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INTRODUCTION

Relatively few persons realize the extent of the powers and jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission which was created by Act of Congress in the autumn of 1914. Requests from clients and attorneys and my own desire for a compilation of the pertinent statutes in convenient form have prompted the publication of this pamphlet. The passage in April of last year of the Webb Export Law materially extended the already broad powers and responsibilities of the Commission.

By the fifth section of the Act of September 26, 1914 (38 U. S. Stats., 717), which created the Federal Trade Commission, it is provided "That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." In the following sentence the Commission is empowered and directed to "prevent" persons, partnerships or corporations, except banks, and carriers subject to the acts to regulate commerce, "from using unfair methods of competition in commerce." This is the first of the quasi judicial powers conferred by Congress upon the Federal Trade Commission. The second of such powers is contained in the seventh section of the act, which provides that in any suit in equity brought by the Attorney General under the antitrust acts, the court may, if after the taking of testimony it is of opinion that complainant is entitled to relief, refer the suit to the Commission "as a master in chancery to ascertain and report an appropriate form of decree therein." By sections two, three, seven and eleven of the "Clayton Act" (38 U. S. Stat., 730), approved October 15, 1914, less than one month after the passage of the act creating the Commission, three additional quasi judicial powers of this character are conferred upon the Commission. Section two of the Clayton Act declares discrimination in price to be unlawful if in restraint of trade. The third section prohibits the leasing or sale of articles, whether patented or unpatented, upon condition that the lessee or purchaser shall not deal in commodities of a competitor of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such transaction may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Such sale and leasing contracts are commonly known as "tying contracts." The seventh section prohibits one corporation from acquiring the whole or any part of the stock of another or of others where such corporations are engaged in interstate commerce and

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the effect of such acquisition "may be to substantially lessen competition." This section also provides it shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for investment and "not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition." Authority to "enforce compliance" with sections two, three and seven is conferred upon the Federal Trade Commission by the eleventh section in all cases except those of banks and common carriers. In cases where the Commission duly finds the existence of conditions which are prohibited by the provisions of the acts mentioned above it may order such person, partnership or corporation to "cease and desist" therefrom. The Commission may enforce compliance with its order upon application to a circuit court of appeals and the person, partnership or corporation against which such order was entered may obtain a review thereof upon application to such court. It is provided that the findings of fact by the Commission "if supported by testimony shall be conclusive." In respect of findings of fact by the Interstate Commerce Commission, Mr. Justice Lamar, in speaking for the Supreme Court in Interstate Commerce Commission vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 222 U. S. 541, 547, said:

"Its conclusion, of course, is subject to review, but, when supported by evidence, is accepted as final; not that its decision, involving, as it does, so many and such vast public interests, can be supported by a mere scintilla of proof, but the courts will not examine the facts further than to determine whether there was substantial evidence to sustain the order."

See also Louisville and N. R. R. Co. vs. United States, 238
U. S. 1, 9, 10, 11.

The judgment and decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari, as provided by section 240 of the Judicial Code.

An important provision in the act creating the Commission is one which confers jurisdiction upon the United States district courts to issue writs of madamus commanding any person or corporation to comply with the provisions of the act or any order of the Commission made in pursuance thereof. Applications for this relief must be made by the Attorney General at the request of the Commission. In addition to the jurisdiction and powers of the Commission heretofore adverted to, it has had conferred upon it broad powers

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