Mr. RODERICKS. I think that's another contingency plan. A crisis relocation plan must be made up of a half dozen contingencies, in my judgment, and I understand what they're talking about when they say the rationale would be that the Soviets are looking at the same contingencies of course, the Soviets, as I see it-are planning to overcome that time lag by currently dispersing industry and population. Anyway, I think it's a contingency plan that would have to be ready when the President makes a judgment that it's time to start some movement. Again, we can go to England, and if you look at what the British did when they were really assaulted, they didn't move everybody out, but their contingencies were for moving people to Canada and moving people old and young away from target areas. There are many, many examples of evacuation in wartime and I feel that our Defense Department has not examined those fully. I have suggested that they take a look at those as examples and learn by the experience. Apparently we're going to make a U.S. product without profiting from the experience of others.

Mr. EVANS. Pardon the interruptions, Mr. Rodericks. I had a couple other questions that I want to ask this morning. Successful evacuation seems to depend a lot on Soviet cooperation as to the timing of their attack, advance notice, target areas, accuracy, reliable warheads, and various factors of that type. Do you think that we can count on the Soviets to attack us in a manner that's most suitable for urban evacuation?

Mr. RODERICKS. Well, obviously, no, but I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, since we know every bit of their capability, there's no unknown capability, we are capable of planning and making the contingency plans to meet each of their capabilities if we have the national will to do it.

Mr. EVANS. So with planning, these capabilities can be dealt with, you feel?

Mr. RODERICKS. In my judgment, yes.

Mr. EVANS. Also, successful evacuation depends on citizens behaving in a very idealized manner, to say the least, so as to prevent disruptions. Do you think we can rely on the people of this Nation then to act in this very idealized manner that is often envisioned ?

Mr. RODERICKS. I think we maybe cannot expect them to act in any idealized fashion, but certainly we are intelligent enough to know the reactions of crowds in moving away from danger spots and we can channel the people by organizing a system which would offer to them the prospect of survival if they execute the maneuvers. If they are believable maneuvers and they believe it can save their lives, I believe they will follow the procedures and I again draw on England, Russia, Germany, and Poland and other places when they had to have massive evacuation; when they knew the threat was real and there were prospects for survival at the other end, they did it with a minimal amount of objection.

Mr. EVANS. Going back to another earlier report, the 1957 Gaither report, it found the strategic evacuation to be an unworkable alternative. What in the meantime, since 1957, would you say has changed to make evacuation more realistic today?

Mr. RODERICKS. I think the election campaign of President Nixon and Hubert Humphrey and the campaign that President Kennedy

waged both brought to the national attention this tremendous change in the capability of the Soviet Union to rain destruction on America. I think the 1962 missile crisis convinced those who were of a mature age during that period. I think that after Cuba we went into a national period of revulsion because we finally knew that we are no longer safe. The ocean didn't protect us. I do believe in the value of a rational explanation and a continued exposition of this issue, which is not going on in our press. You see it in terms of foreign policy, in terms of State Department activities, without any relevance to what these things mean to our survival here. We are always talking about what's going to happen to the other guy. I think we are at the point where we can face up to the issue. It's the capability, sir, and I think Americans, because they want peace more than ever and because they know now we are more vulnerable, I do think they are willing to accept a low-cost insurance policy, but it must be believable. They must hear from Congressman Evans, for example, that he believes that for the people in his district that this is the right course. They are not hearing this, Mr. Congressman. There's so much doubt in our country because there isn't a well-charted course that we can all agree on even in principle.

Mr. DAWSON. I might ask, Mr. Chairman, if it's possible to submit questions in writing to all the witnesses?

Mr. EVANS. Without objection, that opportunity will be made available to all members of the committee. I would like at this time to thank you very much, Mr. Rodericks, for your willingness to answer our questions this morning. I think you have certainly shed some light on the questions that the committee had. We appreciate your willingness to come here and testify.

Mr. RODERICKS. Thank you. And may I say that again I treasure Governor Davis as a friend and colleague. My disagreements with him I have said to him directly in stronger terms than I have expressed here, so it will be no surprise to him when he reads what I have said here.

[For responses to additional questions for the record see p. 293]

Mr. EVANS. Thank you. Mr. Russell, will you come to the witness table? As soon as you get seated, Mr. Russell, would you introduce your colleagues this morning. Then you may proceed with your oral statement. If you'd like to condense it any for the record, we will be glad to accept a condensation.

STATEMENT OF CECIL RUSSELL, PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES CIVIL DEFENSE COUNCIL; ACCOMPANIED BY LEA KUNGLE, PRESIDENT-ELECT; AND HERBERT SIMPSON, PORTSMOUTH, VA. Mr. RUSSELL. To my left is Mrs. Lea Kungle from Joplin, Mo., the president-elect of the Civil Defense Council. To my right is the executive secretary from Portsmouth, Va., Mr. Herbert Simpson.

Since you have a copy of our statement and presentation, I would just more or less review it in view of time and so forth.

I would like to say that we are an organization that's composed of approximately 2,500 municipal and county executives throughout the land and we cover approximately 90 percent of the population of the United States. We actually work for the local political subdivision.

I want to point out and emphasize that we are local people. We are local people who are employed by local government, but during a disaster we become a member of a multiple organizational team which includes Federal, State and local to get the job done of saving lives and protecting property.

We feel on the local level to build a common base for emergency preparedness that we have to build this common base on natural disasters. Now we at no time emphasize more of the natural disaster aspect than we do nuclear because we feel on the local level that nuclear preparedness is our prime responsibility but we need training and we need manpower and the finances plus the cooperation of the Federal and State government disaster agencies to be successful by working in natural disasters. How we respond the first few minutes could mean the difference in saving many lives and much valuable property in this country. We feel that it's very important to have an adequate warning system. We feel it's very important to respond as hastily and as effectively as possible and we feel that we have the recovery responsibility after other Federal agencies do come in and assist us if it is warranted.

Now there's been much said about the Leggett committee and the report of the Armed Services Committee which most everybody is aware of so I will just briefly hit that, but we of the U.S. Civil Defense Council have to concur with the report of the Armed Services Committee and feel that the local tax dollar and the Federal tax dollar must serve two purposes. It must serve this program on the natural disasters and the nuclear disasters. In other words, make the tax dollar do double duty. We feel there's been a lot said pertaining to our having two types of civil defense and apparently that is in the minds of a lot of people from other Federal disaster agencies. Some people feel that we have a civil defense which is the local responsibility and we have a military civil defense which is Federal responsibility.

Now we don't look at it in that respect. We look at it as one responsibility, one disaster preparedness responsibility on the local level. We feel the dual-use concept that the Office of Management and Budget has just recently narrowed down to single use, so that the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is limited to nuclear preparation only, is rather ridiculous. I would like to mention to you or read to you a March 5, 1973 directive which stated in part:

At the Federal level, the civil preparedness program has been fully redirected to help local governments improve their readiness for lifesaving operations in any type emergency. The redirected program is dual purpose in that it takes into account all likely hazards, whether enemy attack or peacetime emergencies or disasters.

We see the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency has led local governments down that primrose path for several years. We have gone into great length of preparedness to handle all types of emergencies and we feel that this is more practical.

As you know, across this Nation there are hundreds of natural disasters such as tornados, hurricanes and so forth. Who do the local people look at? They look at us on the local level because we are doing the planning. We are involving them. We are exercising our plans on the local level and we are getting the news media to publicize the

exercises and so forth, and they look at us as the agency for them to seek recovery from, to look for their survival.

Now we realize also if a disaster is of a magnitude such as a large disaster, a tornado or something of that nature, and the damage is tremendous and we are unable to have the amount of resources that we need on a local level, then we must go to the State and subsequently we apparently may have to go to the Federal Government for assistance, but we first must utilize all of the available resources on the local level in that community and that State, which we do.

Now if it's beyond what we have available, then we go to the Federal Government through our governors of the respective States. You're aware that many Members of Congress and other highly trained people in the nuclear field in recent years have visited the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China and they have returned to tell us some very startling information as to how those countries are prepared. I feel that anything that any other country can prepare we can prepare and we can prepare it just as adequately as any other country.

The bad thing about our country is the fact that I think we have a tendency to downgrade our capability. We sometimes create a bureaucracy on the top echelon which has a tremendous amount of duplication and it makes it very difficult for us on the local level sometimes to know who to turn to when we go to Washington.

Now we understand also that Russia, the Soviet Union, spends approximately $1 billion a year. The Leggett committee recommended $110 million, which is quite a difference. So if you break that down, you're talking about approximately $6 per person to 39 cents per person of the people in the United States.

Just recently I believe Mr. Colby, the former CIA Director, at a reserve officers association stated that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have developed civil defense capabilities far more advanced than the civil preparedness in this country.

The Honorable Paul Nitze, former SALT negotiator, says the thrust of Russia's strategic civil defense program is to build a war-winning capability and he felt the only way to dissuade the Soviets was to demonstrate resolve to match their deployments and preclude their winning an advantage.

So, Mr. Chairman, we submit that in order for us on the local level to accomplish what our people are demanding of us, I feel the following needs to be undertaken immediately to ensure the people of the United States that we can and will survive a nuclear attack as well as a natural disaster:

First, the Federal Civil Defense Preparedness Agency Federal funding for 1977 be no less than that of $110 million;

Second, that dual-use concept be authorized under existing laws. And one of the most important things I think that all of us have been negligent through the years is not paying as close attention to civil defense and civil preparedness as we should have;

Third, the Armed Services Committee conduct oversight and review hearings each year on civil defense; and

Fourth, remove all termination dates from existing legislation.

Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my statement, the few remarks I have to make, so we open ourselves to any questions.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]

STATEMENT BY CECIL H. RUSSELL, PRESIDENT, U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE COUNCIL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present the views of the members of the United States Civil Defense Council.

My name is Cecil Russell, and I am the director of emergency services in Huntington, West Virginia. I am President of the United States Civil Defense Council, who I represent today with my colleague, Mr. J. Herbert Simpson, Executive Secretary of the United States Civil Defense Council and a past President.

May I take a moment to tell you our organization is composed of approximately 2,500 municipal and county executives from throughout the land and covers approximately 80 percent of the population of this country. We actually work for the local political subdivision, not the State or Federal Government: however, in a disaster, we become a member of a multiple organizational team which includes Federal, State, and local to get the job done of saving lives and property when disaster strikes.

I wish to first point out there is no way local civil defense can operate by merely waiting for a nuclear disaster to occur, like the Office of Management and Budget has mandated to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. We need training, we need manpower, and we need the finances, plus the cooperation of the Federal and State government disaster agencies to be successful. By working in natural disasters, even though it would not be of the magnitude of a nuclear holocaust, we are learning the basic procedure methods and the know how of handling major disasters in order that we on the local scene may be ready for a nuclear attack or nuclear accident. How we respond in those first few minutes could mean the difference in the saving of many lives and much valuable property in this country.

I should point out, at this time, there is not enough money in the Federal Budget to pay for State and local operational capability for civil preparedness. It has to be a partnership, which means that Federal matching funds and services along with those of the States and local governments must share the load if we intend to give the people of this Nation the protection they feel they already have and rightly deserve from their Government.

Recently, the House of Representatives Panel on Civil Defense, chaired by Representative Robert L. Leggett of California, held lengthy hearings on civil defense. Following these hearings, the panel recommended to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Forces that the DCPA FY77 Budget be set at $110 million. This recommendation was approved by the Committee on Armed Services and sent to the Committee on the Budget and Appropriations, chaired by Representative Tom Steed of Oklahoma.

After hearings by the Steed committee, participated in by members of the United States Civil Defense Council, we were led to believe that the $110 million figure would hold: however, we were stunned when the Steed committee voted to recommend the $71 million of the administration.

On June 14, 1976 the full House of Representatives voted on an amendment by Representative Bill Chappell of Florida to increase the DCPA FY77 Budget to $85 million, which cleared the House by voice vote. Strong support from the floor was offered by Leggett of California, Glenn Anderson of California, John McCollister of Nebraska, William Hughes of New Jersey, and Representative Don Mitchell of New York.

On June 16, 1976 the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, chaired by Senator Joseph M. Montoya of New Mexico, submitted to his committee the administration's OMB budget figure of $71 million. Once again, local civil defense directors across the Nation felt they had been let down and immediately began contacting their own senators to increase this amount to the Leggett proposal of $110 million. Following a great deal of debate, it was finally decided by the committee that a compromise figure of $80 million against the amendment of $85 million, proposed by Senator J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, was acceptable to the committee and this is where it stands in the Senate today.

We, on the State, and particularly the local level, of whom I represent today, are unable to understand the administration's stand on $71 million for DCPA FY77. This action alone can and will destroy many local civil defense agencies throughout the land. It will cause a great deal of unemployment in many of our cities and will tend to break down the civil preparedness structure of many others.

This brings me to the dual use concept whereby the administration, through OMB, suddenly decided DCPA could not work in natural disasters anymore.