embraces whatever characteristics belong, in common, to the several individuals which thus resemble each other. To this general conception we appropriate the name Indian, Negro, Caucasian, etc., which henceforth represent to us so mary classes or varieties of the human race. Bringing these classes again into comparison with each other, we observe certain points of resemblance between them, and form a conception still more general, that of man. Further Illustration of the same Process.—In this way the genera and species of science are formed. On grounds of observed resemblance, we class together, for example, certain animals. They differ from each other in color, size, and many other respects, but agree in certain characteristics which we find invariable, as, for example, the form of the skeleton, number of vertebræ, number and form of teeth, arrangement of organs of digestion. We give a name to the class thus formed — carnivora, rodentia, etc. The class thus formed and named, we term the genus, while the minor differences mark the subordinate varieties or species included under the genus. In the same way, comparing other animals, we form other genera. Bringing the several genera also into comparison, we find them likewise agreeing in certain broad resemblances. These points of agreement, in turn, constitute the elements of a conception and classifica tion still wider and more comprehensive than the former. Under this new conception I unite the previous genera, and term them all mammalia. And so on to the highest and widest generalizations of science. Having forme our classification we refer any new speci men to some one of the classes already formed, and the more complete our original survey, the more correct is this process of individual arrangement. It is remarked by Mr. Stewart, that the islanders of the Pacific, who had never seen any species of quadruped, except the hog and the goat, naturally inferred, when they saw a cow, that she must be long to one or the other of these classes. The limitations of numan knowledge may lead the wisest philosopher into essentially the same error, It is in the way now described that we form genera, and species, and the various classes into which, for purposes of science, we divide the multitude of objects which are pre sented in nature, and which, but for this faculty, would ap pear to us but a confused and chaotic assemblage without number, order, or arrangement. The individuals exist in nature- not the classes, and orders, and species: these are the creations of the human mind, conceptions of the brain, results of that process of thought now described as the reflective faculty in its synthetic form. -- Importance of this Process.It is evident at a glance that this process lies at the foundation of all science. Had we no power of generalization had we no power of separating, in our thoughts, the quality from the substance to which it pertains, of going beyond the concrete to the abstract, beyond the particular to the general could we deal only with individual existences, neither comparison nor classification would be possible; each particular individual object would be a study to us by itself, nor would any amount of diligence ever carry us beyond the very alphabet of knowl edge. Existence of general Conceptions questioned. Import ant as this faculty may seem when thus regarded, it has been questioned by some whether, after all, we have, in fact. or can have, any general abstract ideas; whether triangle, man, animal, etc., suggest in reality any thing more to the mind than simply some particular man, or triangle, ‹r ani nal, which we take to represent the whole class to which the individual belongs. There can be no question, however, that we do distin guish in our minds the thought of some particular man, as Mr. A, or some particular sort of man, as black man, white man, from the thought suggested by the term man; and the thought of an isosceles or right-angled triangle, from the thought suggested by the unqualified term triangle. They do not mean the same thing; they have not the same value to our minds. Now there are a great multitude of such general terms in every language, they have ? definite meaning and value, and we know what they mean It must be then that we have general abstract ideas, or general conceptions. Argument of the Nominalist. But the nominalist replies. The term man, or triangle, awakens in your mind, in reality and directly, only the idea of some particular individual or triangle, and this stands as a sort of type or representation of other like individuals of whom you do not definitely think as such and so many. I reply, this cannot be shown; but even if it were so, the very language of the objection implies the power of having general conceptions. If the individual man or triangle thought of stands as a typo or representation, as it is said, of a great number of similar men and triangles, then is there not already in my mind, prior to this act of representation, the idea of a class of objects, arranged according to the law of resemblance, in other words, a general abstract idea or conception? If I had not already formed such an idea, the particular object presented to my thoughts could not stand as type or representation of any such thing, or of any thing beyond itself, for the simple reason that there would be nothing of the sort to represent. Further Reply. — Besides, there is a large class of general terms to which this reasoning of the nominalist would not at all apply-such terms as virtue, vice, knowledge, wis dom, truth, time, space which manifestly do not awa ken in the mind the thought of any particular virtue or vice, any particular truth, any definite time, any definite space, but a general notion under which all particular in stances may be included. To this the nominalist will per haps reply, that in such cases we are really thinking, after all, of mere names or signs, as when we use the algebraic formula x-y, a mere term of convenience, having indeed some value, we do not know precisely what, itself the ter minus and object of our thought for the time being. In such cases the mind stops, he would say, with the term itself, and does not go beyond it to conjure up a general conception for it. So it is with the terms virtue, vice; so with the general terms, class, species, genus, man, animal, triangle; they are mere collective terms, signs, formulas of convenience, to which you attach no more meaning than to the expression x-y. If you would find their meaning and attach any definite idea to them, you must resolve them into the particular objects, the particular vices, virtues, etc., which go to make up the class. I reply to all this, you are still classifying, still forming a general conception, the expression of which is your so called formula, x-y, alias virtue, man, and the like. § II. - PROVINCE AND RELATION OF SEVERAL TERMS EMPLOYED TO DENOTE, IN PART, OR AS A WHOLE, THIS POWER OF THE MIND. We are now prepared to consider the proper province and relation of several terms frequently employed, with considerable latitude and diversity of meaning, to denote, in part, or as a whole, the process now described. Such are the terms abstraction, generalization, classification, and indgment. I. ABSTRACTION. Term often used in a Wide Sense. - This term is fre quently employed to denote the entire synthetic process as now described the power of forming abstract general con ceptions, and of classifying objects according to those conceptions. It is thus employed by Stewart, Wayland, Mahan, and others. There is, perhaps, no objection to this use of the word, except that it is manifestly a departure from the strict and proper sense of the term. limited sense. More limited Sense. mon use of the term abstraction, which gives it a more As thus employed, it denotes that act of the mind by which we fix our attention on some one of the several parts properties, or qualities of an object, to the exclusion of all the other parts or properties which go to make up the complex whole. In consequence of this exclusive direction of the thoughts to that one element, the other ele ments or properties are lost sight of, drop out of the ao count, and there remains in our present conception only that one item which we have singled out from the rest. This is denominated, in common language, abstraction. Such is the common idea and definition of that term. J is Mr. Upham's definition. -There is another and more com This not really Abstraction. Whether this, again, is the true idea of abstraction, is, to say the least, questionable. When I think of the cover of a book, the handle of a door, the spring of a watch, in distinction from the other parts which make up a complex whole, I am hardly exercising the power of abstract thought; certainly no new, distinct faculty is requisite for this, but simply attention to one among several items or objects of perception. Hardly ever can it be called analysis, with Wayland. It is the simple direction of the thought to some one out of several objects presented. A red rose is before me. I may think of its color exclusively, in distinction from its form and fragrance; that is, of the redness of this particular rose, this given surface before me. The object of my thought is purely a sensible object. I have not abstracted it from the sensible individual object to which it belongs. It is in no sense an abstract idea, a pure conception. There has been nothing done which is not done in any case where one thing, rather than another of a group or assemblage of objects, is made the object of attention. The true Nature of Abstraction. But suppose now that instead of thinking of the redness of this rose in par |