That you may see what a husband you have, I send you the route. We go to-morrow morning, at six o'clock, to Coburg, to the Queen of England. I must go too, and I am sorry to say Spa is all over for me; but it can not be otherwise.

CHAPTER III.

THE GREAT YEAR 1866.

Disputes with Austria.-The Central States.-Mobilization of the Army.-Bismarck shot at by Kohn-Blind, 7th May, 1866.-Excitement in Berlin.-War Imminent. -Declaration.-The King sets out on the Campaign.-Sichrow.-Litschen.-Battle of Sadowa, 3d July, 1866.-Bismarck with His Majesty on the Battle-field.Negotiations of Nicolsburg.-Treaty of Prague.-Illness of Bismarck.-Consolidation of Prussia.-Triumphant Entry of the Army into Berlin.-Peace.

ERE the year 1865 was at an end, Bismarck had become firmly convinced that Austria had lapsed from the Treaty of Gastein and had returned to the Central State policy, the advocate of which was the Freiherr von Beust. This policy, which could only ultimate in eternizing the old vacillating system at the Federation between Prussia and Austria, as this was the only way in which the existence of the Central State sovereignties could be prolonged, was skillfully guarded by the Freiherr von Beust, and always presented the seductive appearance of modera

DISPUTES WITH AUSTRIA.

383 tion, as it neither conceded any thing to Prussia nor Austria, but kept the one constantly in check against the other. That Germany was certainly being imperilled by it, politicians entirely overlooked. At the moment Prussia had the preponderance, not only actually, as Bismarck in fact and truth pursued a national policy, but also formally, as it had separated Austria by the Treaty of Gastein from the Central States. According to the principles of the Central States, Prussia had now to be depressed, and Austria elevated. Here was the point at which Bismarck awaited his diplomatic opponents. Had they been the German patriots for which they were so anxious to pass—and perhaps they quite honestly deemed themselves such-they would have come to the material point, and demanded more from Austria for Germany than Prussia had offered. Austria was in the position. to accede to the German princes—perhaps to the German people -more than Prussia could do, whose whole position was much more awkward. Austria did not imperil her entire autonomy as Prussia did. Bismarck, however, knew his Pappenheimers-the Central State policy did not go upon the material, but the formal point-and only used their federation with Austria to force Prussia to the acceptance of a new Augustenburg minor State north of the Elbe.

So little a policy necessarily would come to destruction in face of the energy with which Bismarck clung to his national programme. This also became very ominous for Austria, for she saw herself obliged to give battle upon a basis which tottered under her. Faithful to the traditions of her old policy, Austria sought to win the Courts by promises, and she succeeded; but she knew very well that little or nothing was gained thereby. The result has shown how little worth Austria set upon the German Confederation. Prussia, while she asked, promised nothing. Bismarck adhered to his policy, which only demanded sacrifices on the part of the princes-sacrifices for Germany, not for Prussia, who was ready to bring far greater ones than any minor State.

Thus approached the hour of decision-a decision whether in future the German people, under the leadership of Prussia, should assume its proper place in Europe, or whether it should coalesce into a weak federation of impuissant territories, under

Austrian satraps, and be blindly obedient to every signal from Vienna.

Preparations were made in every direction; but it was certain that in Vienna, in a scarcely credible misapprehension of Prussia, the authorities had armed for a long time only because it was believed that Prussia was to be terrified by such armaments. At Vienna, the peaceable disposition of the venerable King William, who, to the last moment, hoped for a peaceful termination, which was indeed possible until the firing of the first cannon-shot, was looked upon as fear. Was it impossible for Austria, without any stain upon her honor, to concede to Prussia and Germany in May all that which she had solemnly acknowledged at Prague in August?

It would be far beyond the limits of this book to enter upon the fomented quarrels in the Elbe Duchies and at the Diet on the diplomatic recriminations concerning the earlier or later armaments. We conceive that we have already sufficiently set forth Bismarck's policy; for our purpose it is quite unimportant whether Austria really desired war, or whether her object was to terrorize. King William did not wish for war; but he wished to be free from Austria, for the present and future, in the interests of Prussia and Germany. Prussia had seriously armed; for whoever desires to attain an end must have the means to attain it, and Bismarck had not forgotten what had caused the fall of the Radowitz policy. But Radowitz had not been wrecked upon the insufficiency of the Prussian military system of his day, but on the actual course of foreign policy.

How had this changed since the days of Erfurt and Olmütz? In judging of the rupture with the Diet, it must be here again borne in mind, what had become of it since 1851, what position it had assumed towards Prussia. Count Bismarck, on the re-establishment of the Diet in 1851, had been sent to Frankfurt as a friend of Austria. Prussia desires to co-operate openly and freely with Austria, and that this was also the endeavor of Count Bismarck, his whole political behavior had testified at the very time, in the most unequivocal manner, when Austria, weakened by internal revolution, was obliged to resort to foreign assistance. He soon perceived, however, that such co-operation was impossible. The necessary condition of it was the equalization of Prus