[SP No. 109014, February 17, 2011] WELLINGTON BATALLONES, petitioner, vs. ANA FE DONATO-LUMBA, represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, ATTY. RAMON J. QUISUMBING, respondent.

1. CIVIL LAW; URBAN LAND REFORM LAW (P.D. NO. 1517;) RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL UNDER P.D. NO. 1517 GRANTED ONLY TO LEGITIMATE TENANTS.-Pertinent to the resolution of this case is Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517 which grants a right of first refusal to legitimate tenants in the purchase of the property, to wit: SECTION 6, Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas.Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at

reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.

2. ID.; ID.; THE TERM "TENANT" AS DEFINED UNDER P.D. 1517 DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE WHOSE PRESENCE ON THE LAND IS MERELY TOLERATED AND WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A CONTRACT, THOSE WHO ENTER THE LAND BY FORCE OR DECEIT, OR THOSE WHOSE POSSESSION IS UNDER LITIGATION.-The Urban Land Reform Law (P.D. No. 1517) defines the term "tenant" as the rightful occupant of land and its structure, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of a contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.. From this definition, it is evident that Batallones cannot be considered as tenant within the purview of P.D. No. 1517. It is interesting to note that, the Contract of Lease presented by Batallones before the trial court was not betweem him and Lumba. The lease agreement which was executed way back in 1971, was between his father Policarpio Batallones and Amparo Donato. After the demise of the original parties to the contract, the title of the property was vested to Lumba, a superseding event which significantly alters the relations of parties.

PETITION FOR REVIEW from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Andy E. Lapid for petitioner.

Marvin V. Masangkay for respondent.

GAERLAN, S.H., J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Wellington Batallones, seeking to reverse and set aside, the Decision' dated May 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 1091-07-CFM-R00-00. The assailed decision affirmed the Decision2 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) directing the ejectment of petitioner from the subject property.

The facts:

In a Complaint3 filed on September 3, 2007 with the MeTC of Pasay City, Branch 45, Ana Fe Donata-Lumba (Lumba) alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17899, registered by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and particularly described as follows:

A portion of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2483, located at Brgy. 99, Zone 14, Block 25, Corners Vergel and Lopez Streets, Pasay City, with an area of 3,011 square meters (subject property).

Lumba alleged that Batallones had been occupying the subject property for years by mere tolerance and without any title. She further averred that Batallones was not paying any rent thereon. Since she will be using the property herself, Lumba demanded from Batallones to vacate and to surrender possession of the subject

1 Rollo, 122-130. 2 Id. at 84-89. 3 Id. at 25-38.

052380-3

property. The demand letter was sent to Batallones thru registered mail on May 9, 2007.

On the other hand, Batallones countered that he is occupying the subject property under a lease agreement wherein he is religiously paying monthly rental as agreed thereunder and thereby rebuking the allegation of Lumba that his possession was by mere tolerance. To support his position, Batallones presented the Contract of Lease1 entered into by Amparo Donato, the mother of Lumba and Policarpio Batallones, his father on December 17, 1971. Batallones asserted that after the death of Amparo Donato, Policarpio Batallones still continues to religiously pay monthly rentals to Lumba as shown in the receipts signed by the latter.5

In addition, Batallones invoked the provision of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 15176 providing protection to the occupants of urban land who were in possession thereof for 10 years or more.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Lumba] and against [Batallones], among others] and all persons claiming rights and interest under them to:

1. Vacate and surrender possession to [Lumba] of the leased premises at Lot No. 2483, Barangay 99, Zone 14, block 25, Vergel Street, Pasay City; 2. Pay [Lumba] jointly and severally the reasonable

compensation for the use and enjoyment of the premises in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) from the time of the filing of the complaint, until the premises is vacated;

3. Pay [Lumba] jointly and severally the attorney's fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and

4. Pay the cost of the suit. SO ORDERED.9

On appeal, the RTC affirmed the order of the court a quo evicting Batallones from the subject property in its Decision10 dated May 4, 2009.

Hence, Batallones seeks recourse before this Court via this Petition for Review challenging the RTC Decision and ascribing the following errors:

1.

he has a right of first refusal to purchase the property under P.D. No. 1517.

On August 14, 2008, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Lumba and ordered Batallones to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property. The court a quo declared that Batallones is not entitled to the right of first refusal to the property since he failed to show any written document evidencing such right. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

4 Id. at 44.

5 Id. at 39-43.

6 Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof

7 Id. at 62-69.

8 Id. at 84-89.

THE HONORABLE RTC GRAVELY ERRED IN

QUO IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT FILED BY LUMBA THE COURT A QUO NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION;

IV.

THE HONORABLE RTC GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IN SPITE OF THE FAILURE OF LUMBA TO COMPLY WITH JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR DEMAND.

V.

THE HONORABLE RTC GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE SUBSTITUTION OF VERGEL P. LOPEZ HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. TO BECOME THE PLAINTIFF IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

VI.

THE HONORABLE RTC GRAVELY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO ORDERING [BATALLONES] TO VACATE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TO PAY REASONABLE RENTALS.11

Upon careful examination of records reveals that this case hinges on the issue of whether Batallones is entitled to preemptive right under P.D. No. 1517.

Batallones posits that he has a right of first refusal to purchase the lot pointing out that such property is covered by the Area of Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zone under P.D. No. 1517. Citing Section 6 of the law, Batallones asserts that he is a legitimate tenant who had been lawfully occupying the property for the past 37 years by virtue of the Contract of Lease.

On the other had, Lumba refutes the foregoing contention on the ground that Batallones is not a legitimate tenant and his occupation on the subject property is merely tolerated. Even assuming that Batallones is lawfully occupying the subject property, still, he forfeited his right under P.D. No. 1517 and became a deforciant by defaulting in rental payments.

We resolve to deny the petition.

Pertinent to the resolution of this case is Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517 which grants a

11 Id. at 6-7.

right of first refusal to legitimate tenants in the purchase of the property, to wit:

SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree. [Emphasis supplied].

The Urban Land Reform Law (P.D. No. 1517) defines the term "tenant" as the rightful occupant of land and its structure, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of a contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.12

From this definition, it is evident that Batallones cannot be considered as tenant within the purview of P.D. No. 1517. It is interesting to note that, the Contract of Lease presented by Batallones before the trial court was not between him and Lumba. The lease agreement which was executed way back in 1971, was between his father Policarpio Batallones and Amparo Donato. After the demise of the original parties to the contract, the title of the property was vested to Lumba, a superseding event which significantly alters the relations of parties.

Worthy to stress, that as early as July 9, 1973, Lumba was already the registered owner of the lot in question as evidenced in TCT No. 17899. Almost four decades had passed, however, there was no contract of lease that was executed between Batallones and Lumba. Although the lessor need not be the owner of the property being leased, he should have a right (e.g., either as a usufructuary or a lessee) or at least an authority (e.g., as an agent of the owner, usufructuary, or lessee) to lease it out.13

12 Vergara v. IAC, May 7, 1990.

13 Ballesteros v. Abion, February 9, 2006.

Here, the authority of Amparo Donato to lease of the property was not shown. Needless to say, Lumba is not bound by the lease agreement Policarpio Batallones and Amparo Donato.

Neither was it shown by Batallones that there was an implied lease agreement between him and Lumba. Mere allegations that rental payment had been religiously delivered to the purported lessor, without any proof thereof, cannot be given credence by this Court.

Putting everything aside, what hugely tramples upon Batallones' position, is his own admission that as early as 2005 he had not been paying rent for occupying the subject property.14 Whatever may be his reason for his failure to deliver the rental payment, this Court cannot do more but to adjudge his occupation on the subject property as illegal.

Accordingly, Batallones cannot invoke the protection of P.D. No. 1527 and the correlative pre-emptive right reserved by law to lawful possessors only. Since Batallones' possession was merely tolerated by the real owner, he has no legal right to remain in the subject property upon demand. The right of possession (jus posedendi) and the right to dispose (jus dispodendi) the property

14 Batallones' Petition for Review, p.4.

according to his will, were among the inherent attributes of ownership granted by law to the owners thereof. Lumba, as the registered owner of the subject property, should not be denied of these elementary rights.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision dated March 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 1091-07-CFM-R00-00 is hereby Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Abdulwahid and Rosario, JJ., concur.

Petition denied. Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119 affirmed.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.

(Sgd.) HAKIM S. ABDULWAHID

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Tenth (10th) Division

[SP No. 110557, March 17, 2011]*

ELIZABETH RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 78, and LEONILA NAVARRO, respondents.

GUIDELINES

IMPLEMENTATION

FOR

1. REMEDIAL LAW; MEDIATION; REVISED THE OF MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS (A.M. No. 01-10-5-SCPHILJA); TRIAL COURTS ARE NOT UNDER COMPULSION TO DISMISS AN ACTION FOR FAILURE OF A PARTY TO ATTEND MEDIATION PROCEEDINGS.A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated 16 October 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court grant judges the discretion to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at mediation proceedings. Specifically, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA provides that: 12. Sanctions. Since mediation is part of PreTrial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pretrial, in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings. To reiterate, the Court a quo is not under compulsion to dismiss an action for failure of a party to attend mediation proceedings. The trial court is granted the discretion in imposing the appropriate sanction.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; NON-DISMISSAL OF A CASE DESPITE FAILURE OF A PARTY TO ATTEND MEDIATION PROCCEDINGS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION.-Here, the Court a quo

decided not to dismiss the case filed by the private respondent but instead ordered the latter to explain why the case should not be dismissed for her failure to attend the

mediation proceedings. The private respondent explained that her failure to attend the mediation proceedings was due to her little understanding of the intricacies of the law. The private respondent even made an undertaking that she will be present in all the subsequent proceedings

Court of Appeals Reports Annotated, Vol. 50

of the case. In not dismissing the case and in accepting the reason given by the private respondent, the Court a quo cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion. As ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Real Bank, Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, that unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the court should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end. Likewise, as held in the case of Euhilda C. Tabuada vs. Hon. J. Cedrick O. Ruiz, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, Erlinda CalalimanLedesma and Yolanda Calaliman-Tagriza, in the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Leo D. Villavert for private respondent.

Christian Peter C. Bautista for petitioner.

GAERLAN, S.H., J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the 14 July 2009 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court, City of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Civil Case No. 559M-2008. The questioned Order of the Court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner Elizabeth Rodriguez of the 26 May 2009 Order of the Court a quo which was given in open court. In the Order asked to be reconsidered, the Court a quo accepted private respondent Leonila Navarro's explanation on why she failed to attend the mediation proceedings and the preliminary conference which in effect denied the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the case filed by the private respondent against her.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-13 2 Rollo, p. 14