part. I am not aware of any principle of law upon which such a defence can be supported."

(p) Downes v. Church, 13 Pet. 205; Commercial Bank v. Routh, 7 La. Ann. 128. (q) Byles on Bills, 311.

(r) Dehers v. Harriot, 1 Show. 163.

that it requires, upon all matters which belong to the representative character of this paper, or, in other words, as to everything which makes it an accurately defined contract which must be executed promptly and accurately according to its precise tenor, a very great exactness. And it is perhaps true that the courts in many recent cases seem to be taught, by the increasing experience of the mercantile community, rather to increase and strengthen this exactness than to relax it in any

Whatever favor the equities of a particular case may require, we believe that the general purpose of the law of negotiable paper, and the general good of a community among whom the use of this paper is now universal, requires at least all of the exactness and all of the stringency that the courts of England or of this country have ever applied to this subject. In addition to the requisites of certainty in a promissory note, a bill of exchange must be reasonably certain as to the person to whom it is directed. An instrument which is not directed to any one is not a bill of exchange.(s) But where an instrument in writing possessed all the other requisites of a bill of exchange, and was made payable at a particular house, it was held suffi

(s) The case of Regina v. Hawkes, 2 Moo. C. C. 60, seems to have held a different doctrine. But we think that case would not now be regarded as law. In Peto v. Reynolds, 9 Exch 410, Parke, B. said: "I cannot help observing, that, with the excep tion of Regina v Hawkes, there is no case in which it has ever been decided that an instrument could be a bill of exchange where there was not a drawer and a drawce. With respect to that case, it does not seem to me entitled to the same weight of authority as a decision pronounced in the presence of the public, and on reasons assigned after hearing an argument in public. I must own that, but for that case, I should bave had no doubt that the law merchant required that every bill of exchange should have a drawer and drawee" Alderson, B. said: "With respect to the question whether this instrument is or is not a bill of exchange, the case of Regina v. Hawkes is undoubtedly in point. I must own, however, that I now think that I was wrong on that occasion. The case seems to have been decided on the ground that Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739, governed it; and the fact was not adverted to, that Gray v. Milner may be thus explained: that a bill of exchange, made payable at a particular place or house, is meant to be addressed to the person who resides at that place or house. Therefore, in that case, the bill was on the face of it directed to some one; and the court held, that, inasmuch as the defendant promised to pay it, that was conclusive evidence that he was the party to whom it was addressed. But in the case of Regina

v. Hawkes, the instrument was addressed to no one." Martin, B. said: "It seems to me that it is absolutely essential to the validity of a bill of exchange, that it should have a drawer and a drawee; and, except for the case of Gray v Milner, I should have doubted whether the making a bill payable at a particular place was a sufficient address." See also Reynolds v. Peto, 11 Exch. 418.

cient, upon the ground that it must be considered as directed to the person residing at that house; and the defendant having accepted it, this was regarded as an acknowledgment that he was the person to whom it was directed. (t) The soundness of this decision has been questioned. (u) An instrument in the common form of a bill of exchange, except that the word at was substituted for to before the name of the drawee, has been held to be a bill of exchange. (v) If there was evidence that an instrument was so drawn for the purpose of deception, there would be no doubt that it would be a bill of exchange.(w) And it is not absolutely necessary that the drawee should be a different person from the drawer. For it is very common for a man to draw upon himself; and it has long been held, that such an instrument is a good bill of exchange. (x) But it may be treated as a promissory note, at the election of the holder.(y) The same principle applies where a copartnership carries on business at two different places, and one establishment draws a bill upon the other.(z) So where a duly au

(t) Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739.

(u) See Peto v. Reynolds, supra, and Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 16.

(v) Shuttleworth v. Stephens, 1 Camp. 407; Regina v. Smith, 2 Moo. C. C. 295. (w) Rex v. Hunter, Russ. & R. C. C. 511; Allan v. Mawson, 4 Camp. 115. In this last case Gilbs, C. J. said: "I shall leave it to the jury whether the word 'at,' from the manner in which it is written, was not inserted for the purpose of deception, and then the instrument is a bill of exchange in point of fact. The 'at' being struck out, it is in the common form in which bills of exchange are drawn. . . I can see no

motive for drawing an instrument in this form, except to deceive the public. If such instruments have been common in the country, they ought not to be continued or endured."

(x) See Starke v. Cheesman, Carth. 509; Dehers v. Harriot, 1 Show. 163; Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077. In Harvey v. Kay, 9 B. & C. 364, Bayley, J. said: "In Magor v. Hammond, which was a special verdict in Common Pleas argued before the twelve judges, all the judges were of opinion that an instrument might be a bill of exchange, though the drawer and drawee were the same person." In Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B. 19, Patteson, J. said: "I do not know that a party may not address a bill to himself, and accept, though the proceeding would be absurd enough." See also Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story, 22; Cunningham v. Wardwell, 3 Fairf. 466.

(y) Roach v. Ostler, 1 Man. & R. 120; Randolph v. Parish, 9 Port. Ala. 76. (2) Thus, in Miller v. Thomson, 3 Man. & G. 576, it was held, that an instrument in the form of a bill of exchange, drawn upon a joint-stock bank by the manager of one of its branch banks, by order of the directors, might be declared on as a promissory note. Tindal, C. J. said: "It is an instrument drawn by one of several partners, directing that a sum of money shall be paid by the partnership at a different place. There is an absence of the circumstance of there being two distinct parties as drawer and drawee, which is essential to the constitution of a bill of exchange. That being so,