and determine his conduct, by controlling and determining his inclinations, and so his choice; while, at the same time, the man is left perfectly free to put forth such volitions as he pleases, and to do as he likes. There can be no higher liberty than this. To this point I shall again revert, when the question comes up respecting the divine agency in con. nection with human freedom.

CHAPTER IV.

CERTAIN QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE PRECEDING

§ I.-CONTRARY CHOICE.

The Question stated. In the preceding chapters our attention has been directed to the psychological facts respecting the will, and also to the general question respecting the freedom of the will. Closely connected with this main question, and involved in its discussion, are certain inquiries of a like nature, which cannot wholly he passed by, and for the consideration of which the way is now prepared. One of these respects the power of contrary choice. Have we any such power? Is the freedom, which, as we have seen, belongs to the very nature of the will, such a freedom as allows of our choosing, under given circumstances, any otherwise than we do? When I put forth a volition, all other things being as they are, can I, at that moment, in place of that volition, put forth a different one in its stead?

Not identical with the preceding. This question is not identical with that respecting the freedom of the will, for it has been already shown that there may be true freedom without any such power as that now in question. My will is free, provided I can put forth such volitions as I please, irrespective of the power to substitute other volitions and choices in place of the actual ones.

Such Power not likely to be exercised. The question, however, is one of some importance, whether we have any such power or not. And whether we have it or not, one thing is certain we are not likely to exercise it. If among the fixed and given things, which are to remain as they are, we include whatever inclines or induces the mind to choose and act as it does, then, power or no power to the contrary, the choice will be as it is, and would be so, if we were to try the experiment a thousand times; for choice depends on these preceding circumstances and inducements — the inclination of the mind — and if this is given, and made cer tain, the choice to which it will lead becomes certain also. A choice opposed to the existing inclination, to the sum total of the existing inducements to action, is not a choice at all; it is a contradiction in terms. The power of contrary choice, then, is one which, from the nature of the case, will never be put in requisition, unless something lying back of the choice, viz., inclination, be changed also.

But does such Power exist.-The question is not, however, whether such a power is likely to be employed, but whether it exists; not whether the choice will be thus and thus, but whether it can be otherwise. When, from various courses of procedure, all practicable, and at my option, I select or choose one which, on the whole, I will pursue, have I no power, under those very circumstances, and at that very moment, to choose some other course instead of that? Can my choice be otherwise than it is?

In what Sense there is such Power. Abstractly, I suppose, it can. Power and inclination are two different things. The power to act is one thing, and the disposition to exert that power is another thing. Logically, one does not involve the other. The power may exist without the disposi tion, or the disposition without the power. There is power, logically, abstractly considered, to choose, even when inclination is wanting; you have only to supply the requisite inclination, and the power is at once exerted, the choice is

made, the act is performed. But the change of inclination does not create any new power; it simply puts in requisition a power already existing.

II. POWER TO DO WHAT WE ARE NOT DISPOSED TO DO.

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The Question under another Form. Closely analogous to the question last discussed, virtually, indeed, the same question under another form, is the inquiry, whether we can at any moment, will or do what we are not, at that moment, inclined to do. Have I any such power or freedom as this, that I CAN do what I am not DISPOSED or do not wish to do? My disposition being to pursue a given course, is it really in my power to pursue a different one?

In order to determine this question, let us see what constitutes, or in what consists, the power of doing, in any case, what we are disposed to do; and then we may be able to judge whether that power still exists, in case the disposition is wanting.

In what Power consists. - It is admitted that I can do what I wish or am disposed to do. Now, in what consists that power? That depends on what sort of act it is that I am to put forth. Suppose it be a physical act. My power to do what I wish, in that case, consists in my having certain physical organs capable of doing the given thing, and under the command of my will. Suppose it be an intellectual act. My power, in that case, of doing what I like, depends on my having such mental faculties as are requisite for the perform. ance of the given act, and these under control. So long, then, as I have the faculties, physical or mental, that are re quisite to the performance of a given act, and those faculties are under the control of my will, so that I can exert them if I please, and when I please, so long my power of doing what I like is unimpaired, and complete, as, e. g., the power of walking, or adding a column of accounts.

But suppose the Disposition wanting. Suppose, now, che disposition to be wanting; does the power also disappear, or does it remain ? I have the same faculties as beore, and they are as fully under the control of the will as ever, and that constitutes all the power I ever had. I have she power, then, of doing what I have no inclination to do. Whatever I can do if I like, that also I can do, even if I do not like. In itself considered, the power to do a thing may be quite complete, and independent of the inclination or disposition to do or not to do.

Will it be put in Requisition? - But will this power be ever exercised? Certainly not, so long as the disinclination continues. In order to the doing of any thing, there must not only be power to do it, but disposition. If the latter be wanting, the former, though it may exist, will never be put forth.

Our Actions not consequently inevitable. — Have I, then, no power, that is really available, to do what I do not happen to be, at this moment, inclined to do? Am I shut up to the actual inclinations and choices of any given hour or moment? Am I under the stern rule of inevitable necessity and fate to do as I do, to choose as I choose, to be inclined as I am inclined? By no means. My inclinations are not fixed quantities. They may change. They depend, in part, on the intellectual conceptions: these may vary; in part on the state of the heart: divine grace may change the heart.

Actual Choices not necessary ones. The actual choice of any given moment is by no means a necessary one. Another might have been in its stead. A different inclination is certainly possible and conceivable, and a different inclina tion would have led to a different choice. If, instead of looking at the advantage or agreeableness of a proposed course, and being influenced by that consideration, I had looked at the right, the obligation in the case, my choice would have been a different one, for I should have been in

Two different objects were
As it is, I choose a, but

fluenced by a different motive. presented to my mind, a and b. might have chosen b, and should, had I been so inclineú. Why did I choose a ? Because, as the matter then presented itself to my mind, I was so inclined. But I might have taken a different view of the whole thing, and then my clination and my choice would have been different. It was in my power to have thought, to have felt, to have acted differently. What is more, I not only might, but, perhaps, ought to have felt and acted differently. I am responsible for having such an inclination as leads to a wrong choice responsible for my opinions and views which influence my feelings; responsible for my disposition, in so far as it is the result of causes within my own control.

Different Uses of the Term Power. It ought to be clearly defined in all such discussions what we mean by the principal terms employed. In the present instance what we mean by the words power, ability, can, etc., ought to be distinctly stated. Now, there are two senses in which these words are used, and the question before us turns, in part, on this difference.

1. We may use the word power, e. g., to denote all that is requisite or essential to the actual doing of a thing, whatever is so connected with the doing, that, if it be wanting, the thing will not be done.

Or, 2. In a more limited sense, to denote merely all that is requisite to the doing the thing, provided we please or choose to do it, all that is requisite in order to our doing what we like or wish.

The latter distinguishes between the ability and the willingness to do; the former includes them both in the idea of power. In order to the actual doing there must be both. But does the word power properly include both? In ordinary language, certainly, we distinguish the two. I can do a thing, and I wish to do it, are distinct propositions, and neither includes the other. It is only by a license of speech