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France shall enjoy the exclusive right of fishing within a radius of three miles from low-water mark along the entire extent of the coasts, and the subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall enjoy the exclusive right of fishing along the entire extent of coasts of the British Isles." It was stipulated that over that part of the coast of France which was included between Cape Carteret and Point Menga the exclusive right for all kinds of fishing would only belong to French subjects within the limits of Article I of the convention. It was likewise understood, as we have said before, that the radius of 3 miles, fixing the general limits of the exclusive right of fishing on the coasts of the two countries, established the measurement for bays whose opening on the sea did not exceed 10 miles from a straight line drawn from one headland to another.

A convention was signed at The Hague May 6, 1882, by several maritime States having reference to the policing of fishing in the North Sea beyond territorial waters. The contracting parties were Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Article 2 provides that the national fishermen shall enjoy the exclusive right of fishing within a radius of 3 miles from low-water mark along the entire extent of the coast of their respective countries, as well as of the islands and bays dependent upon them. "For the bays," the same article reads, "the radius of three miles shall be measured from a straight line drawn across the mouth of the bay in the narrowest part of the entrance, at the first point at which the opening does not exceed ten miles." It is to be noted that the application of Article 3 determines the limits of the North Sea.

The distance of 3 miles figures in international acts other than in conventions relating to fishing. For example, it is stipulated in the treaty of Constantinople, of October 29, 1888, for the neutralization. of the Suez Canal, which nine powers concluded and which, in Article 4, includes a prohibition for right of war in the canal and its ports of access, as well as within 3 miles of those ports.

The legislation of a great number of states has likewise adopted the radius of 3 miles. The chief subject of the British Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, of the French law of March 1, 1888, forbidding foreign fishing within 3 miles of low-water mark. and the decree of June 12, 1896, and the laws and regulations of many countries concerning prizes and declarations of neutrality and other ordinances fix the same limit. The Bering Sea arbitrators declared that the limit of 3 miles is the ordinary limit. .

Twenty years ago Germany and Mexico agreed that along the coast of the latter country the territorial sea was to be carried to 3 marine leagues to serve as a protection against contraband.

The Norwegian and Swedish legislation places the limit at 4 marine miles. They maintain it for matters of jurisdiction, neu

trality, customs, fishing, and sanitary police. The rule goes back, it would seem, to the eighteenth century. They explain it by the configuration of the coast, by the fact that rocks of solid earth are continued under the sea and emerge at a great distance, by the number of fiords with large mouths. Within a line drawn from one rock to another or else within the islands situated in the mouth of the fiord, the waters are considered interior seas, and fishing is made the object of inspection and regulations.

The Spanish legislation establishes the radius of 6 miles for fishing and customs, but in all other respects the radius of 3 miles constitutes the general rule.

We may add that the establishment of the 3-mile limit has occasioned considerable criticism. Even Azuni, who proposed to limit the extent of the littoral sea when there was a question of establishing restrictions upon the liberty of passage of foreign vessels and of making customs visits, showed himself in favor of enlarging the zone when there was a question of protection against hostilities and against expeditions of belligerents. In the latter case he advised the adoption of a radius of 6 miles and he cited "as an example of national equity and moderation " the treaty concluded in 1740 by the Ottoman Porte and the Kingdom of Naples. "In all places belonging to one of the two sovereigns," it said, "whence one may recognize ships or whence ships may perceive the coast, it will not be permitted on the part of either Power that ships be pursued or molested.”

The question was raised in a note addressed on October 16, 1864, by William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, to the British Minister. Two points were mentioned. Ought not the jurisdiction of the bordering State to be extended from 3 to 5 miles, and was it not advisable to adopt a definite limit in figures in order no longer to depend upon the range of cannon shot? He proposed modifications to the existing rules. . On the supposition that the range of cannon shot was 5 miles, Seward would have forbidden firing within 8 miles of the coast.

An argument was also deduced from the fishing interests. It was invoked in 1893 by a commission appointed by the British Government. The commission proposed to assemble an international conference of the States which signed the convention of May 6, 1882, concerning the police of fisheries in the North Sea outside territorial

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In 1895 the Government of the Netherlands addressed a collective note to the different powers by which it invited them to a conference to fix the limits of the littoral sea, and proposed to take as a basis for negotiations the limit of 6 miles, with a neutral zone of the same

width. But objections were raised against the adoption of a total zone of 12 marine miles, that is, more than 22 kilometers; for neutral States, who have not only rights but also duties, the extent of sea in which they could effectively enforce their neutrality and punish infractions would be too large. For belligerents it would have the dangerous result of restricting the space of open sea and consequently lead to a violation of the littoral sea of neutral States in compelling enemy fleets to make the littoral sea the theater of their hostile engagements. States have frequently established special zones in which to apply their customs laws, their laws concerning fishing, and their regulations of sanitary police.

To cite some examples with respect to customs: In 1736 Great Brit ain established a right of surveillance of 4 marine leagues, that is, 12 marine miles. In 1797, 1799, and again in 1807, the United States adopted a provision analogous to the English law of 1736. By the terms of the French law of August 6-22, 1791, the frontier on the sea extends to a distance of 2 leagues from the coast. By the terms of 4 Germinal, year II, a sea captain having arrived within 4 leagues of the coast, shall, on request, display a copy of the manifest, stating the nature of the cargo to a customs inspector who was to come on board and visé the original. According to the same law the customs inspector was to visit all ships below 100 tons "at anchor or hovering within 4 leagues of the coast of France except in case of force majeure." A law of March 27, 1813 [1817], extended the zone up to 2 myriameters, somewhat more than 4 leagues.

If some States leave the coastal fishing free for foreigners as for nationals, other States reserve a monopoly for their nationals, or impose a license fee upon aliens. In this case a delimitation is made; often it extends beyond the traditional limits of the littoral sea.

Some States require that at a definite distance ships coming from infected ports shall hoist the quarantine signal. Great Britain requires this signal to be raised at a distance of 12 marine miles.

A problem is posited with respect to these zones: In the absence of conventions do they not constitute a violation of international law? Have not other States the right to make claims? Wheaton has noticed this delicate point. The answer must be that exceptions to a general rule of international law can only be established by virtue of an agreement of States.

Page 517. Recently a French jurist, de Lapradelle,' has reversed the usual rôles ascribed to States whose interests conflict within the territorial sea, and has tried to show that the different maritime zones constitute coastal servitude for the benefit of the adjacent State. He regards the sea as susceptible of being the property of a juristic person which he would make the international society of States. The

1 See ante, p. 183.

riparian State would have the right of limiting near the coast the free use of the sea. Thus he would legitimate the right of forbidding naval warfare within the vicinity of the coast, that of establishing a customs frontier, as well as that of undertaking measures of sanitary police. But, without touching upon the question as to whether the notion of international servitude is legal, we shall merely remark that international servitudes are established by convention, that they deal with the relations of State to State, that they presuppose two territories, two domains, belonging to different States, of which one is servient while the other is dominant. The sea is not common. There is no collective domination of the States, and there are still other objections to the new theory, although these seem to us sufficient. Moreover, if this thesis is adopted, how can we justify the obligations which are incumbent upon the adjacent State, the principal objects of which are to insure order, to punish crimes, to take the necessary measures for the security of navigation, and to assist foreign vessels encountering the dangers of the sea.

DE OLIVART: Tratado de Derecho Internacional Público. Fourth edition. Madrid, 1903.

§ 41, page 203.-Things likely to be international property (inland seas, lakes, territorial seas, ports, etc.).-Having determined the things over which it is impossible for the States to have any particular right of appropriation, and also those in which, if possible, such right of appropriation is limited by the right of use thereof of other nations, we must finally concern ourselves with those other things of which there exists an absolute right of possession, but only inasmuch as conditioned by international law. Among the latter, inland seas occupy the first place; not only those which, being properly considered as great lakes, belong to the class of possessions owned by the power or powers within whose territories they are inclosed, as obtains, for instance in the case of the Caspian Sea, but also those others which communicate with the ocean by means of a strait, e. g., the Zuyder Zee, the Baltic, etc. The Ottoman Porte has declared it always to be its traditional rule of conduct to forbid entrance into straits to warships of all other nations; it also declared the neutralization of the Black Sea which, ratified by the treaties of 1841 and 1856, was revoked by the London conference in 1871 and the treaty with Russia at the same place and date; the treaty of

Thus Lake Constance (Bodensee) is the common property of Austria, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Switzerland.

Berlin in 1878 not having taken up that question.1 It is a universally recognized principle that the right of national defense is legally exercised over the nearest part of the sea washing the coast owned by the State. The generally practiced international law, repeatedly confirmed by conventional law, limits the extent of territorial sea to the range of a cannon, which is considered to be equivalent to 3 nautical miles; but as in such case, the rule laid down by Bynkershoek: Terra potestas finitur ubi finitur armorum vis, is applicable, such geographical limit can not be considered invariable, as at all times it is dependent upon progress in arms of warfare. If the jurisdiction

The Black Sea belonged exclusively to Turkey until 1774 (Kuchuk-Kainarji treaty). By the treaty of Adrianople the principle of free navigation was established. The treaty of 1841 forbade the entrance of warships into the straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Article XI of the treaty of Paris, in 1856, forbids the entrance of any warship into the Black Sea except those mentioned in the appendix thereof and the light craft used by the legations, and also forbids the possession, by riparian nations of arsenals on the coast. Russia, in 1870, declared her intention of not complying with the treaty in this last respect, representing to Lord Granville that such a measure could not possibly have any validity without the previous consent of the interested powers. Therefore, the London Conference of 1871 was called. Its protocol says that no power can, of its own will and without a friendly understanding with the other signers, free itself from what is solemnly agreed upon in the treaties. In the treaty of London which ensued, It was agreed to revoke Articles xi, xiii, and xv of the treaty of Paris, referring to the Black Sea, allowing Turkey to permit the entrance of the warships of friendly nations as a means of better complying with the treaty of Paris of 1856 (Article 11). In another conference of the same date, Russia and the Porte revoked the appendix to the treaty of Paris which limited the number of warships allowed in the Black Sea. The treaty of Berlin does not mention this point at all. It only says, in Article 63, that the treaty of Paris and that of London declare nothing contrary to it. In the protocol of said treaty Lord Salisbury declares that: "The obligations of H. M. are to respect the determinations of H. I. M. in accordance with the already existing treaties" (prot.. 18), and the Russian plenipotentiary answered that "the principle governing the closing of straits is a European principle and that the ratification of the treaties of Paris is obligatory on all signing powers."

3 Valin claimed it should be as far as where bottom could be reached. Rayneval extended it as far as the range of vision or the horizon. Baldus and Bodino, before the XIV century, favored 60 miles. Abreu claimed it should be 100 miles, and others that it should be equal to a two days' journey.

Bynkershoek has formulated the rule by which the extent of territorial sea can be determined. Terræ potestas finitur ubi finitur armorum vis." An immense majority of ancient and modern writers accept Bynkershoek's rule, and perhaps Riquelme is the only contemporaneous writer to be found attacking it, claiming that each State can freely fix the limit of its jurisdiction and dominion (according, says he, to the topographical character of its coasts, its real means of defence, and the class of dangers to which it is exposed) with the knowledge of the other nations.

Our port law provides in its second article: "The things to be considered subject to national dominion and public use, without any prejudice to private rights, are: 1°, The beach zone, which is the coast space or sea frontier of the Spanish territory washed by high and low tide and as far as where the heaviest breakers can reach at high tide or during a storm. Said zone also extends to the shores of rivers as far as where they can be navigable or are subject to the influence of the tide. 2°, The littoral sea, or the sea zone bordering the coasts and frontiers of Spanish domains, the full width thereof to be determined by international law, with its coves, havens, bays, ports, and any other harbor useful for fishing and navigation. The coast patrol and advantages of the zone are under the States' control as also the right of refuge and immunity according to international laws and treaties." This is evidently very vague and one must believe that the law accepts the three-mile principle; but it is well to remember the following extract from the R. C. of June 14, 1797 (1. 5, tit. viii, lib, vi, latest edition). "The line of immunity of the coast of all domains must not necessarily be determined, as it has been until now, by the varying and uncertain range of a cannon, but by a distance of two miles of 950 fathoms each."

In times of peace the larger or smaller width of territorial sea is of little importance, since warships are allowed to navigate therein provided they mean no offence, com

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