Time and again. We find it significant to quote the well-settled rule which was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the recent case of People vs. Obina, et al.12, viz: As a rule, findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and of their testimonies are accorded great respect, unless the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case. In criminal cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect, because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. This deference to the trial court's appreciation of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. observed Josefa on how she testified on what transpired on the day of the crime. In its decision, the trial court said The complainant in this case suffers from mental disorder and speech disability ("Apa). At the time of the commission of the crime, she was nineteen (19) years old but her mentality is between 6 to 9 years old. Such mental retardation is confirmed by the psychiatrist of the Center for Mental Health who interviewed and examined the said complainant in the said Center on July 24, 2004 and on March 1, 2005. She classified the complainant's sickness as mild mental retardation. But despite the complainant's speech impairment and mental retardation, she was able to identify the herein accused, VICTORIANO ARTIENDA, JR. as the one who ravished her in the mountain for four time (4) times in succession in the presence of the accused' sister Dada. She pointed to the accused as the one who choked, pointed undressed and raped her. Her factual descriptions on the manner how she was deflowered was comprehensible although lacking of some minor clarity. She testified that before she was brought to the mountain, she was embraced hard by the accused near their house and when they reached the mountain which is to far away from their house, she was forced to lie on her back two (2) hands raised as if in surrender and was raped. Then followed by the second sexual intercourse which she described as "patuwad" then followed by the third sexual assault and this time, she claimed she was undressed and then raped; and again followed by the fourth sexual abuse which she described to have happened when the accused pulled and hold her arm and then there was sexually abused. She tried to struggle while being sexually assaulted but felt so weak and just lied on her back with her palms opened depicting submission to the sexual act. She also admitted that she did not cry or shout while being raped. The observation of the trial court and reading of complainant's testimony in its entirely shows that she repeatedly stated what accused-appellant had done to her. It is noteworthy that she has been consistent in her narration of what transpired in the day she was ravished. Dr. Briones also testified on complainant's consistency in her narration when she was interviewed during her mental examination. We observed that only if such testimony is read in parts and the portions thereof are isolated or taken out of context and no allowance is made for complainant's mental condition can accused-appellant's reading of it be provided for by the Rules of Court as to the qualifications of a witness have no application in the case at bar. Josefa, though a mental retardate at the time she called to be examined in court, was capable of intelligently making known what she perceived during the commission of the crime. Verily, the trial court did not err in upholding her testimony. The trial court also did not commit any error in upholding the testimony of Josefa Capalad as a witness on the four counts of rape committed against her. As to reiterate, the testimony of witness who meets the test of credibility can alone be sufficient to convict the accused. Further, the lower court's findings were supported by the testimony of Maria Arlen G. Briones. M.D., a then medical officer of the National Center for Mental Health.18 The examination she conducted upon Josefa Capalad was reduced into writing and submitted as clinical abstract to the lower court. She also identified the same and explained the results thereof.19 it was found that Josefa Capalad is suffering from a mental disorder known as mild mental retardation.20 She also testified that Josefa Capalad disclosed by means of sign language that she was sexually was abused and even demonstrated to her and how the accused strangled her neck, punched her abdomen and forcibly undressed her.21 She even said that Josefa consistent in her narration in two separate interviews.22 Dr. Briones did not only testify on the earliermentioned condition of the victim but also explained how this condition would affect the perception and credibility of Josefa as a witness. Q: Now, the private complainant who has the mentality of 7 to 8 year old child like any other child is very prone to be truthful or untruthful in her narration of facts known by her? A: Because mentally retarded people, to put it in layman's term, they have little knowledge so that they cannot fabricate or they cannot make stories, sir. Q: So they are no prone to be truthful than deceptive? A: Yes, sir. Q: So based on that view of yours and the result of your examination of the private complainant you are the view or opinion that the declaration of the private complainant should be given credence.? A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Ours.) Again, the trial court having the direct opportunity in observing the witnesses, is given much respect in its evaluation and appreciation of facts. We concur with the trial court and now say that it did not commit any error in giving credence and full weight to the testimony of Josefa. 19 lbid. 20 Id. 2000. 17 People v. Mitra, G.R. No. 130669, March 27, 2000. 21 Id. 22 Id. 18 Rollo, p. 73. Moreover, the prosecution has sufficiently appellant defiled her.27 Accused-appellant, adduced evidence to prove beyond in defense, alleged that Elvira Bo, the reasonable doubt that the appellant mother of Arnold Bo who stabbed Florante raped Josefa. The latter narrated in a Artienda, brother of the appellant, influenced spontaneous and straightforward manner by Josefa Capalad to point at him during the demonstrating what was done to her on how police-line-up.28 The Office of the Solicitor she was sexually abused. Indeed, the rule General (OSG) argued that it is readily is that when a rape victim's testimony is apparent that Josefa has nothing to do with straightforward and candid, unshaken by the case entitled People of the Philippines rigid cross-examination and unflawed by vs. Arnold Po and Jaime De Leon.29 We relevant inconsistencies, or contradictions agree with the OSG and say that by human in its material points, the same must be experience, it is difficult to believe that given full faith and credit.23 complainant, whose intelligence is It is also noteworthy that the appellant admittedly low, could have concocted so has not adduced any evidence of ill-motive on the part of Josefa to falsely charge him of the heinous crime of rape. He even admitted that their mothers were friends and that Josefa herself is friend.24 Absent any ill-motive on the part of Josefa to falsely charge the appellant of rape, the presumption is that, she is telling the truth; hence, her testimony is entitled to full probative weight. It would run counter to the natural order of events and of human nature, and contrary to the presumption of good faith, for a prosecution witness to falsely testify if the appellant is truly innocent.25 We agree with the trial court26 that the defense of the appellant is plain alibi and denial. The accused-appellant denied to have sexually abused the complainant. He presented his own father to corroborate his denial/alibi and never offered any valid defense to extricate himself from the charge. Alibi is particularly worthless compared to the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses especially by the rape victim. The accused-appellant's denial of the crime charged constitutes negative selfserving evidence which cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Josefa that the 23 People vs. Canuto, G.R. No. 169083, August 7, 2006. 24 Rollo, p. 98. 26 Rollo, note 135. 27 Supra, note 22. grave a charge against accused-appellant or that she and her mother would go into the trouble of having her medically examined and undergo trial had she merely invented the charge.30 Moreover, denial as a defense is inherently weak because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. It is quite incredible that a woman would falsely accuse a man of rape because someone else has a score to settle with him.31 As to the issue on the period within which Josefa failed to immediately report to her mother what transpired on the day she was defiled by the accused-appellant, We also agree with the OSG in citing the case of People vs. Umayam32 where the Supreme Court held that the Court has not prescribed a uniform manner of behavior during and after a rape incident. The failure of Josefa to let her mother learn about what happen to her does not change the fact that she was raped. It should not also be taken against her even if she admitted to have frequented accused-appellant's house even after the incident.33 Let it be remembered, not all women who are mentally fit who went through a harrowing experience knew hot to handle the same, what more woman who is a mental retardate having a mentality of 7 to 9 years old? 28 Rollo, pp. 104-105. 29 Rollo, p. 164. 30 People vs. Golez, 192 SCRA 663 (1990). 31 Supra, note 29. 32 402 SCRA 457 (2003). 33 Rollo, p. 165. Finally, although We are the same view as to the credibility of Josefa as a witness and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, We do not share the same view as to the order of the trial court for the accused-appellant to acknowledge and support the child born by Josefa. The four counts of rape were proven beyond reasonable doubt but this does not prove the accused-appellant is the father of the child born by Josefa. Accordingly, the accused-appellant also be ordered to support the child unless it has been proven before the proper court where it is proved that the accused-appellant is indeed the father of the same child. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 15 August 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The order of the trial court to acknowledge and support the child of the victim is hereby OMITTED. SO ORDERED. Abdulwahid and Rosario, JJ., concur. modification. Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed with CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution it is hereby certified that conclusions in the decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court. (SGD.) HAKIM S. ABDULWAHID Associate Justice Chairperson, Tenth (10th) Division GOVERNED BY R.A. 8974; BASIS FOR COMPENSATION.-To enlighten both parties, We find significance in citing the well-settled rule enunciated in the case of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp. citing the case of Republic vs. Gingoyon where the Supreme Court ruled that there is a difference between the expropriation procedures under Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. *** There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon filing of the complaint to be entitled to writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of TRB that the RTC correctly applied the procedure laid out in Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the Republic. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT OF POSSESSION ISSUED ONLY UPON PRESENTATION OF A CERTIFICATE OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS. RA 8974 must be complied with before a writ of possession be issued in favor of the petitioner. We agree with the petitioner that its submission of the Certification issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines which contain as follows: "This is to certify that LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY (LRTA) has deposited the amount of PESOS: Twenty two million four hundred seventy five thousand four hundred pesos (P22,475,400.00) only to SA No. 02711220-47 in the name of LRTA FAO ANTONIO C. OPPEN (Deposit in Trust for Expropriation of Private Property), which is held in abeyance subject to the orders and final disposition of a competent court" is sufficient compliance to the provisions of RA 8974 for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. It is noteworthy at this juncture that the law explicitly provides that before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned. The certificate issued by the Land Bank shows nothing but the availability of funds deposited in the name of LRTA FAO ANTONIO C. OPPEN for the compensation of the property owner as expressly provided in the same certificate. Also, We observed that public respondent ruled that the deposit was too conditional in favor of herein petitioner. Let it be given emphasis that the phrase "held in abeyance subject of an order of final disposition of a |