2. 7 G. 2. c. 21. A stick held to be an "offensive weapon"
within this statute, though not of extraordinary size, and
though it might in general be used as a walking stick. See
See ARSON, 1. CORPORATIONS, 1. FORGERY, 11. INDICT-
MENT, 1, 2. 13.
See LARCENY, 6, 7. 22. 31.
BANK OF ENGLAND.
Forgery. The Bank having preferred bills for uttering, and
having in possession in respect of the same note, and having
elected to proceed on the bill for having in possession.
Held, that although facts, sufficient to support the capital
charge, were made out in proof, an acquittal for the minor
offence ought not to be directed, because the whole of the
minor offence was proved, and it did not merge in the larger.
It is not necessary that the signing clerk at the Bank should
be produced, if witnesses acquainted with his hand-writing
state that the signature to the note is not in his hand-writing.
The Bank may elect to proceed on indictments for the lesser
offence, although indictments have been found for the capital
charge.
BANK NOTES.
See EMBEZZLEMENT, 1.
Bank notes are not money, goods, wares, &c., within the
30 G. 2. c. 24.
BANK POST BILL.
BANK AGENT.
See FORGERY, 10.
BANKERS.
1. Stealing re-issuable notes after they have been paid, and
before they have been re-issued, does not subject the party
to an indictment on the 2 G. 2. c. 25. for stealing notes; but
he may be indicted for stealing the paper with valuable
stamps upon it. Rex v. Clark.
2. Secreting a letter containing country bank notes paid in
London and not re-issued, holden to be within the statute
7 G. 3. c.50. Rex v. Ranson.
1. If an indictment against a bankrupt for concealing pro-
perty, in stating the property does not sufficiently specify
particular parts of it, though it may sufficiently specify
others, and those specified may be of the necessary value,
the indictment will be bad, because the statement as to the
parts not specified tends to embarrass the prisoner. Where
value is essential to constitute an offence, and the value is
ascribed to many articles collectively, the offence must be
made out as to every one of those articles, for the grand
jury has ascribed that value to all those articles collectively.
Rex v. Forsyth.
Page 274
2. If a bankrupt surrenders to his commission, and, at the time
of such surrender, refuses to answer particular questions con-
cerning his property, but takes the oath and assigns as his
reason for not answering, that he intends to dispute the
commission, the refusal to answer such questions will not be
a capital offence within the 5 G. 2. c. 30. s.1. Rex v. Page. 392
BANNS.
See BIGAMY, 4. 6, 7.
BASTARDS.
See INDICTMENT, 24. 26.
1. Upon a trial on the coroner's inquest for the murder of a
bastard child, a woman may be found guilty of concealment
under the 43 G. 3. c. 58. s. 4. Rex v. Maynard. 240
2. A woman may be found guilty of concealment within the
43 G. 3. c. 58. s. 3., though, from appearances, it was pro-
bable the child was still-born, and although the birth was
probably known to an accomplice. Rex v. Cornwall. 336
1. On a trial for bigamy the registry of the first marriage
stated to be by licence generally without saying by consent
of parents or guardians. The prisoner proved that he was
an infant at the time, and that his parents were never known
to have been in England. The Judge held this primâ facie
evidence that the first marriage was without consent of pa-
rents or guardians, and that the jury might have acquitted
the prisoner if such evidence was unanswered. Rex v.
James.
2. When the marriage is by licence, and the party is under age
at the time of such marriage, it is necessary on the part of the
prosecution to give evidence of the consent required by the
marriage act, 26 G. 2. c. 33. s. 11. Rex v. Butler. Page 61
3. When the prisoner having been apprehended for another
offence is detained in the same county for bigamy, the de-
tainer is such an apprehension as will warrant the indicting
him in that county under the 1 Jac. 1. c. 11. Rex v. Gordon. 48
4. If the marriages are proved by a person present at them, it
is not necessary to prove the registration, or licence, or
banns. And it seems that the assuming a fictitious name
upon the second marriage will not prevent the offence from
being complete. Rex v. Allison.
5. On an indictment for bigamy, where the first marriage is in
England, it is not a valid defence to prove a divorce à vin-
culo matrimonii out of England before the second marriage,
founded on grounds on which a marriage cannot be dissolved
à vinculo matrimonii in England. Rex v. Lolley.
6. On an indictment for bigamy, if the first marriage was by
banns, it is no objection that the parties did not reside in the
parish where the banns were published and the marriage
celebrated. Rex v. Hind.
7. If the prisoner write down the names for the publication of
the banns, he will be precluded thereby from saying that
the woman was not known by the name he delivered in, and
that she is not rightly described by that name in the indict-
ment. Rex v. Edwards.
See FORGERY, 14. 24. 29, 30. INDICTMENT, 16.
A bill upon the commissioners of the navy for pay, may be a
bill of exchange, although it is not such an instrument as
the 35 G. 3. c. 94. warrants. Rex v. Chisholm.
If witnesses go before the grand jury without being sworn,
and the bill is found, and the prisoner tried and convicted,
it is proper to recommend him for a free pardon. Rex v.
Dickinson.
See ARSON, 1. INDICTMENT, 17.
1. Breaking down the head or mound of a fish-pond is not a
felony within the 9 G. 1. c. 22., if the only object in so doing
is to steal the fish. Semble, That the statute 9 G. 1, c. 22.
applies only to cases of wanton and malicious mischief.
Rex v. Ross.
2. Wounding a horse out of malice to the owner is an offence
within the Black Act, 9 G. 1. c. 22., though the wound is not
permanent and the horse is likely to recover.
3. Pigs are cattle within the meaning of the 9 G. 1. c. 22.
Rex v. Chapple.
4. A building within the curtilage (as a school-room) is an
"outhouse" within the 9 G. 1. c. 22., though not of the or-
dinary description of outhouses. Rex v. Winter.
5. Cutting down a tree is sufficient to bring the case within the
9 G. 1. c. 22., though the tree is not thereby totally destroyed.
Dwarf apple and pear trees bearing fruit are trees within
the statute. To bring the case within the 9 G. 1. the act
must be done from malice against the owner. See now the
4 G. 4. c. 54. Rex v. Taylor.
6. Maliciously killing, &c. cattle within 9 G. 1. c. 22. s. 1., held,
that the malice must be against the owner of the cattle, and
not against a servant or relative of the owner.
4 G. 4. c. 54. s. 2. Rex v. Austen.
See BURGLARY, 3. 12. 16, 17.
1. Where the owner has never by himself, or by any of his
family, slept in the house, it is not his dwelling-house so as
to make the breaking thereof burglary, though he has used
it for his meals and all the purposes of his business. Rex v.
Martin and another.
2. When a servant has part of a house for his own occupa-
tion, and the rest is reserved by the proprietor for other
purposes, the part reserved cannot be deemed part of the
servant's dwelling-house, and it will be the same if any
other person has part of the house and the rest is reserved.
Rex v. Wilson.
3. The prisoner broke out of a cellar by lifting up a heavy
flap, by which the cellar was closed on the outside next the
street. The flap was not bolted, but it had bolts. Six of
the learned Judges were of opinion that there was a suffi-
cient breaking to constitute burglary; the remaining six
were of a contrary opinion. Rex v. Callan.
4. A building within the same fence as the dwelling-house,
and used with it as parcel of the dwelling-house, though it
has no internal communication with the house but through an open passage, is parcel of the dwelling-house, and it is equally parcel of the dwelling-house, though used partly for the separate business of the occupier of the dwelling-house, and partly for a business in which he has a partner. Rex
v. Hancock and others. Page 170 5. Though a servant stipulates upon hire for the use of certain rooms in the premises of his master, for himself and family, the premises may be described as the master's dwelling-house, although the servant is the only person who inhabits them, for he shall be considered as living there as servant, not as holding as tenant. Rex v. Stock and another.
6. J. W. let part of his house, viz. a shop, passage, cellar, &c. to his son. The son did not sleep there; there was a distinct entrance into the son's part, but his passage led to his father's cellars, and they were open to his father's part of the house. The shop was broken into. The Judges thought (on case reserved) that by reason of the internal communication the son's part contained part of the father's house; and conviction for the burglary held right. Rex v. Sefton. 202 7. If a house is let to A. and a warehouse under the same roof, and with an internal communication to the house, to A. and B.; the warehouse, in an indictment for burglary, cannot be described as the dwelling-house of A. Rex v. Jenkins and another.
8. A door, which only forms part of the outward fence of the curtilage, and opens into no building, but into the yard only, is not such a part of the dwelling-house as that the breaking thereof will constitute burglary. Rex v. Bennett and another.
9. An area gate, opening into the area only, is not part of the dwelling-house, so as to make the breaking thereof burglary, if there is any door or fastening to prevent persons in the area from entering the house, although such door or fastening may not be secured at the time. Rex v. Davis and an
322 10. Prosecutor's house was at the corner of a street, and adjoining thereto was a workshop, beyond which a stable and coach-house adjoined; all were used with the house, and had doors opening into a yard belonging to the house, which yard was surrounded by adjoining buildings, &c. so as to be
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