the word dan selected by the writers of the New Testament to express the nature of the transaction between God and man in the plan of salvation? It might be said, indeed, that they found this word uniformly used in the Septuagint, and that they employed it as expressing the idea which they designed to convey, with sufficient accuracy. But this is only removing the difficulty one step farther back where it remains in all its force. Why did the LXX. adopt this word? Why did they not rather use the word ouvexn, the common and appropriate Greck word to express the notion of a covenant? And why, if there was no settled plan, or no propriety in the nature of things for the use of the word dathan did they adhere to it with such remarkable uniformity, a uniformity which has probably not a parallel in the use of an important word in the Scriptures?

In regard to this enquiry, it was suggested by the late Rev. James P. Wilson, D.D., of Philadelphia, that the reason might have been that the translators of the Septuagint, who were surrounded by the heathen, and who supposed that their work would be read by them, were unwilling to convey the idea that the Great God had entered into a compact, or an agreement with his creature man. That idea, he supposed, would have been revolting to them, and to avoid this, they used the word dian-as conveying the thought that God meant merely to express his will, or to make a testament in regard to what he required them to do, similar to that which a man makes of his property when he dies. How far considerations like this may have influenced their minds, it is impossible now to determine. It is scarcely, however, to be supposed that a resolution of this kind could have been formed by the translators of the Septuagint, without an express agreement or compact among themselves; and it may fairly be doubted whether there is not more refinement and artifice in the supposition than would have been likely to have occurred in making that translation.

A reason may, however, be suggested for this remarkable fact, which seems to be liable to no objection. It is, that in the apprehension of all the authors of the Septuagint, and of the writers of the New Testament, the word dial in its original and proper signification fairly conveyed the sense of of the Hebrew word , that the word ouvexn, or compact, agreement, would not express that idea; and that they never

meant to be understood as conveying the idea either that God entered into a COMPACT or COVENANT with man, or that he made a WILL They meant to represent him as making an arrangement, a disposition, an ordering of things, by which his service might be kept up, and by which men might be saved; but they were equally remote from representing him as making a compact, or a will. In support of this supposition, we may allege (1.) the remarkable uniformity in the manner in which the word dan is used, showing that there was some settled principle from which they never departed; but (2.) and mainly, the meaning of the word itself. In its original and appropriate signification, it is just the word that was needed, and will accord with all the usages of the word n. Prof. Stuart has, undoubtedly, given the accurate original sense of the word. "The real, genuine, and original meaning of dan is, arrangement, disposition, or disposal of any thing," p. 440. The word from which it is derived-diarion-means, to place apart, or asunder; and then to set, arrange, dispose in a certain order. Passow. From this original signification is derived the use which the word has with singular uniformity in the Scriptures. For although in classic Greek, the word remotely has the signification of will or testament (Passow), yet it never has that sense in the Bible, unless the passage *before us be an instance (Stuart, p. 439); and though in the classic Greek also the word may have the notion of a cove nant or compact remotely (Passow), yet it cannot be shown to have that meaning in a single instance in the Scriptures. It denotes the arrangement, disposing, or ordering of things. which God made in relation to mankind, by which he designed to keep up his worship on the earth, and to save the soul. It means neither covenant nor will; not compact or legacy; not agreement, or testament. It is an arrangement of an entirely different order from either of them; where the sacred writers with singular care, and with an uniformity which could have been secured only by the presiding influence of the One Eternal Spirit that inspired them, have avoided the suggestion that God had made with man either a compact or a will. Unhappily, we have no one word which precisely expresses this idea, and hence our conceptions are constantly floating between the conception of an agreement, or a testament; and the views which we have

are as unsettled as they are unscriptural. The simple idea is, that God has made an arrangement, or disposition of things by which his worship may be regulated; by which man may approach him, and by which they may be saved -an arrangement having all the force of law, and which men are not at liberty to neglect or disregard. Under the Jewish economy this arrangement assumed one form; under the Christian another. In neither was it a compact or covenant between two parties, and where one party would be at liberty to reject the terms proposed; in neither was it a testament or will, as if God had died and left a legacy to man.

nant

If these remarks are well founded, they should materially shape the views in the interpretation of the Bible. Whole treatises of divinity have been written on a mistaken view of the words, and diabxn-understood as meaning covenant. Volumes of angry controversy have been published on the nature of the "covenant" with Adam, and on its influence on his posterity; and in no subject, perhaps, are the views of men more indefinite than in regard to this " cove" which they are supposed to make with God in the purposes of salvation. The only literal "covenant" which can be supposed to exist in the plan of salvation is that subsisting between the Father and the Son-though even the existence of any such covenant is rather the result of pious and learned imagining than of any distinct statement in the volume of revelation. The simple statement there is, that God has made an arrangement, the execution of which he has entrusted to his incarnate Son, and has proposed it to man; an arrangement which they are not at liberty to disregard, and which being embraced will secure their salvation.

Bearing with us now the remarks which have been made in regard to the meaning of this word diabhxn, we are prepared to examine the meaning of the passage before us, Heb. ix: 16-18. Two interpretations of the passage have been proposed, in one of which the word diathan is regarded as meaning covenant, and in the other, as meaning will, or testament. The latter is the interpretation adopted by Professor Stuart. It is the object of this paper to examine the reasons which he suggests for this interpretation, and to state considerations why the former is to be preferred; or rather, why the word dan should be regarded here as employed in accordance with its uniform usage elsewhere, to denote not

will, but arrangement or disposition. If the word is used here, as Professor Stuart supposes, in the sense of testament or will, then the idea is, "that where there is a testament, it is necessary that the death of the testator should take place, because a testament is valid only in respect to those who are dead, and has no force while the testator lives." The reason

of this is, that by the very nature of a testament, it relates to the disposal of a man's property after he is dead, and of course cannot be regarded as valid until his death takes place. The force of this remark, according to this interpretation, here would be that the fact that the Lord Jesus made or expressed his will to mankind, implied that he would die to confirm it, or rendered his death necessary in order that his "will" might be complete or ratified. The fact of a "will”—diadý×ŋ -involved the idea of the death of him who had made it. Of the truth of this observation about the nature of a “will” there can be no difference of opinion. The only question is, whether such an illustration would be pertinent to the argument of the Apostle here, and whether it is such as he meant to use. In opposition to it, and in defence of the other interpretation, I adduce the following considerations.

(1.) The word dan is not used in this sense in any other place in the New Testament, nor in any other place in the Bible. This has been already fully shown, and is fully admitted by Professor Stuart himself. "The sense given to Sadhan here [by Prof. S.], viz., testament or will, is beyond all doubt consonant with the usus loquendi of the Greeks; although in the Septuagint and New Testament no example of this usage occurs, excepting in the present passage." "The Hebrew, never has the sense of Testament.”* pp. 439, 440. Of the twenty-six times in which Paul used the word, and the more than three hundred times in which it is elsewhere used, not a solitary instance confessedly occurs, in which it is employed in this sense, unless it be in the passage before us. That must be a strong necessity which will require us to depart from a usage so uniform in the Bible, and to adopt a meaning which a word may have in a classic writer. It is to be presumed, however, that no such necessity exists in the case of any other word in the Bible, and

The Italics are my own.

that not another instance can be found in which such a rule of interpretation is acted on. It is not denied that the "exigency of the place" may be such as to justify such a usage, but it remains to be asked whether such an exigency exists here.

(2.) The Lord Jesus made no such will or testament as is supposed by this interpretation to have been made. According to this exposition the argument must be, that since it was a settled principle that a will was valid only when the testator died, it was essential that the Lord Jesus, who designed to make such a "will," should die, or his death was necessary, in order to confirm it. But the Saviour made no such will or testament; nothing which can in any proper sense be called a "will." He made no arrangements about the disposition of his property after his death, he left no legacies; he did not even direct where his body should be entombed. There was nothing in his instructions, or in any wish which he expressed, which can in any proper sense be called a will, and all the argument which is based on such a supposed fact, must, of course, be merely imaginary. Assuredly, the Apostle Paul did not argue on the supposition of any such testamentary disposition of what belonged to the Redeemer.

(3.) Such an illustration would not be pertinent to the design of the Apostle, or in keeping with his argument. In ch. ix, as in some of the previous chapters of the epistle, he is comparing the Jewish and Christian systems, and the point of comparison in this chapter relates to the question about the efficacy of sacrifice in the two arrangements. The Apostle shows that the arrangement for shedding blood in sacrifice entered into both systems; that the high priest of both offered blood as an expiation; that the holy place, in the one instance in the tabernacle, and in the other in heaven, was entered with blood, and that consequently the necessity of the death of a victim was supposed in both arrangements or dispensations. The argument is, that the former dispensation or covenant was ratified with blood; and that the shedding of blood was supposed in the whole arrangement. See vs. 1922. The argument is not at all that Moses made a will or testament which could be of force only when he died, and that the same thing was necessary in the new arrangement, but it was that the former covenant was ratified with blood, or by the death of a victim, and that it might be expected that