the other thinks something, but it doesn't come together, and without that you don't have the good relationships and the good understanding.

I think, too, that as our budgets have been shrunk, that has caused a little unrest and uneasiness about it all.

But I think there is a good enough forum in which all of these things can be discussed. As far as looking at the executive branch of Government and how it relates to the State and local governments, some of these things may not have been put in proper context to bring about solutions and understanding.

Mr. KINCADE. Thank you very much.

Mr. EVANS. Governor Davis, as you know a lot of attention has been focused on your agency's crisis relocation planning program, which I think now is a part of Nuclear Crisis Preparedness or NCP. Several of the State agencies have expressed skepticism about the feasibility of this plan. Earlier this week an official of the General Accounting Office told the committee his agency had reservations about the workability of urban evacuation in densely populated areas such as New England. Perhaps you or members of your staff could help put to rest some of these concerns, or fears, or doubts that some people have.

[See chart, p. 75.]

Here you see a chart depicting some of the effects on Washington and the surrounding areas of a nuclear attack.

The areas in red on that map indicate locations which your agency expects to receive nuclear blast overpressures of 2 pounds per square inch. The blue shaded areas represent locations expected to receive at least an acute dose of radioactivity at the level of 600 REMs. I think it is interesting to note some of this fallout would result not only from local nuclear explosions, but also from warheads dropped on the Minuteman missile complex about 800 miles away, at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. The prevailing winds would carry it eastward. The crosses you see on the map represent approximate locations of the Federal Relocation Centers in the mountains to the west of Washington. These also would be likely targets in a nuclear attack aimed at destroying our warmaking capability and would hence cause additional blast effects and fallout. North of the area shown on the map will likely be more blast damage and fallout from warheads targeted against cities such as Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and other industrial and military facilities. What we are trying to find out is this: Where can civilians be evacuated in large numbers, in hundreds of thousands, without exposing them to blast and fallout effects?

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Evans, I would like to ask Mr. McConnell, our Assistant Director for Plans and Operations, who works more intimately with this, to respond to that.

Mr. McCONNELL. First of all, Mr. Evans, you must understand that the risk map that we have produced in our publication called TR-82, depicts a maximized effect situation.

It includes a total massive attack on the United States. It also, for blast effects purposes, all weapons were depicted as air bursts, which of course would not be the case. For fallout prediction, all weapons were depicted as ground bursts. So we have depicted a maximized situation for planning purposes.

Now, we know that in certain locations in the United States where a medium-sized city, which may be a potential target area, is surrounded by small towns with populations totaling roughly equivalent

to that of the high risk area, evacuation could take place relatively simply by people being moved into those small towns on a 1-to-1 basis with the present population.

The public buildings that exist in small towns, such as schools, churches, and many other facilities, do present an opportunity for fallout protection.

Mr. EVANS. You are talking about small towns outside of the blast effect areas; is that correct?

Mr. McCONNELL. That is correct, yes.

Now as you move into highly populated areas, such as the Northeast corridor, running from Washington, D.C. through New York City, including Philadelphia and Camden and so forth, obviously the situation is much more complicated to attempt to find hosting areas for the people in those highly populated areas.

Mr. EVANS. This is the question we are trying to get an answer to; where can you move these people?

Mr. McCONNELL. We have one feasibility study on the entire Northeast corridor. We find it is possible, theoretically, to move the people on the highways available to outlying areas where fallout protection can be provided through expedient means. This is difficult in many cases to provide. It requires putting dirt on the roofs, and very unusual type activities. In some cases it requires loading those small communities at a ratio of four to five times their normal population.

Now I say that is a theoretical solution to the Northeast corridor situation, but it is the worst case situation in the United States.

We feel that, first of all because the Russians have an evacuation plan, if they would evacuate their cities in a crisis situation, we must offer the President an option to take somewhat similar action. Therefore we are obligated to develop a plan to get people out of high risk areas in that crisis period.

We know it can be done in many places in the United States, and simply speaking, just because it is complicated and we may not be able to find ideal solutions to the Northeast corridor situation, or to the Detroit-Chicago or California situation, we should not avoid giving the opportunity to other places in the country.

So we are starting with those. We have done the prototypes in nine places in the United States, from one end of the country to the other, including upper New York State, and as we move along we will try to find the best possible solutions to very complicated situations.

And it may be many years at this funding level before we can find a solution that is acceptable to the people involved.

Mr. EVANS. To what extent would people, let's say, from the New York area, be protected if they were moved west of New York City 100 or 200 miles or whatever, if all of that area is going to be an area which will receive a considerable amount of fallout from nuclear blasts that would occur to the west? You know, you really cannot secure a home or a gymnasium or whatever other types of facilities there might be in these towns against that type of fallout effect within a day or two, can you?

Mr. McCONNELL. That is not exactly true, Mr. Congressman. Many solutions can be found in a short length of time, in 24 to 48 hours, for expedient fallout protection.

Practically any home that has a basement, for example, is relatively easy to improve by providing a mass on the upper floor to give protec

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tion to people in the basement. And there are various other solutions that can be done in expedient fashion.

Mr. EVANS. How long could these people exist in these receiving areas in terms of food and medical facilities and so forth, that might or might not be available to them?

Mr. McCONNELL. Our research is looking at this in the case of specific situations, and it would obviously require a revision of the market area distribution of materials to support people in the relocated mode. In the specific State that we have studied in particular, Colorado, they have found ways to divert the market distribution of food to outlying areas. Each case is a separate situation of its own.

Mr. EVANS. If an attack does occur, how feasible is it, I wonder, to reorient these market areas?

Mr. McCONNELL. Well, it is feasible. It is certainly not easy. And one has to realize that to consider a decision to relocate people is only short of accepting a full nuclear attack on the United States.

So it is a very drastic type situation with a drastic effect on the national economy. We are analyzing that, too.

If we could do it, if we could direct a relocation nationwide, it might have something near $1 billion per day effect on the gross national product, and certainly would have a very lasting effect on the economy of the United States.

Mr. EVANS. Well, I am glad your agency is thinking along the lines of what, in maximum situations, might occur, because it seems, even though you hope the worst situation never happens, that in wartime and other crises in the past, you always have had the maximum effects that you plan for and then it is worse beyond that.

As you talk about the crisis relocation work, I wonder if you could. explain in a little detail exactly how you would go about moving these masses of people out of urban areas to these relocation areas? Exactly how would that occur when you have a very large population, like New York City, for example, that depends on mass transportation, with fewer automobiles? How would that be accomplished in a short period of time?

Mr. McCONNELL. As I said, New York City is probably the most complicated situation in the United States. Each risk area is different. In the prototype cities of medium size, solutions were found, principally by use of private transportation and public transportation. As far as the feasibility study of New York City is concerned, they did find that there is sufficient public transportation-as you know, New York City has one of the lowest rates of private transportation in the United States-but there is sufficient public transportation, making two or three trips during a period of 3 to 5 days, that could move all of the people out of New York City.

Mr. EVANS. And the persons with private automobiles, would they be willing to allow their neighbors to go out with them and to return alone in their cars to take more people out to these relocation areas? Mr. McCONNELL. I don't think that was figured in the statistical analysis of the feasibility study of New York City.

Mr. EVANS. For private automobiles, then, you are figuring on it being one trip by car with the family to which the car belongs?

Mr. McCONNELL. That decision was made by the local officials in the prototype cities where the planning has taken place.

Mr. EVANS. How would people be alerted as to where they would go to receive a mode of transportation to these relocation areas? How does that occur?

Mr. McCONNELL. One of the main elements of a crisis relocation plan is a public information document that can be distributed over the media in a short length of time, giving people this information. As I said, the situation would be different in each city. It might include getting information over the radio and television, or going to your local fire station to pick up information. But in each city situation the method of notification of the people will be different.

Mr. EVANS. So people would be notified to come to some central location to receive information on how they should go about moving to these relocation centers. They would be told what possessions they could take with them, whether they could take their pets along and so forth? What type of planning is involved here? I mean what are you suggesting that people take to these relocation centers? How immediately should they move to these areas?

Mr. McCONNELL. That plan may be different in every city, depending on the decision of the local government officials who make that kind of decision.

Mr. EVANS. You have no guidelines that you offer?

Mr. McCONNELL. Oh, absolutely. We have a manual with example information and options to be selected by the local officials as to what decision they want to make on the type of material to take along.

To speak to one of your points, Mr. Evans, I tend to think rather than having people go to a central location to find information about the crisis relocation planning, that this would be distributed to them by the media, either by the radio and television, or by distribution of

newspapers.

Mr. EVANS. One other question along that line. What happens when you are moving these people to the relocation centers, will that crisis relocation not interfere with the movement of military vehicles, for example, on highways?

Mr. McCONNELL. In every case where we have done planning, we have coordinated with the military installations nearby, and all crisis relocation for civilian planning has been dovetailed with the military. We have found no reluctance or difficulties that we couldn't overcome.

Mr. EVANS. Now getting back to you, Mr. Davis, for a moment, the Gaither report rejected urban evacuation as an unacceptable alternative in 1957. What has led to a change in this assessment in the meantime, since 1957 ?

Mr. DAVIS. At that time it was a fact dealing with tactical evacuation in 4 to 6 hours. Later it was reduced to minutes.

Now you can not evacuate any cities under these circumstances. So when we talk about a crisis condition that we believe would be created within the world, there would be at least-if you had the plans-a 3day period and within that period of time, we could relocate our people until the thing blew over, or if an attack did happen they would have a much greater chance of survival.

So that the Gaither report dealt with a shorter period of time than we are dealing with today, as we develop the concept for evacuation.

Mr. EVANS. So I understand your crisis relocation then is based upon, if I am able to discern what you have said here, a period of warning time perhaps from 48 hours to 5 to 7 days?

Mr. DAVIS. And a longer period for planning, possibly when a crisis situation gets created. It is a little difficult to make precise determinations. But certainly I think in the negotiation of the relationships of world powers today, something would be occurring, that would indicate trouble is arising.

Now what it would lead to would again be up to the authorities to deal with their own people on how you would implement this evacuation.

But you do have a time element that is much more favorable as we perceive it.

I would like to make one comment on this plan. Most of them accept the concept. Many do not have the total detail, because we have been basically working on the nine prototypes. We have been trying to train people and have not gone to many areas. Washington, D.C. is one we have not covered. We have learned from the research and prototype effort as we have done it. We will not do it unless there is the cooperation and acceptance of the public officials within the community.

Mr. EVANS. I have some other questions which I would like to submit for your answers for the record, and I would also like to get a copy of your manual submitted for the record.

Mr. McCONNELL. TR-82, the high risk manual that depicts

Mr. EVANS. I think the manual I am speaking of is the one we mentioned earlier that gave some guidance to these local communities in carrying out the plan.

Mr. DAVIS. Oh, yes. All right.

Mr. EVANS. I appreciate all of you gentlemen for joining us this morning and for your willingness to answer questions.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Evans.

[For responses to additional questions for the record, see p. 300.] Mr. EVANS. I would like to conduct a panel session with the remaining witnesses that we have this morning, Mr. San Felippo, General Weller, and Mr. Mitnick.

STATEMENTS OF MILTON MITNICK, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL DEFENSE, STATE OF INDIANA; GEN. WILLIAM WELLER, ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF COLORADO; AND RONALD S. SAN FELIPPO, ADMINISTRATOR, DIVISION OF EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT, STATE OF WISCONSIN

Mr. EVANS. Welcome to the committee this morning, gentlemen. Let's begin with your reading of the prepared statements which you have brought with you this morning. If you could summarize those statements to keep them brief, it would allow us a longer time for discussion and questions and answers.

Let's begin with Mr. San Felippo. Will you go ahead, please?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I brought a very short statement, in exactly the hope that we have more time available for questions and answers.