mental constit ation and habits, our power of self-control the strength of our desires, as compared with our sense of duty, the presence or absence of the exciting object; in fine, on a great variety of predisposing causes and circumstances, all of which are to be taken into the account, when the ques tion is, why do we choose thus, and not otherwise? Now, these circumstances which go to determine our inclinations, and so our choices and volitions, are, in a great measure, be yond our direct control. Our physical and mental constitu tion, our external condition, our state of mind, and circum stances at any given moment, whatever in the shape of motive or inducement may be present with moving power to the mind, inclining us this way or that, all this lies much more under divine control than under our own.

The Point of Connection. Here, then, to speak rever. ently, lies the avenue of approach, through which Deity may come in and take possession of the human mind, and influence and shape its action, without infringing, in the least, on its perfect freedom. He has only to present such motives as shall seem to the mind weighty and sufficient, has only to touch the main-spring of human inclination, lying back of actual choice, has only to secure within us a disposition or liking to any given course, and our choice follows with certainty, and our volition, and our action; and that action and volition are free in the highest sense, because our choice was free. We acted just as we pleased, just as we were inclined.

The Influence of Man over his fellow Men an Illustration of the same Principle. - Now this is just what we, in a limited way, and to a small extent, are constantly doing with respect to our fellow men. We present motives, inducements, to a given course, we work upon their inclina tions, we appeal to their sensibilities, their natural desires, their sense of duty, and in proportion as we gain access to their hearts, we are successful in shaping and controlling their conduct. The great and difficult art of governing

men hes in this. We have only to suppose a like power, but complete and perfect, to be exercised by the supreme disposer and controller of events, so shaping and ordering circumstances as to determine the inclinations of men, gaining access, not in an uncertain and indirect manner, but by immediate approach to the human heart, all whose springs lie under his control, so that he can touch and command them as he will; we have only to conceive this, and we have, as it seems to me, a full and sufficient explanation of the fact that man acts freely, and just as he is inclined, while yet he is perfectly under the divine control.

Power which the Scriptures ascribe to God. And this, if I mistake not, is precisely the sort of control and power over man which the Scriptures always ascribe to God, viz., power over the inclinations, affections, dispositions, from which proceed all our voluntary actions. In his hand are the hearts of men, and he can turn them as the rivers of water are turned.

The Theory does not suppose a divine Influence to Evil. -It is not necessary to suppose that God ever influences men to evil; the supposition is inconsistent with the divine character, with all we know and conceive of Deity. Nor is any such influence over man necessary in order to the accomplishment of evil, but, on the contrary, much is needed to restrain and prevent him from sin. Sufficient already are the motives and influences that incline him to go astray; feeble and inefficient, the inducements to a better life. Could we suppose, however, any influence of this sort to be exerted over man, inclining him to evil, we can still see how such influence might be perfectly consistent with his entire freedom. It is not the integrity of human freedom, but the integrity of the divine character, that forbids such a supposition.

Does not interfere with Responsibility. - Does such a power over human conduct, as that now attributed to the supreme Being, interfere with human responsibility? Not

in the least. Responsibility rests with him who acts freely and as he pleases, doing that which is right or wrong, of his own accord, knowing what he does, and because he has a mind to do it. And it is thus man acts, under whatever degree of divine influence we may suppose him placed.

§ II.-MAN'S POWER OVER HIMSELF.

Unjust to require what it is impossible to perform.Have I power, in all cases, to do what the divine will re quires; power to do right? It would seem to be the ver dict of reason, and the common sense of mankind, that to require of any man what is literally and absolutely beyond his power, is unjust, and that such a requirement, if it were made, would impose no obligation, since obedience would be impossible. We cannot suppose God to be guilty of such manifest injustice. His commands are right. They carry with them the judgment and reason of men. Conscience approves them. Obligation attends them. They must, therefore, be such commands as it is possible for us to obey. It would be manifest injustice and wrong to require of me what it is actually and absolutely out of my power to do.

Supposed Disinclination. But suppose I have really no inclination, no disposition, to do right. My affections and desires are all wrong, inclining me to evil, and my sense of duty or moral obligation is not strong enough to prevail against these natural desires and evil inclinations; suppose this, which, alas! is too often true, and what then becomes of my power to do right? Does it any longer exist? Have I any power to change those affections and inclinations; or, they remaining as they are, have I any power to go contrary to them? A question this, at once profoundly philo sophical, and intensely practical.

Position of the Fatalist.—The fatalist has no hesitation in replying no, to these questions. Man has no power to change the current of his own inclinations, nor yet to go

against that current. He is wholly under the influence of motives; they turn him this way and that. He has power to do as he wills, but no power over the volitions themselves. He has power to do only what he has a mind to do. He has no mind, no inclination to do right, therefore, no power to do so.

ent answer.

say

This Position at Variance with a true Psychology. — A correct psychology, as we have already seen, gives a differ It is not true, as a matter of fact in the philos ophy of the human mind, that man has no power to do what he has no disposition to do; nor is it true that his inclinations and affections are wholly out of his power and control. In both respects, fatalism is at war, not more with the common sense of mankind, than with a sound and true philosophy. Confounds Power with Inclination. Το that man has no power to do what he is not inclined to do, is to confound power with inclination. They are distinct things. The one may exist without the other. I have power to do what I have no disposition to do; on the other hand, I may have the disposition to do what is not in my power. I have power to set fire to my own house, or to my neighbor's, or to cut off my right hand; power, but no disposition. Present a motive sufficiently weighty to change my mind, and incline me to the act, and you create, in that way, a new disposition, but no new power. This point has been fully discussed in the previous chapter, and I need not here repeat the argument. It was shown that in order to the actual doing of a thing, two things are requisite, namely, the power to do, and the inclination to exert that power; and that neither involves the other. Where the power alone exists, the thing can be done, but will not be; where both exist, it both can and will be done. It is not true, then, in any proper use of terms, that want of inclination is want of power.

Our Inclinations not wholly beyond our Control. Equally incorrect is the position that our inclinations and

affections are wholly out of our own control. Within cer tain limits it is in our power to change them. Inclination is not a fixed quantity. It may change. It ought to change. In many respects it is constantly changing. We take dif ferent views of things, and so our feelings and inclinations change. Circumstances change, the course of events changes; and our disposition is modified accordingly. So that while the affections and inclinations are certainly not under the direct and immediate control of the will, it is still, in a great measure, in our power to modify and control them. While they remain as they are, it is quite certain that we shall do as we do; but it is not necessary that they should, nor certain that they will, remain as they are.

The true Answer. — To the question, then, can the man whose inclinations are to evil, whose heart is wrong, do right? a true psychology answers yes. He can do what he is not inclined to do; nor is that evil inclination itself a fixed quantity; he can be, he may be, otherwise inclined.

Something else needed beside Power. It must be admitted, however, that so long as the heart is wrong, so long as the evil disposition continues, so long the man will continue to do evil, notwithstanding all his power to the contrary. Left to himself, there is very little probability of his effecting any material change in himself for the better. In order to this, there is needed an influence from without, and from above; an influence that shall incline him to obedience, that shall make him willing to obey.

The Gospel meets this Necessity.-This is precisely the want of his nature which divine grace meets. It creates within him a clean heart, and renews within him a right spirit. This is the sublime mystery of regeneration. The soul that is thus born of God is made willing to do right. The inclinations are no longer to evil, but to good, and the man still doing that which he pleases, is pleased to do the will of God. The change is in the disposition; it is a change of the affections, of the heart; thus the Scriptures always