sea, and not merely to assure the customs service, but also for the sanitary police and for other objects, that national establishments may be placed beyond the limits of the territorial sea, properly so called. Conventions have been concluded to this effect.

The range of cannon ought to be the distance actually fixed for all countries by the state of the science and industry and not that which the artillery of a country may reach. The rational principle of the range of cannon is formulated by Bynkershoek in chapter 2 of his dissertation De dominio maris.

The distance of 3 miles has been admitted by the Russian Prize Rules of 1869, by the British Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, by the Hague convention of 1882, and by the convention relative to the Suez Canal of 1889. The Bering Sea tribunal also considered it as the normal distance in 1893.

The littoral sea being a part of the territory, a State generally exercises within it all the rights flowing from sovereignty.

Thus, the exclusive right of coastal navigation, the exclusive right of taking the fruits of the sea, fishing, taking oysters, pearls, corals, sponges, etc.; the administration of justice and the exclusive right of legislation; the administration of customs and general police; the regulation of pilotage, signals, shipwrecks, and salvage; the right of inquiry aboard ship at anchor in the littoral sea; and to decide upon the admission into its ports and roadsteads of foreign ships of

war..

The sovereignty of the State over the littoral sea, in spite of certain limitations which result from the nature of the sea, is an actual sovereignty not differing in its nature from that which belongs to the State over other elements of the territory. The State over the littoral sea has not a but the right of sovereignty.

The most well-known and important derogations from the exclusive right of fishing in the littoral sea are the servitude constituted in favor of France by Article 13 of the treaty of Utrecht, of 1713, ceding Newfoundland to Great Britain, and the servitude in favor of the United States in the British waters of Newfoundland and Canada.

Page 153.-Every sea which is a part of the ocean is a part of the free sea. It is otherwise when it is surrounded by the territory of a single State, which can control its entrance or dominate the straits by means of batteries, thus having an effective power to close it at will. In such a case the sea belongs to that State. It is a closed sea, mare clausum. If there are several coastal States, the liberty of the sea prevails; the sea does not belong to the bordering States pro rata regionis, it is free.

The sovereignty of a State over the closed sea is not limited like that over the littoral sea. It does not legally differ from sover

eighty over an interior sea, in the strict sense, and over a lake. “A sea or a gulf communicationg with the ocean by one or more straits can not be recognized as an appropriated sea, except in cases in which its coasts belong to a State which is master of the straits giving access to it, provided that this passage be narrow enough to be controlled by cannon placed on the two shores." 1

66

This denomination [of closed seas] cannot be applied except to portions of the sea projecting far into the land and communicating with the sea by a strait narrow enough to be commanded by force from the two shores. It is necessary, moreover, in order that the sea be actually closed that all its shores on the two sides of its entrance be subject to the same sovereignty. When these two conditions are united such a sea, whatever its extent, is considered territorial. It is the exclusive property of the State which governs its shores, but from the moment that the shore belongs to several sovereigns, none of them, not even the proprietor of the two shores of the straits, has the power of closing its passage." "

2

In conformity with what we have just said, portions of the sea or seas which are, by reason of their configuration, called gulfs or bays, are territory when they are surrounded by the land of a single State or when their entrance is sufficiently narrow to be commanded by cannon from its shores; but as soon as there are several bordering States, the gulf is a free sea, whatever the width of its entrance. A gulf, even though surrounded by a single State, is a free sea if its entrance is too wide to be dominated from the shore. It is generally admitted that this is the case where the distance between the shores is more than 10 marine miles.

Territorial gulfs are governed by the same legal principles which apply to other interior seas. territorial gulf ends.

The littoral sea commences where the

The word "gulf" is here employed in the wide sense, comprising bays, roadsteads, etc. A gulf is a part of the sea which penetrates the land and whose opening toward the sea is fairly wide, giving it the appearance on the map of the breast of a woman, whence its name. A bay, according to Littré, is simply a gulf whose entrance is narrow. There are, however, wide bays. A roadstead is "a stretch of sea inclosed by more or less elevated land which presents to vessels an anchorage secure from winds and waves from a certain direction." The Frische Haff and the Kurische Haff are German, as well as the Gulf of Stettin and the Bay of Jade. The Gulf of Riga is Russian. Great Britain has declared territorial the Bay of Conception, Newfoundland, and the Bay of Fundy, whose entrance is 15 miles

wide.

1 Perels, p. 35.

2 Hautefeuille, Histoire, p. 21.

The Gulf of Bothnia is a free sea, as well as the Gulf of Finland, although Russia calls it Russian. The Delaware and Hudson bays are free, in spite of the contrary English and American opinion.

Roadsteads, ports, and harbors are not in the status of the littoral sea. They belong to the State absolutely and entirely, in the same way as every other part of the territory.

SCHMALZ: Le Droit des Gens Européen. Paris, 1823.

[Translated from German into French by de Bohm.]

Page 143.—It is evident that the right of property is not admissible with respect to the ocean. Cultivation could secure no property whatever for the individual, nor could the combination of several rights of property form for the State a maritime domain as one may form a continental territory by uniting portions of land. It is, therefore, only by means of treaties that nations may establish in the ocean an analagous right, a domain, or sphere for the exercise of sovereignty. Nevertheless, this order of things can only be obligatory for the contracting parties and could not extend to other peoples and exclude them from it, as the cultivation of the soil excludes all other acquisition. We do not consider it superflous to recall here that, according to the law of nations, the term " property" is used to designate the right of a nation over its territory; but we can not attach to this expression any other sense than that of sovereignty, and that the latter appears in the law of nations under the character of property, although in the internal law of a State it may have a different sense. From this point of view, then, the exercise of sovereignty may equally apply to the maritime domain and limit its use for foreigners in like manner as this restriction is applied to the land territory. But there are parts of the sea over which the domination of the State is recog nized by all nations, even when they are not enclosed within the land. so that this supremacy would appear as a natural consequence. St. Georges Channel, between Great Britain and Ireland, belongs to the British Empire. The Hellespont and Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, the Aegean, and the Black Sea are a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Straits of Messina are a dependency of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; the Zuyder Zee belongs to the Netherlands, as the Sound itself and the two Belts belong to Denmark. Moreover, the parts of the sea which wash the coasts have always been regarded as the property of the country adjacent to them. It is only outside of Europe, in which the restless jealousy of the powers seek to maintain an exclusive commerce with their colonies, that the navigation of foreign nations to a considerable distance from these shores has often

been forbidden. In Europe the opinion of the jurists who treated this matter philosophically appears first to have been adopted as a system. According to this principle the sea ought to belong to the nation as far as the defense of the coasts may extend, taking as the standard of measurement the range of cannon shot; but since then it has been fixed quite arbitrarily at 3 marine leagues. Great Britain is the only power which has extended its claim farther in this regard, seeking to forbid herring fishing in the North Sea to the Dutch as far as a distance of 30 English miles; as in Iceland Denmark asserted the right to keep off foreign vessels within 4 German miles.

On the other hand, the powers recognized as free several portions of the sea over which it would seem to be easy to raise claims, as the Straits of Gibraltar, the White Sea, and the Spanish Sea. But serious debates have taken place on other points and perhaps they will arise again. Denmark, it is true, no longer claims sovereignty over the Baltic because it possesses the key; Austria, for Venice, does not claim domination of the Adriatic Sea, nor Sardinia for Genoa, over the Ligurian Sea. But it has not yet been decided to whom the Gulf of Finland belongs, which Sweden, up to the cession of that Province, possessed uncontested. The sovereignty of Great Britain over the seas which surround it has often been debated; more often in schools than between powers. The British Government itself does not believe it is authorized to extend this sovereignty to the opposite coasts, a right which some publicists sought to ascribe to it. These claims, however, have only been asserted with respect to the British Channel and the Pas-de-Calais. .

Page 188.-We have already observed that the right of sovereignty which different States possess over certain portions of the sea, principally over those which border the coasts, is recognized. We must now examine the relations which result therefrom among the nations. Every State in the parts of the sea subject to its domination exercises all the rights attached to sovereignty, consequently crimes and misdemeanors committed there are within its jurisdiction. A pirate may be pursued in the open sea by the subjects of any power, but near the coasts he is subject to the authority of the sovereign to whom they belong. The sovereign is likewise authorized to assert rights within the extent of this district, because he maintains peace. and security within it by his police. By the same right, with the exception of free navigation, the State may forbid subjects of foreign powers the free use of the sea up to a certain distance, and by much greater reason prevent them from appropriating objects lying along the coasts, either those that consist in marine products, like amber, or wrecks or cargo jettisoned at sea to lighten the vessel.

A State has the incontestable right of reserving to its subjects the right of fishing along the shore, but in the open sea beyond the limits

recognized, it can not forbid fishing to foreign vessels, although they may oppose the drying of fish on the coast. This is why powers have frequently extended the exercise of their rights of sovereignty beyond the distance of 3 marine leagues, which custom sanctions. Denmark, among others, has claimed 15 German miles for Greenland and 4 for Iceland.

Navigation in parts of the sea subject to a power, entrance into its harbors, permission to enter its roadsteads, are reciprocally. granted by the European States under the condition of not conravening the local laws, but principally of not bringing in prohibited merchandise. It is only outside of Europe that closed ports exist, the entrance to which is not permitted to foreigners except in case of distress.

SCHÜCKING: Das Küstenmeer im Internationalen Rechte. Göttingen, 1897.

Page 6.-The doctrine of the territorial extension of the sovereignty of adjacent States over the coastal sea in its historical development up to the resolutions of the Institute of International Law. Studying the historical development of the doctrine of the coastal sea we find that Bartolus de Sassoferrato, the most prominent of the postglossators, first expressed the idea of sovereignty of the adjacent State over the coastal sea in his "Tractatus: Tyberidis.”1 We read that once, when he was spending his vacation in a country home near Perugia, a spirit appeared to him and asked him in the name of the God of the Tiber to write an essay on this subject. And in this essay Bartolus held that every adjacent State should have an "imperium" over the coastal sea to the extent of 100 miles, or a two days' journey. His brother Angelus was willing to concede to the State an "imperium" beyond that limit if they would not get into conflict among themselves with regard to the extent of their "imperium," and this same view is taken by the postglossators of the fifteenth century, such as Fulgosius, Castro, Caepolla, and Felinus.2

But, in fact, the doctrine of Bartolus has been leading the Italian State system, especially since even Zaldus de Ubaldis agrees with Bartolus. Thus, we know of a decision of the Supreme Court of Piedmont of the second half of the seventeenth century which upon these authorities allowed a Spanish ship sailing for Naples to be

1 Bartolus, Operae, vol. vi, Lugdunum, 1552, p. 146.

Tellegen, Disputatio de iure in mare, imprimis in proximum, Groningen, 1857, p. 13.