the investigation is likely to extend beyond the bounds of the science itself, into other and kindred sciences. The most serious consequences may flow from it, in other and wider fields of thought.

Sources of Information.—The sources of our information are essentially the same in this as in the preceding divisions of the science. They are twofold; the consciousness of what passes in our own minds, and the observation of others. Our single business is to ascertain facts, actua phenomena; not to inquire what might be, or what ought, to be, according to preconceived notions and theories, but what is. This is to be learned, not by reasoning and logical argument, but by simple observation of phenomena. Having once ascertained these, we may infer, and conclude, and reason from them, as far as we please, and our conclusions will be correct, provided the data are correct from which we set forth, and provided we reason correctly from these principles.

Method to be pursued. In treating of this department of mental activity, it will be our first business, then, to point out the well established and evident facts pertaining to the matter in hand, viewed simply as psychological phenomena, as modes in which the human mind manifests itself in action, according to the laws of its constitution. These being ascertained, we shall be prepared to consider some of the more difficult and doubtful matters respecting the will, on which the world has long been divided, and which can never be intelligently discussed, much less settled, without a clear understanding, in the first place, of the psychological facts in the case, about which there need be, and should be, no dis pute.

CHAPTER 1.

NATURE OF THE WILL.

What the Will is. I understand, by the will, that powe which the mind has of determining or deciding what it will do, and of putting forth volitions accordingly. The will is the power of doing this; willing, is the exercise of the power; volition, is the deed, the thing done. The will is but another name for the executive power of the mind. Whatever we do intelligently and intentionally, whether it implies an exercise of the intellect, or of the feelings, or of both, that is an act of the will. All our voluntary, in distinction from our involuntary movements of the body, and movements of mind, are the immediate results of the activity of the Will.

Condition of a Being destitute of Will. We can, perhaps, conceive of a being endowed with intellect and sensibility, but without the faculty of will. Such a being, however superior he might be to the brutes in point of intelligence, would, so far as regards the capacities of action, be even their inferior, since his actions must be, as theirs, the result of mere sensational impulse, without even that unerring instinct to guide him, which the brute possesses, and which supplies the place of reason and intelligent will. To this wretched condition man virtually approximates when, by any means, the will becomes so far enfeebled, or brought under the dominion of appetite and passion, as to lose the actual control of the mental and physical powers.

Will not distinct from the Mind.- It must be borne in mind, of course, as we proceed, that the will is nothing but the mind itself willing, or having power to will, and not something distinct from the mind, or even a part of the

mind, as the handle and the blade are distinct parts of the knife. The power to think, the power to feel, the power to will, are distinct powers, but the mind is one and indivisible, exercising now one, now another, of these powers.

§1-ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN AN ACT OF WILL.

Proposed Analysis. In order to the better understand. ing of the nature of this faculty, let us first analyze its oper ations, with a view to ascertain the several distinct stages or elements of the mental process which takes place. We will then take up these several elements, one by one, for special. investigation.

Observation of an Act of Will. What, then, are the essential phenomena of an act of the will? Let us arrest ourselves in the process of putting forth an act of this kind, and observe precisely what it is that we do, and what are the essential data in the case. I am sitting at my table. I reach forth my hand to take a book. Here is an act of my will. My arm went not forth self-moved and spontaneously, it was sent, was bidden to go; the soul seated within, animating this physical organism, and making it subservient to her will, moved that arm. Here, then, is clearly an act of will. Let us subject it to the test of observation.

The first Element. First of all, then, there was evidently, in this case, something to be done an end to be ac complished a book to be reached. The action, both of body and of mind, was directed to that end, and but for that the volition would not have been put forth. It is to be observed, moreover, that the end to be accomplished, in this case, was a possible one—the book was, or was supposed to be, within my reach. Otherwise I should not have attempted to reach it.

A second Element. I observe, furthermore, in the case under consideration, a motive, impelling or inducing to that end; a reason why I willed the act. It was curiosity, per.

haps, to see what the book was, or it may have been some other principle cf my nature, which induced me to put forth the volition.

A further Step in the Process. But the motive does not, itself, produce the act. It is merely the reason why I produce it. It has to do not directly with the action, but with me. Its immediate effect terminates on me, and it is only indirectly that it affects the final act. The next step in the process, then, is to be sought, not in the final act, but in my mind as influenced by motive; and that step is my choice. Previous to my putting forth the volition to move my arm, there was a choice or decision to do so. In view of the end to be accomplished, and influenced by the motive, I made up my mind · to use a common but not inapt expression to perform the act. The question arose, for the instant, Shall I do it? The very occurrence of a thing to be done, a possible thing, and of a motive for doing it, raises, of itself, the question, Shall it be done? The question may be at once decided in the affirmative, in the absence of reasons to the contrary, or, in the absence of reflection, so quickly decided, that, afterward, we shall hardly be conscious that it was ever before the mind. Or it may be otherwise. Reasons to the contrary suggest themselves - counter influences and motives - in view of which we hesitate, deliberate, decide; and that decision, in view of all the circumstances, is our preference, or choice. In most cases the process is so rapid as to escape attention; but subsequent reflection can hardly fail to detect such a process, more or less distinctly marked.

The final Stage of the Act. We have reached now the point at which it is decided, in our own minds, what course to pursue. In the case supposed, I have decided to take up the book. The volition is not yet put forth. Nothing now remains, however, but to put forth the volition, and at once the muscular organism, if unimpeded and in health, obeys the will. The thing is done, and the experiment concluded

Summary of Results. or a hundred times, but always with like results. I find always, where there is an act of the will, some end to be ob tained, some motive, a choice, an executive volition. I conclude that these are the essential phenomena of all voluntary action.

I repeat now the experiment ten

Of these, the two former, viz., the end to be accomplished, and the motive, may be regarded as more properly condi tions of volition, than constituent elements of it. Still, so intimately is the volition connected with one, at least, of these conditions, viz., the motive, that it claims special con sideration. The ends to be accomplished by volition are as numerous as the infinite variety of human purposes and ac tions, and, of course, admit of no complete enumeration or classification. We confine our further attention, then, to these elements- the motive, the choice, the executive volition — and proceed to their more careful investigation as phenomena of the will.

The first of these Elements, Motive, always implied in Ac tion. — I. THE MOTIVE-that which incites the mind to action the reason why it acts, and acts as it does. We never act without some such incitement, some reason for acting; at least this is true of all our intelligent and volun tary actions, of which, alone, we now speak. It may be nothing more than mere present impulse, mere animal appe tite or passion, even that is a motive, a reason why we act. We cannot conceive of any being having the power of vol untary action, and exerting that power without any reason whatever why he did it. The reason may, or may not, be clearly apprehended by his own mind-that is another question; but whether distinctly and clearly recognized as such, or not, by our own minds, a reason there always is for what we do