FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MONDAY, JUNE 28, 1976 U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION, Washington, D.C. The Joint Committee met at 10:05 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 5302, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William Proxmire, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee, presiding. Present: Senators William Proxmire and John Sparkman; Congressmen David Evans and Parren Mitchell. Senator PROXMIRE. The committee will come to order. Chairman Sullivan has asked me to continue with the preparedness inquiry which the Joint Committee began in the second session. Today's hearings begin the second phase of the Joint Committee on Defense Production's inquiry into the state of the national emergency preparedness effort. In these 3 days of hearings we will be examining the organization, programs, and the management of the Federal agencies. This, of course, requires looking at the State and local agencies and programs, for the operational heart of the national effort the front line troops, so to speak-is the firefighters, the policemen, the hospital, and other emergency services personnel whom we rely on for support in a disaster. Without the local programs, and local people, there would be no meaningful preparedness effort in this country. This kind of organization befits the American tradition of community self-help, but it is also eminently practical because it permits resources to be employed for any kind of emergency at a local, regional, or national level on an "as needed" basis. It permits emergency personnel to perfect their skills for the kinds of natural disasters most frequently in their areas. And, when funds are used for both natural and nuclear disaster planning, this system relieves us of the necessity of maintaining a large and costly, nationwide "exclusive use" civil defense force, as the Soviet Union does. Now, a number of the basic organizational principles are undergoing change. On one side, we are told the Soviet Union spends over $1 billion a year at the national level for nuclear attack preparedness, while the U.S. Federal figure has fluctuated between $70 million and $200 million annually. The implication is that we need to increase our Federal spending for this function by at least three or four times. the average rate. That was the advice given to the committee last April by some members of a panel of experts. But first we need to know whether we are getting our dollars' worth for the money that we are already spending. On another front, the Government decrees that funds used for nuclear attack preparedness cannot also be used for natural disaster preparedness even though, with some notable exceptions, the functions are the same or virtually the same. Most natural disaster operations are identical to nuclear attack operations as, for example, in terms of hospital services, provision of food and shelter for the homeless, emergency communication facilities, and the availability of trained personnel for firefighting, dike building, crime prevention, and similar tasks. The notable exceptions to this common identity of emergency or disaster functions are fallout shelters, urban evacuation plans, and the maintenance of radiological monitoring equipment. With the increasing construction of nuclear powerplants and the increased probability of "melt-downs" or other nuclear emergencies not associated with nuclear attack, even this distinction begins to blur. It is in the context of these and other changed circumstances that the Joint Committee wishes to examine the present condition of our preparedness programs and organizations. We need to determine what is going on now in order to be able to recommend any changes that might be needed to the legislative committees of the Congress. Thus far our inquiry has revealed that the national preparedness effort has suffered from long-term neglect in nearly every level and branch of Government. Last spring Senator Tower, who is the ranking Republican member of the committee, and I asked the governors of 53 States and territories to comment on the adequacy and responsiveness of Federal preparedness organizations. Of the 49 who have replied so far, 98 percent indicated dissatisfaction with the Federal system that is supposed to support and provide guidance to State and local agencies. On the other hand, we are also aware that there is great disparity between the levels of preparedness achieved by different State and local governments. Some have good protection, others who may need it more, do not. For example, one State has not had an emergency readiness exercise in nearly a decade. We need to know, then, how to assure minimum standards of emergency preparedness for all our citizens without creating yet another Washington bureaucracy. Among the other questions to which the committee seeks answers or remedies in this week's hearings are the following: What is the rationale for three separate Federal prepared ness organizations? Are Federal preparedness organizations duplicative? Are resources committed to the most urgent preparedness Are preparedness programs feasible and realistic? Are they well managed? Do the different priorities of the separate Federal preparedness agencies adversely affect State and local planning and programs? Our guests today are Mr. Fred J. Shafer, Director of the Logistics and Communications Division, General Accounting Office; Maj. Gen. Leslie Brav, Jr., Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency; and the Hon. Philip E. Coldwell, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board. I will ask each of the witnesses to summarize his statement in 10 or 15 minutes, if possible, and we will incorporate the entire text of the prepared statements in the printed hearings record. First, we will hear from Mr. Shafer. STATEMENT OF FRED J. SHAFER, DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY MARIANN THOMSON, WERNER GROSSHANS, AND CARMEN SMARRELLI Mr. SHAFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, I welcome this opportunity to present the General Accounting Office views and discuss our study of current civil emergency preparedness activities. I have with me on my left, Mariann Thomson, who has been supervisory auditor on this work; on my right, Werner Grosshans, who's senior associate director; and to his right Carmen Smarrelli, assistant director, each of whom has been personally involved in the study. I will eliminate from my presentation some of the background material which can be submitted for the record in an effort to shorten the presentation. The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, contains a statement of national policy and prescribes a series of actions which were intended to provide the Nation with a comprehensive civil defense posture. Although the nature of offensive weapons and the threat to the Nation have changed, the policy remains essentially the same. As originally conceived, the act provided for comprehensive preattack preparations to protect both property and people and for postattack organization and control of the surviving people and industry. The Act of 1950 was a recognition of the potential future danger to the United States arising out of the first Soviet Union atomic detonation in 1949. The initial funds requested were for large-scale blast shelter surveys and for modification of existing structures to provide blast protection. These measures were proposed at a time when the fallout threat was not a matter of general public knowledge and when the general concept of shelter was protection from the immediate effects of atomic blast, heat, and shock. Following the Soviet Union detonation of a thermonuclear device and the recognition of the enormous destructive potential of the downwind fallout hazard of the newer weapons, blast shelters and evacuation were deemphasized and fallout shelters assumed the major role as the most feasible life-saving protection against nuclear attack. Early in 1961 it became apparent that careful scrutiny of the program for civil defense had to be made. There was general feeling that past efforts, handicapped as they were by insufficient political and financial support, had not produced the type of program that could provide security against thermonuclear weapons. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy delivered a message to the Congress on urgent national needs, in which he announced the initiation of a long-range program to protect the public from fallout. The President stated: This Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack. We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute. The President stated further that the aforementioned deterrent concept assumed rational calculations and that there still remained the possibility of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, or a war of escalation which could not be either foreseen or deterred. He also said: It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable as insurance for the civilian population in case of an enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed--but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of a catastrophe. The President concluded by recommending a "nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures." By Executive Order 10952, as amended, the President in 1961 decided that civil defense functions would include among other things: a fallout shelter program; a chemical, biological and radiological warfare defense program; a warning and communications system; postattack assistance to State and local governments; and protection and emergency operational capabilities of State and local governments. The order had the effect of abandoning general attempts at survival from heat and blast effects, adding provisions for defenses against chemical, biological and radiological agents. It generally placed emphasis on providing primarily for post attack survival, continuity of government, and communications and an administrative base around which the surviving population could coalesce for effective action. This revised policy as established by the executive branch seems to be the basis for the continuing civil defense and preparedness efforts we see today. In October of 1971 the General Accounting Office issued to the Congress the results of its study of activities and status of civil defense in the United States. In our report we described the policy changes I have summarized and made the following observations: Measures planned for a war-related emergency generally are limited to protection against nuclear attack. There were no civil defense programs, other than research to protect people from the effects of attack with chemical or biological weapons. Although the direct effects of nuclear weapons-blast, heat and shock-are recognized as major elements of the threat, the civil defense program includes no specific activity to mitigate them. DoD had recognized the potential nuclear deterrent of effective damage-limiting measures but stated in its January 1969 program justifications that: . . . on the basis of our present knowledge of military technology, we still see no practical way in which to do this (taking damage-limiting measures) against the kind of attack the Soviets could potentially mount in the 1970s. Accordingly, our best alternative is to continue to base our policy of deterrence on our assured destruction capability. The fallout shelter program appears to be a result of identifying and developing shelter spaces in only existing facilities or in new construction. The civil defense program was not aimed at adding significantly to the Nation's shelter capacity since it did not provide for constructing shelter space. (Since that time Federal agencies can incorporate shelters in federally financed buildings or projects.) The civil defense program did not have a good working priority system. Because of limited financial and other resources available, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish priorities and stress the development of protection in those areas to be most likely at risk from fallout after a nuclear atack. In general, in view of the changed conditions since the original legislation was enacted, GAO suggested that the national policy be reconsidered to provide better guidance to civil defense planning. The level of funding for civil defense has not constituted a large part of our national budget. We have an indication that the Nation's interest in expanding civil preparedness activities can be piqued if there is an imminent threat. Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, annual funding reached a high of over $200 million. Even this funding level constituted only one-half of 1 percent of the total defense budget and was a minor item in terms of the total national budget. Nevertheless, even though the Russian nuclear capability is now greater than in 1962, by the early 1970's the annual expenditures were only about $80 million, and the President's fiscal year 1977 budget would bring that figure down to $71 million. The response to imminent threat thesis seems to be the basis for the Nation's current civil defense posture. In his 1977 posture statement the Secretary of Defense stated: The current civil defense program seems best suited to a posture of planning in peacetime for surging in a crisis. Such a program will keep peacetime civil defense costs low, while at the same time providing the basis to permit expanding the peacetime disaster preparedness base to provide an increased capability in times of nuclear crisis. It is within the framework of the above analysis of policy changes that we have reviewed the present civil defense program. What capabilities exist today? Our review concentrated on the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency [DCPA], and we also did some work at GSA's Federal Preparedness Agency [FPA] and HUD's Federal Disaster Assistance Administration [FDAA]. As our review progresses, we are finding some potential problems in coordination and in duplication of functions at Federal, State and local levels. But as was the case in our 1971 report, priority setting under conditions of limited funding continues to be a major problem. I will devote the balance of my comments to the priority problem. As provided in the 1950 Act, civil defense is a cooperative effort between the Federal Government and the States. Thus State cooperation. is essential to a comprehensive civil defense. We believe that this is both a strength and a weakness in the defense effort. A strength in that it involves the entire Nation as participants; a weakness in that accomplishment of national goals can be frustrated by local disinterest or disagreement. Given the limited funding available, we believe that |