analytical The imperfect and irregular sketch which has here been attempted, Utility of th of the logical system, may suffice (even though some parts of it form. should not be at once fully understood by those who are entirely strangers to the study) to point out the general drift and purpose of the science, and to render the details of it both more interesting and more intelligible. The Analytical form, which has here been adopted, is, generally speaking, better suited for introducing any science in the plainest and most interesting form; though the Synthetical, which will henceforth be employed, is the more regular, and the more compendious form for storing it up in the memory. It is to be observed, however, that technical terms and rules will be rather an encumbrance than a help, unless we take care not only to understand them thoroughly, but also to learn them so perfectly that they may be as readily and as correctly employed as the names of the most familiar objects around us. But if any one will take the trouble to do this once for all, he will find that in the end much trouble will have been saved. For, the explanations given of such technical-terms and general rules, when thoroughly learnt, once, will save the necessity of going through nearly the same explanation, over and over again on each separate occasion. 66 In short, the advantage of technical-terms is just like what we derive from the use of any other Common-terms. When, for instance, we have once accurately learnt the definition of a Circle," or have had fully described to us what sort of creature an ! Elephant" is, to say "I drew a circle," or, "I saw an Elephant," would be sufficiently intelligible, without any need of giving the description or definition at full length, over and over again, on every separate occasion. 66 BOOK II. SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. Operations CHAP. I. Of the Operations of the Mind and of Terms. § 1. THERE are three operations [or states] of the mind which are of the Mind. immediately concerned in Argument; which are called by logical writers-1st. Simple-apprehension; 2d. Judgment; 3d. Discourse or Reasoning.1 Simple-ap of " "" 66 1st. Simple-apprehension they define to be that act or condition prehension. of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object; and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. It is either Incomplex or Complex:2 Incomplex-apprehension is of one object, or of several without any relation being perceived between them, as a man, a horse, "cards:" Complex, is of several with such a relation, as of " a man on horseback, a pack of cards.' 2d. Judgment is the comparing together in the mind two of the notions [or ideas] which are the objects of Apprehension, whether complex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they agree or disagree with each other: [or that one of them belongs or does not belong to the other.] Judgment, therefore, is either affirmative or negative. Judgment. Discourse. Language. 99 66 3d. Reasoning [or "discourse"] is the act of proceeding from certain Judgments to another founded upon them, [or the result of them.] § 2. Language affords the signs by which these operations of the mind are not only expressed, and communicated to others, but even, for the most part, carried on by ourselves. The notion obtained in 1 Logical writers have in general begun by laying down that there are, in all, three operations of the mind: (in universum tres) an assertion by no means incontrovertible, and which, if admitted, is nothing to the present purpose. Our business is with argumentation, expressed in words, and the operations of the mind implied in that; what others there may be, or whether any, are irrelevant questions. The opening of a treatise with a statement respecting the operations of the mind universally, tends to foster the prevailing error (from which probably the minds of the writers were not exempt) of supposing that Logic professes to teach the use of the mental faculties in general;" the "right use of reason," according to Watts. 66 2 With respect to the technical terms employed in this work, see the Preface. an act of apprehension, is called, when expressed in language, a term; an act of judgment is expressed by a proposition; an act of reasoning, by an argument; (which, when regularly expressed, is a syllogism;) as e.g. "Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial; Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, Therefore they are beneficial:" is a Syllogism; the act of reasoning being indicated by the word "therefore." It consists of three propositions, each of which has (necessarily) two terms, as "beneficial," "dispensations of Providence," &c. In introducing the mention of language previously to the definition of Logic, I have departed from established practice, in order that it may be clearly understood, that Logic is entirely conversant about language. If any process of reasoning can take place, in the mind, without any employment of language, orally or mentally, (a metaphysical question which I shall not here discuss) such a process does not come within the province of the science here treated of.3 This truth, most writers on the subject, if indeed they were fully aware of it themselves, have certainly not taken due care to impress on their readers. for which Language is employed for various purposes. It is the province Purposes of the historian, for instance, to convey information by means of Language is language,―of the poet, to afford a certain kind of gratification,— employed of the orator, to persuade, &c. &c.; while it belongs to the argu mentative writer or speaker, as such, to convince the understanding. And as Grammar is conversant about language universally, for whatever purpose it is employed, so, it is only so far as it is employed for this last purpose, viz. that of reasoning, that it falls under the cognizance of Logic. Propositions. And whereas, in reasoning, terms are liable to be indistinct, (i.e. Terms without any clear, determinate meaning,) propositions to be false, syllogisma and arguments inconclusive, Logic undertakes directly and completely to guard against this last defect, and, incidentally, and in a certain degree, against the others, as far as can be done by the proper use of language. It is, therefore, (when regarded as an art) "the Art of employing language properly for the purpose of Reasoning; and of distinguishing what is properly and truly an Argument from spurious imitations of it." The importance of such a study no one can rightly estimate who has not long and attentively considered how much our thoughts are influenced by expressions, and how much error, perplexity, and labour are occasioned by a faulty use of language; and many who are not unaware of that, have yet failed to observe that "signs" (such as Language supplies) are an indispensable instrument of all Reasoning, strictly so called. See Introduction, § 5. Degree and manner in which the several defects are to be guarded against. Analysis of Syllogism and Proposition. In reference however to the above-mentioned defects, two impor tant distinctions are to be observed. 1st, It is to be remembered that that which is, really, a Term, may be indistinctly apprehended by the person employing it, or by his hearer; and so also, a Proposition which is false, is not the less a real Proposition: but, on the other hand, any expression or statement which does not really prove any thing, is not, really, an Argument at all, though it may be brought forward and passed off as such. 2dly, It is to be remembered that (as it is evident from what has been formerly said) no rules can be devised that will equally guard against all three of the above-mentioned defects. To arrive at a distinct apprehension of every thing that may be expressed by any Term whatever, and again, to ascertain the truth or falsity of every conceivable Proposition, is manifestly beyond the reach of any system of rules. But on the other hand, it is possible to exhibit any pretended Argument whatever in such a form as to be able to pronounce decisively on its validity or its fallaciousness. So that the last of the three defects alluded to (though not, the two former) may be directly and completely obviated by the application of suitable rules. But the other two defects can be guarded against (as will presently be shown) only indirectly, and to a certain degree. 66 In other words, rules may be framed that will enable us to decide, what is, or is not, really a Term,"-really, a "Proposition"—or really, an "Argument:" and to do this, is to guard completely against the defect of inconclusiveness; since nothing that is inconclusive, is, really, an "Argument;" though that may be really a "Term" of which you do not distinctly apprehend the meaning; and that which is really a "Proposition," may be a false Proposi tion. A Syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable into three Propositions, and each Proposition containing two Terms; of these terms, that which is spoken of is called the subject; that which is said of it, the predicate; and these two are called the terms [or extremes] because, logically, the Subject is placed first, and the Predicate last; and, in the middle, the Copula, which indicates the act of Judgment, as by it the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Subject. The Copula must be either Is or IS NOT; which expressions indicate simply that you affirm or deny the Predicate, of the Subject. The substantive-verb is the only verb recognised by Logic; inasmuch as all others are compound; being resolvable, by means of the verb, "to be," and a participle or adjective: e.g. "the Romans conquered:" the word conquered is both copula and predicate, being equivalent to "were (Cop.) victorious" (Pred.) It is proper to observe, that the Copula, as such, has no relation 41 Greek and in Latin, very often, and, not unfrequently, in English, the predicate is, actually, put first: as "great is Diana of the Ephesians." to time; but expresses merely the agreement or disagreement of two given terms: hence, if any other tense of the substantive-verb besides the present, is used, it is either understood as the same in sense, (the difference of tense being regarded as a matter of grammatical propriety only;) or else, if the circumstance of time really do modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as to make the use of that tense an essential, then, this circumstance is to be regarded as a part of one of the terms: "at that time," or some such expression, being understood: as "this man was honest;" i.e. “he is one formerly-honest. In such cases, an emphasis, accompanied with a peculiar tone, is usually laid on the substantive-verb." Sometimes the substantive-verb is both Copula and Predicate; i.e. where existence only is predicated: e.g. Deus est, "there is a God." "One of Jacob's sons is not." And observe, that the Copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence: e.g. faultless man is a Being feigned by the Stoics, and which one must not expect to meet with." § 3. 66 It is evident that a Term may consist either of one Word or of several; and that it is not every word that is categorematic, i.e. Categorecapable of being employed by itself as a Term. Adverbs, Preposi- matic. tions, &c. and also Nouns in any other case besides the nominative, are syncategorematic, i.e. can only form part of a term. A nomi- Syncatego native Noun may be by itself a term. A Verb (all except the substantive-verb used as the copula) is a mixed word, being resolv- Mixed. able into the Copula and Predicate, to which it is equivalent; and, indeed, is often so resolved in the mere rendering out of one language into another; as ipse adest,' he is present. 66 66 rematic. It is to be observed, however, that under "verb," we do not Infinitives., include the Infinitive, which is properly a Noun-substantive, nor the Participle, which is a Noun-adjective. They are verbals; being related to their respective verbs in respect of the things they signify: but not verbs, inasmuch as they differ entirely in their mode of signification. It is worth observing, that an Infinitive (though it often comes last in the sentence) is never the predicate, except when another Infinitive is the Subject: e.g. subj. pred. "I hope to succeed" i.e. "to succeed is what I hope." to advance is to fall back.” "Not It is to be observed, also, that in English there are two infinitives, one in "ing," the same in sound and spelling as the Participle Strange to say, there are persons who thus understand our Lord's declaration to Pilate: " my kingdom is not of this world;" viz. "now;" meaning (secretly) that it was to become so HEREAFTER, when his followers should have attained greater strength! What can be the |