Imperfections and Behavior in Economic OrganizationsRobert P. Gilles, Pieter H.M. Ruys Springer Science & Business Media, 2012 M12 6 - 319 páginas Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting. The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations. |
Contenido
THE KINKED DEMAND CURVE | 15 |
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE | 39 |
WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES | 71 |
MODELLING OF ECONOMIES WITH | 89 |
TOPOLOGIES AS TRADE INFRASTRUCTURES | 137 |
DEMAND IN A DUOPOLY WITH | 149 |
IMPLEMENTING STRONG AND LOWER | 177 |
COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION | 194 |
Pareto NonOptimality | 244 |
Comparative Economic Systems | 245 |
Cooperative Processing of Information | 249 |
INTERSECTION THEOREMS ON THE UNIT SIMPLEX AND THE SIMPLOTOPE Dolf Talman | 257 |
Preliminaries | 259 |
Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex | 261 |
Intersection Theorems on the Simplotope | 268 |
A SOCIAL POWER INDEX FOR HIERARCHICALLY STRUCTURED POPULATIONS OF ECONOMIC AGENTS René van den Brink and Robert ... | 279 |
Properties of Communication Games | 207 |
Strategic Behavior and Endogenous Formation of Communication Links | 211 |
Generalizations | 215 |
OUTLINE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE NATURE OF THE FIRM Tatsuro Ichiishi | 229 |
Basic Model | 232 |
Ownership Structures | 239 |
Equilibrium Existence Theorem | 242 |
Introduction | 280 |
Hierarchically Structured Populations | 284 |
Social Power Indices | 291 |
A Subjective Approach to the BGIndex | 296 |
An Example | 306 |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations Robert P. Gilles,Pieter H.M. Ruys Vista previa limitada - 1994 |
Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations Robert P. Gilles,Pieter H.M. Ruys Sin vista previa disponible - 2012 |
Términos y frases comunes
allocation organization assume assumption atomless Aumann Bayesian game Bayesian rationalizable behavior BG-index Cartesian product coalition formation coalitional structure coalitionally structured collusive price commodity communication graph communication situation competitive concept condition constraints consumer convex cooperative game core defined Definition denote dominant strategy echelon tree Econometrica economic agents example exists externalities finite function game form Game Theory Gilles given Hence hierarchically structured population Ichiishi implementation interaction Journal of Economic kinked demand kinked demand game left-optimal price Lemma maximal mechanism modelling types Myerson value Nash equilibrium nonempty Nouweland oligopoly outcome p₁ potential predecessors potential successors primitive coalitions Proof rationing relationally structured economy result revelation game revelation principle satisfies semi-core semi-ring sequentially dominant Shapley simplotope social power index space subgame perfect equilibrium Tilburg University topology trade TU-game U.S. Steel unit simplex utility Walrasian equilibrium