Sabotage, as the evidence indicates it to have been advocated and taught by the organization, is not confined, as is the definition contained in the Act, to physical damage and injury to physical property. The organization's printed matter that was received in evidence contains no precise definition of sabotage, but does give a number of descriptive explanations of what it means. As fairly illustrative, we take the following: "Three versions are given of the source of the word. The one best known is that a striking French weaver cast his wooden shoe called a sabot-into the delicate mechanism of the loom upon leaving the mill. The confusion that resulted, acting to the workers' benefit, brought to the front a line of tactics that took the name of sabotage. Slow work is also said to be at the basis of the word, the idea being that wooden shoes are clumsy and so prevent quick action on the part of the workers. The third idea is that sabotage is coined from the slang term that means 'putting the boots' to the employers by striking directly at their profits without leaving the job. The derivation, however, is unimportant. It is the thing itself that causes commotion among employers and politicians alike." The evidence shows that the organization advocated, taught and aided various acts of "sabotage" that are plainly within the meaning of that word as defined by the Act. Some examples are: injuring machinery when employed to use it, putting emery dust in lubricating oil, damaging materials when using them in manufacture or otherwise, scattering foul seed in fields, driving tacks and nails in grape vines and fruit trees to kill them, using acid to destroy guy wires holding up the poles provided to support growing vines, putting pieces of wire and the like among vines to destroy machines used to gather crops, scattering matches and using chemicals to start fires to destroy property of employers. One of the witnesses testified: "I heard . . . a member of the I. W. W. say in

a speech on May 10th, 1923: 'When you go back to work, if we do have to go to work, we will put on the wooden shoe.' Then he said: 'In case you are loading telephone poles on a ship down there, sometime the boss is not looking you can slip a couple of poles crossways and then cover up, and then when that ship goes to sea naturally she will start rolling and the cargo will shift, and then she will come in listed like the one you see out in the harbor, then she has got to tie up to the dock, and she will have to unload the telephone poles and put them in again and put them straight, and then we will get paid for the loading originally, and get paid for unloading it and get pay for loading it again, and that will hit the bosses hard in the pocketbook.'"

The foregoing sufficiently shows the foundation of fact for the portion of the charge complained of. Before giving that instruction, the court warned the jury that the Government must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the I. W. W. was such an organization as is denounced by the Act. The definition of criminal syndicalism was given the jury in the exact words of the statute. The court then gave a number of lexicographers' definitions of sabotage. They are broader than the meaning of the word as defined in the Act and are not confined to physical damage or injury to physical property. Then, by way of contrast, the statutory definition of sabotage was repeated, and by the repetition it was emphasized. The court said: "The statute, itself, you will notice, however, denounces sabotage as meaning wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property." The instruction complained of followed. It referred to the evidence indicating that the organization advocated acts such as loading a ship so that it would list and have to return, and things of that kind. And in that connection the court said that any deliberate attempt to reduce profits "in the manner that I have described" would

constitute sabotage. The language excepted to was followed by an instruction containing this: "If you find, therefore, that this organization advocated sabotage or any other criminal matters mentioned in the section that I have read, either for the purpose of bringing about a change in industrial control, or a political change, then it would constitute criminal syndicalism."

While one of the purposes of such improper loading of ships may be to create more work for the men and so to inflict loss on employers, it is also plainly calculated to endanger the vessels, their cargoes and the lives of those aboard. By the instruction complained of, the consideration of the jury was limited to "things of that kind." The advocating of the malicious commission of such acts is to teach and abet sabotage-physical damage and injury to physical property; it also is to teach and abet crime and unlawful methods of terrorism. It was not necessary for the prosecution to show that the elements. of criminal syndicalism were advocated or taught with the precision of statement required in indictments for criminal acts involved. Cf. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U. S. 77. The purpose and probable effect of the printed matter circulated and of the things said in furtherance of the declared purposes of the organization are to be considered having regard to the capacity and circumstances of the persons sought to be influenced. When there is taken into account the evidence referred to and the parts of the charge preceding and following the part of the charge here assailed-and especially the giving and reiteration of the statutory language defining sabotage it is quite apparent that the instruction was not

erroneous.

Both sides have dealt with the case here as if the question were properly raised, and we have considered its merits. McNitt v. Turner, 16 Wall. 352, 362; Baltimore & Potomac Railroad v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72, 86; Nor

folk & Western Ry. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114. Cf. West v. Rutledge Timber Co., 244 U. S. 90, 99-100. But, after examining the record, we think plaintiff in error failed to make any objection or effectively to take exception to the charge complained of. The exception there indicated did not call the court's attention to the instruction now attacked. It was general in form and applied to the series of statements that followed it, covering about two pages of the record. Plaintiff in error does not contend that all of them are erroneous, and obviously they are not. The rule is well-established that, where a series of instructions are excepted to in mass, the exception will be overruled if any one of them is correct. Johnston v. Jones, 1 Black 209, 220; Beaver v. Taylor, 93 U. S. 46, 54; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600, 610. Exceptions to a charge must be specifically made in order to give the court opportunity then and there to correct errors and omissions, if any. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Minds, 250 U. S. 368, 375, and cases cited; Allis v. United States, 155 U. S. 117, 122. Even if some of the instructions were erroneous, the exceptions taken were not such as to require a new trial.

2. Plaintiff in error complains of another part of the charge: "There has been evidence here that advertisements were published in the official organs of the Industrial Workers of the World, what they call also stickerettes, calling upon people to boycott the entire State of California and its products. That would only be legal in the event that it was in furtherance of a strike, and by 'legal' I mean as established by the State of California, that is to say, if it was in furtherance of a strike, if it was in good faith, an attempt to better their conditions, and if it did not indulge in maliciousness or misrepresentation. If, however, you should find from the evidence that that was not so, then it would be an illegal

328

BRANDEIS, J., dissenting.

boycott and you could take it into consideration in determining the facts of this case."

The record does not contain all the evidence and fails to show that it includes all relating to the matter referred to in this instruction. We think it cannot be said as a matter of law that the things there mentioned, when taken in connection with other facts, may not have been proper for consideration in connection with some element of the criminal syndicalism charged. Moreover, no objection was made or exception properly taken to that part of the charge. Here again the exception failed specifically to point out the instruction now assailed as

erroneous.

MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, dissenting.

Judgment affirmed.

This writ of error was allowed under § 238 of the Judicial Code, on constitutional grounds, prior to the amendment of February 13, 1925. All alleged errors at the trial which were properly excepted to are therefore, before us. Chaloner v. Sherman, 242 U. S. 455, 457. There was, at least, one error committed which, in my opinion, justifies reversal and which does not involve a constitutional question. For that reason, according to the practice approved by the Court, I refrain from discussing the constitutional questions presented. See Steamship Co. v. Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U. S. 33, 39; Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345; Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 184.

The defendant was convicted on the count which charges him with becoming a member of an organization formed to advocate criminal syndicalism. The California statute defines criminal syndicalism as advocating sabotage, among other things; and it defines sabotage "as