1814. at St. James's, Westminster, by the name of Charles Edwards, feloEDWARDS'S niously took to wife one Anna Timson, and to the said Anna Timson was married; the said Jemima, his former wife being alive, against the statute, &c. Case. The first marriage was proved by the brother, who was present, and witnessed the register of the marriage, and the sister of the first wife proved, that the prisoner left his first wife at Walworth, the very morning that he was married to the second wife at St. James's Church, and that the first wife was then living. The second marriage was proved by the prisoner's hand-writing to the note for the publication of banns, and his signature of "Charles Edwards," to the register of the second marriage. The hand-writing of the name "Anna Timson,” in the same register of the second marriage at St. James's, Westminster (as the person then married to the said Charles Edwards), was proved by her father. The father likewise proved the prisoner's acknowledgment of his marriage to his daughter. The father also proved that his daughter's name was Susanna, not Anna, and that he never knew or suspected that she had ever been called or known by the name of Anna, till he heard of her having been married to the prisoner by that name. The jury found the prisoner guilty; but the COMMON SER→ JEANT doubted whether the evidence proved the allegation in the indictment, as to the second marriage to Anna Timson, and whether the indictment should not have charged that the prisoner. was married to Susanna Timson, by the name of Anna Timson, upon which doubts alone he reserved this case for the opinion of THE JUDGES. In Michaelmas term, 12th November, 1814, at a meeting of all the Judges, they held that the prisoner, having signed the note for the publication of the banns of himself and Anna Timson, and having signed the register of his marriage with her by that name wherein she went, should not be permitted to defend himself on the ground that he did not marry Anna Timson, although such might not be her name; and that therefore the conviction was right. 1814. REX v. HUDSON. 39 G.3. c. 85. THE prisoner was tried before Mr. SERJEANT MARSHALL, at Under the the summer assizes for Lancaster, in the year 1814, for embez- it is not nezling a sum of 6l. 12s. 11d., the property of Salisbury and others, cessary to pass with whom the prisoner had lived in the capacity of clerk, and transportwho had entrusted the money to his care. The prisoner pleaded guilty, but was very strongly recommended to mercy by the prosecutors, and under circumstances so favourable to him, that the learned SERJEANT stated, that he should have thought it sufficient to have sentenced him to a years' imprisonment, had he not conceived that under the statute 39 G. 3. c.85., he was bound to pass sentence of transportation upon him, and that he had only a discretionary power as to the term. The sentence passed was transportation for seven years; but upon doubts which subsequently presented themselves to the mind of the learned SERJEANT the sentence was respited, in order that the opinion of THE JUDGES might be taken on the following question, viz. Whether a JUDGE had the power to pass the milder sentence? The concluding words of the act are, "and every such offender, his adviser, &c. being thereof lawfully convicted or attainted, shall be liable to be transported for any term not exceeding fourteen years, in the discretion of the court before whom such offender shall be convicted or adjudged." In Michaelmas term, 20th November, 1814, this case was taken into consideration by ALL THE JUDGES, when they were all of opinion, that the act having made this offence larceny, subjected it to the general punishment of larceny, and that The Judge might inflict the like punishment on the offender as in cases of common larceny. They thought that the words of the act were not imperative on him to transport, and stated that their opinion coincided with the practice universally adopted since the act passed. sentence of ation; any less punishment to which felony is liable may be inflicted. 1814. Prisoner was convicted ca pitally at the Admiralty sessions for maliciously stabing, upon the 43 G. 3. c. 58. Held, that as the statute only made the offence capital if committed in England or Ireland, it was not so if committed at sea. But see now the 1 G. 4. c. 90. s. 1. (a) REX v. MANUEL AMARRO. THE The prisoner was a Portuguese sailor, serving on board an English transport, lying at Tarragona mole. The person stabbed was the captain of the transport. The prisoner was convicted and sentence passed upon him. No objection was taken by the prisoner's counsel, but a doubt occurred to the learned JUDGE who tried him, whether this was a capital felony cognizable under the Admiralty commission, if committed on the high seas out of England or Ireland. The statute 43 G. 3. c. 58. (b) extends only to offences committed in England and Ireland. (a) By this statute it is provided, that the crimes and offences mentioned in 43 G.3. c. 58. which shall be committed on the high seas out of the body of any county, shall be liable to the same punishment as if committed on land in England or Ireland, and shall be inquired of, &c. as treasons, &c. are by 28 Hen. 8. (b) If any person either in England or Ireland shall wilfully, maliciously, &c. See also the preamble to this act. The question was, whether by 39 G. 3. c. 37. (a) it is to be extended to all parts on the high seas within the Admiralty jurisdiction. In Michaelmas term, 12th of November, 1814, this case was argued before ALL THE JUDGES in the Exchequer Chamber, by POOLEY for the prisoner, and GURNEY for the prosecution, when the majority of THE JUDGES were of opinion that the conviction was wrong. THE JUDGES thought that by the terms of the statute 43 G. 3. c. 58. the offence of maliciously cutting, &c., is made a felony only if the act be done in England or Ireland, that the act is therefore local; and supposing the statute 39 G. 3. c. 37. to have the effect of making every act which would be felony if committed on shore, a felony triable by the Admiralty commissioners if committed on the high seas, (whether such act be felony before the statute 39 G. 3., or made so after that time,) (b) yet the statute 43 G. 3. not making it a felony generally, cannot be extended beyond the limits prescribed by the act to the high seas. WOOD B. thought otherwise, that the statute 43 G. 3. was general, and the act if done at sea was cognizable by the Admiralty jurisdiction. GRAHAM B., at first entertained the same opinion, but subsequently acquiesced with the other JUDGES. 1814. AMARRO'S Case. (a) By which it is enacted, That all and every offence which after the passing of this act shall be committed upon the high seas out of the body of any county of this realm, shall be and are hereby declared to be offences of the same nature respectively, and liable to the same punishment respectively, as if they had been committed on the shore. (b) See Rex v. Bailey, ante, 1. and Rex v. Curling, and others, ante, 123. 1814. terfeit silver in possession, with intent to REX v. CHARLES STEWART. Having coun- THE prisoner was tried before GIBBS C. J., at the summer assizes for the county of Cornwall, in the year 1814, on an indictment, charging the prisoner with having in his possession a good, is no of- quantity of counterfeit silver coin knowing it to be counterfeit, fence, for there for the purpose of uttering it as good and lawful coin. utter it as is no criminal act done. There were counts in the indictment charging the offence differently, but the evidence applied only to these which charged it in the manner above stated. The prisoner was convicted. HARRIS for the prisoner moved in arrest of judgment, upon the ground that this was not an offence prohibited by the 15 G. 2. c. 28. or any other statute, nor was it a misdemeanor at common law, nor even an act done with intent to commit the misdemeanor created by the 15 G. 2. of uttering, &c.; for the mere having counterfeit silver in his possession could not be considered as such an act. The counsel for the prosecution cited Rex v. Scofield, 2 East, P. C. 1028. GIBBS C. J., finding this point had been reserved for the opinion of THE Twelve Judges, in the case of Rex v. Parker, 1 Leach C. C. 41. and not decided, he reserved this case. In Michaelmas term, 12th of November, 1814, ALL THE JUDGES met, and were unanimously of opinion that this was not an offence, and that judgment should be arrested. It appeared on enquiry made, by the direction of THE Judges, of the solicitors of the Mint, that the law officers of the Crown had not approved of indictments in this form, and that no such indictment had been preferred before the year 1812; since then there had been several convictions on such indictments at the quarter sessions, but none at the assizes. (a) (a) Vide Rex v. Heath, ante, 184. But getting it into possession with intent to utter it, is an offence. Vide Rex v. Fuller, Easter T. 1816, post, 308. |