We must remark that this last limit has been adopted because we have taken account of the older usual range of cannon. But we must not conclude from this that it constitutes the normal limit outside special conventions. The limit of common law always remains, excepting conventions to the contrary, the greatest range of cannon at the time in question. (See letter of Messrs. Courcel and Gram, arbitrators in the conflict between Great Britain and the United States on the question of fishing on the Bering Sea, Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, vol. 13, p. 282.)

The limit of the greatest range of cannon, however logical it may be, since it corresponds to the effective action of the sovereign over the sea, deserves serious criticism. It is quite uncertain and very variable, following the latest improvements in ballistics. As it increases corresponding to the latest improvements in artillery, it is purely theoretical for many countries which do not possess cannons of the latest model or even have none at all on their coasts. Besides, we take account of the absolute range of projectiles and not their effective range, which is far from being so great. From the legal point of view, finally we would logically have to decide that the assertion of sovereignty in a zone so extended implies a correlative obligation on the part of the adjacent State to completely exercise in that zone its domination and to fulfill in it all its duties; for example, from the point of view of the police of navigation and the safety of vessels. Now, such a burden would clearly be inadmissible. It has also been sought to find a limit of the territorial sea which would take a reasonable middle ground between that of 3 miles, fixed in the majority of treaties on fishing and the legislation of certain States (British act, 1878), but which seems too narrow, and that of the greatest range of cannon, which is excessive. After fruitless attempts at Hamburg and at Geneva in 1891-92, the Institute of International Law succeeded in adopting the following resolution in 1894 at its Paris session: "The territorial sea extends to 6 marine miles from low-water mark along the coast." This extent of the territorial sea is in most cases sufficient and could be adopted by the States.

In spite of all limitations of the territorial sea within the range of cannon, it is well understood that the State may forbid acts of hostility carried on in the open sea within a radius which may affect its shores when it is neutral. It is to assure this line of respect of neutrality that the institute voted the following resolution:

In case of war, the adjacent neutral State has the right of establishing its neutral zone beyond this 6 miles up to the range of cannon, either by declaration of neutrality or by special notification. (Art. 4.)

$405.-Ports, harbors, and roadsteads. In like manner, as among the Romans, these dependencies of the maritime territory are in all modern countries a part of the domain of the State in like title as the shores and derelictions of the sea. They are, therefore, subject to a right of property, and not merely of sovereignty.

$406.-Gulfs and wide bays. Over gulf and wide bays the State no longer has a right of property. It can only exercise the right of sovereignty. This last right is, moreover, subordinated to the condition that the effective power of the State may be exercised throughout the entire extent of the gulf or bay, which can not exceed the total range of cannon from its two shores. In conventions or State laws, especially so far as concerns the monopoly of fishing, we often adopt a rule by virtue of which the right of sovereignty is exercised in an absolute manner only over bays whose width does not exceed 10 miles. (See Franco-British Convention of Aug. 2, 1839, and the French law of May 6, 1882, Art. 2, covering fishing in the North Sea.) Wide gulfs beyond the range of cannon ought to be assimilated to the high seas. We can not, therefore, admit the claim of the United States over the Gulf of Mexico and over Hudson Bay any more than the English theory of Kings Chambers or Narrow Seas, according to which the entire space of sea contained between two shores belonging to one State is under the sovereignty of that State. Thus the English sought to make of the Irish Sea an English sea under the same title as the arms of the sea between Great Britain and the Isle of Wight; and by the Ordinance of 1872, it considered as such the Bay of Conception in Newfoundland, which extends 40 miles inland and is 15 miles wide.

As lex ferenda, the Institute of International Law adopted the following resolution at its Paris session in 1894: "For bays the territorial sea follows the sinuosities of the coast, except that it is measured from a straight line drawn across the bay at its narrowest part toward the sea, where the distance between the two shores of the bay is 12 marine miles, unless continuous and established usage shall have sanctioned a greater width." (Art. 3.) This last reservation contemplated bays more than 12 miles wide, which by reason of their situation or importance have always been claimed in fact as the territorial sea of the adjacent States; for example, the Firths of Scotland, the Fiords of Norway, the Bay of Cancale (17 miles wide), the Bay of Chaleur in Canada (16 miles wide). The width of 12 miles was proposed to harmonize with the extent of 6 miles adopted for the territorial sea, the bay becoming in its entirety subject to the State which surrounds its two shores and which may include it within the zone of its territorial sea. This symmetry is not of great practical value. In treaties and laws covering fishing we extend the sovereignty in bays as far as the point at which the

distance between the two shores reaches 10 miles and not 6 miles, although the extent of the territorial sea in some cases is ordinarily fixed at 3 miles. This is because reasonable account has been taken of the results of experience, which permit the assertion that the bay may be effectively controlled from the two shores so long as the space between them does not exceed 10 miles.

It has been demanded that the mouths of rivers, whatever their width, be assimilated to the rivers themselves, and not to the territorial sea (Annuaire, vol. 13, p. 294); but how shall we regulate. the situation of the mouth of a river, which in reality is only a line separating the river from the sea? In fact, bays into which rivers empty are not subjected to the régime of the latter. This is particularly the case with the mouth of the Danube, according to the treaty of March 30, 1866. We may also say, in the absence of a contrary convention, that there is no reason for not treating bays constituting the mouths of rivers like other bays.

§ 411, page 623. The right of fishing. In the open sea fishing is absolutely free for all States. We no longer seriously take account to-day of claims to a monopoly of fishing, such as those which Denmark formerly asserted over all the seas of Greenland and Iceland; and which treaties sanctioned, even in the seventeenth century. claims such as those which Selden upheld for Great Britain.

In the territorial seas, on the contrary, it is understood that every State reserves to itself an absolute monopoly of the right of fishing in the interest of its coastal population, because the area in question is one of exhaustible use and susceptible of individual appropriation, differing thus from the right of pacific navigation, which has not the same characteristics and can not be raised against other States. In fact, from the point of view of practical value, States may be divided into three categories:

(a) The right of fishing exclusively for nationals in territorial. waters in Great Britain, Spain, and France, since the law of March. 1. 1888, induced by the great competition which was open to foreign fishermen.

(b) Special favors given to nationals by laws or treaties, without excluding aliens (Belgium, Sweden and Norway).

(c) Liberty of fishing for all (Netherlands, Greece, and the United States).

In the municipal statutes as well as in the treaties, the limit of the territorial waters for fishing is ordinarily fixed at 3 geographic niles that is, 60 to a degree of latitude-from low-water mark. This radius is measured for bays from a straight line drawn across the bay in the part nearest the entrance, at the first point in which the width does not exceed 10 miles. (See Hague Conven

tion, May 6, 1882, arts. 2 and 3; French law of Mar. 1, 1888, art. 1: decree of Mar. 5[?],1 1888, for Algeria.) Certain countries for whom fishing constitutes an important industry fix a greater extent as the limit to their territorial sea for fishing.

FIORE: International Law Codified and Its Legal Sanction, or The Legal Organization of the Society of States.

[Translation from the fifth Italian edition by Edwin M. Borchard. New York, 1918.]

RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER TERRITORIAL WATERS.

Page 178.-265. The territorial sea must be considered as constituting a part of the domain of the State to which the coasts belong. By virtue of this eminent domain, every State has the exclusive right to provide for the security and defense of the territory of the State, the protection of the private interests of its citizens. the free carrying on of commerce, and the protection of the general and fiscal interests of the State.

No State can, however, assume the right to prohibit the inoffensive use of its territorial waters.

266. Every State has the exclusive right to regulate the patrol of navigation within territorial waters, the approach to the coasts, the entrance into ports, the obligation to take a local pilot, free pratique, and all similar matters. It is incumbent upon it to establish a strict supervision so as to insure compliance with the laws and regulations. by providing punishment for those who infringe them.

267. The right to fish and collect all under-water products within territorial waters may be reserved for citizens, except when treaties extend the fishing privilege to foreigners.

Fishing in territorial waters is generally regulated by commercial treaties and by special conventions covering the matter. In several treaties concluded by Italy, fishing in Italian territorial waters is reserved for her citizens. It is so stipulated in the treaty with Austria-Hungary of December 6, 1891, article 18, and in the treaty with Mexico of April 6. 1890, article 17, and others. The delimitation of the fishing limits in the bay of Mentone was determined by the convention of June 18, 1892, between Italy and France. There are many instances of treaties where the reservation of the exclusive right of citizens to fish in territorial waters is not stipulated. It is always necessary to refer to special conventions, to decide whether or not such reservation has been made. In principle. in the absence of a treaty of commerce, the privilege ought to be recognized as reserved to citizens. Compare Oppenheim. International Law, I, § 187.

1 July 9. See Journal officiel, July 13, 1888.

268. Let us suppose that by the law of a State fishing in territorial waters is reserved to citizens, and in a special treaty concluded with another State the right of fishing is granted to the citizens of that State. If, in the commercial treaty concluded with another State the right of fishing is not expressly reserved to citizens, and if the treaty contains the clause under which the contracting parties are assured the privileges of the most favored nation, the reservation based on the law granting citizens alone the right to fish in territorial waters should not be considered as impliedly renounced on the ground that the right of fishing has been granted in a treaty concluded with another State.

The French law of March 1, 1885 prohibits foreigners from fishing in the territorial waters of France and Algeria and reserves this right to French citizens. Now, let us suppose that a State, such as France, reserves fishing in its territorial waters to its citizens and that, afterward, by a treaty concluded with State A, it stipulates that fishing in the respective territorial waters shall be permitted under reciprocity to the citizens of the two contracting parties. Let us suppose, furthermore, that in a later treaty concluded with State B there is inserted the most favored nation clause. In such instances, could it be held that, by reason of such clause, the citizens of State B could claim the right of fishing conceded to State A? Derogations from the general law reserving fishing to citizens may only be sought in a special law, and as special laws derogating from the general law are strictly interpreted, it cannot be admitted that the derogation contained in the special concession to State A should apply to other powers. It would in fact require another special express provision in favor of another State to furnish a derogation in its favor, from the general law reserving fishing in territorial water to citizens. 269. The sovereign of every State also has the right to reserve the coasting trade to citizens. This right must be considered as reserved, whenever it has been established by law or custom and no derogation therefrom has been suffered by treaty.

The expression "coasting trade" denotes the transportation of merchandise and passengers between two parts of the same State. This trade as a rule is reserved exclusively for national ships. We believe, however, that as the right of free, peaceful navigation over the territorial sea is now conceded, the privilege cannot be sustained except by virtue of a special law of the State or established custom. The rule reserving the coasting trade to citizens is generally adopted in all European States; in Germany, by the law of May 22, 1881; in Spain, by the ordinance of July 15, 1870, and in France, by the law of April 2, 1889. In England, an order in council prohibits the coasting trade to vessels of countries which do not admit reciprocity. In the United States, foreign vessels are absolutely excluded from the coasting trade. On the other hand, in Belgium, the coasting trade is free