1 Facts and assumptions: 300 research, test, or training reactors and critical and subcritical assemblies were in operation in 1966. About 315 are listed in vol. VI of the IAEA Directory of R. & T. Reactors. Some of these are no longer in operation, but perhaps several dozen in operation then are not listed because they were not reported by IAEA member states. 25 R., T. or T. reactors and assemblies that require safeguards will be added each year in the future. Additions per year listed in the IAEA Directory from 1957 to 1963 are 30, 29, 47, 22, 33, 29, and 20. Therefore the assumed 25 per year addition rate is conservative and probably low. 2 Facts and assumptions: Until 1971 the numbers of power reactors and their cumulative electrical generating capacity are derived from IAEA power reactor summaries found in IAEA bulletins and from the July 1967 issue of Atomic Industrial Forum's Nuclear Industry. After 1971, additions to these have been made by reference to an unpublished summary by International Research & Technology Corp. (Vienna, Austria), obtained by a review of periodicals and trade journals for announcements of new contracts and plans for construction of new powerplants, particularly outside the United States. From 1975 on it is assumed that world energy production will increase steadily at a rate of 6 percent per year, 50 percent or all new energy sources built between 1975-80 will be nuclear, and 75 percent will be nuclear after 1980. Much of the power production after 1975 from nuclear sources will not be for production of electricity, but reactor powerplant outputs have been listed in equivalent electrical units, assuming 30 percent efficiency for production of electricity, a low assumption. The basis for all these assumptions is that nuclear energy sources will be cheaper than other energy sources for most purposes by about 1970-so that very strong economic forces will tend to push the world into "going nuclear" at a fast rate. Large-scale desalting of seawater, use of electricity for automobiles, space heating, etc., all help lead to forecasts considerably larger for nuclear power production than those shown. In the estimates after about 1972 it is assumed that the average electrical output of nuclear powerplants will be 700 MWE. This may be reduced considerably if new developments in reactor technology lead to competitive power costs at lower size plants, because, at the same power cost, smaller plants are often more desirable. Such development will increase the need for safeguards inspectors by 4 per plant. Chairman STENNIS. Gentlemen, following up on one of Senator Thurmond's questions about Red China, let me pose this situation. Assume this treaty is signed. Now, if China should then implement a policy of deliberately furnishing nuclear weapons to neighboring Asian countries within its own sphere of influence, suppose it be North Korea or North Vietnam or both, or if nonsignatory industrial nations achieve an independent nuclear capability of their own, would this treaty survive? Wouldn't that itself tear this thing apart so as to alter the situation in world affairs? General WHEELER. I believe that it would certainly have a serious effect upon the treaty, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, a proliferation of nuclear powers in the Far East would raise the incentive for nonnuclear powers to attain their own nuclear capability by one means or another." We have already seen this, as a matter of fact, in a sense in the attitude of India toward the Nonproliferation Treaty because of the creation by the Communist Chinese of a nuclear capability. Chairman STENNIS. Do you have any comments you wish to make, gentlemen? Dr. FOSTER. No, sir. General WHEELER. No, sir. Chairman STENNIS. Mr. Braswell, do you have any questions to ask? Mr. BRASWELL. No, sir. Chairman STENNIS. Senator Schweiker, do you have any questions to ask? Senator SCHWEIKER. No, sir. Chairman STENNIS. Gentlemen, we want to thank you for what has been for us a very profitable hearing. You have been over this many times yourselves, but there are new thing always coming up, and this has been the first time that I have talked to you gentlemen when you are testifying under the responsibility of the important offices that you hold. We thank you very much. I have already announced we will have Dr. Seaborg in the morning, along with Mr. Smith, and I hope we can promptly start at 10 o'clock. Before we recess, Dr. Foster, would you please furnish an answer for the record to the following questions: 1. What is the status of the development of the ABM system with the nonnuclear kill capability? How much money is being requested in fiscal year 1970 budget to support this program? In your opinion could this program be pushed to advantage if more funds were available? What more could be done and how much more funds would be required in fiscal year 1970 to do it? What service will manage the development program? ANSWER TO QUESTION 1 There is a major effort under way as part of the Advanced ABM Program to develop an interceptor system which could employ a small nuclear or non-nuclear warhead. At the present time, this defense system concept requires a major R&D effort to provide solutions to many technological risk areas. While almost any R&D program, could be pushed harder with the application of more money, the subject effort is primarily limited by our understanding of some of the physics involved. Thus, more money could be spent only at a sharply reduced efficiency by employing more task duplication or concurrency. If an immediate interceptor system start were made at this time, there is a strong possibility of a false start and a great waste of R&D funds. [Deleted.] [Deleted.] The activity necessary to develop a non-nuclear kill capability is being supported by all three Services, plus ARPA. [Deleted.] 2. In such an event what safeguards are there in the treaty or elsewhere, to protect both the nuclear and the nonnuclear signatories? ANSWER TO QUESTION 2 In such an event, what safeguards are there in the Treaty or elsewhere, to protect both the nuclear and the non-nuclear signatories? The Treaty provides, as a general protection for both nuclear and non-nuclear nations, that a party may withdraw from the treaty after giving three months notice, "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." Chairman STENNIS. The committee will recess now until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee adjourned until 10 a.m., the following day, Friday, February 28, 1969.) MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1969 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Young of Ohio, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, Tower, Murphy, Goldwater, and Schweiker. Also present: Armed Services Committee: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief of staff; Gordon A. Nease and Labre Garcia, professional staff members: Charles B. Kirbow, chief clerk; and Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee: James T. Kendall, chief counsel; and Everette L. Harper, military consultant. Atomic Energy Commission: Dr. Gerald F. Tape, Commissioner; Mr. Allan M. Labowitz, Special Assistant for Disarmament; Dr. Abraham S. Friedman, Deputy Director, Division of International Affairs; and Mr. Robert D. O'Neill, Director, Congressional Relations. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director; Lt. Gen. John Davis, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control; Mr. Charles N. Van Doren, Acting General Counsel; and Mr. Mel Christopher, Congressional Liaison. Chairman STENNIS. The committee will please come to order. The committee continues its hearings today on military implications of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The witnesses today will be Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Mr. Gerard C. Smith, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who is accompanied by Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of that Agency. For the record, the Chair would like to say that the committee had a very fruitful hearing yesterday when we received testimony from General Wheeler and Dr. Foster. One of the factors which yesterday's hearing brought out, and an issue on which there is some concern, is the entire matter of inspection and proper safeguards. In view of Dr. Seaborg's responsibility in this area some of the questions on this matter were deferred until today. We hope to receive from Dr. Seaborg a frank discussion on all aspects of the safeguard system which must be negotiated, the weaknesses of the system, its strength, and its probable cost. We hope to hear from Mr. Smith in detail on the precise role his Agency will play in connection with this treaty, if ratified by the Senate. After they have completed reading their prepared statements, the Chair will recognize each member as usual for questioning under the same procedure as was observed yesterday, namely the 10-minute rule. Just one additional word for the record, and I am not giving undue prominence to this. I made a brief statement, members of the committee, out in the corridor yesterday about our hearing. It is not a written statement, of course, and as reported in the morning's Post, I was quoted as follows: "One of the major matters is the question of inspection rules and regulations. We are agreeing to inspection of our military capacity under rules and standards that are not yet formulated." I did not make that remark as quoted. What I did say was that by voluntary agreement this country has decided to permit an inspection of our atomic facilities devoted to peaceful uses and ofttimes inspection of such facilities can indirectly be useful to another country with regard to military implications. The rules have not been drawn up for this program. I just mention this for the record and expect to take no further notice of it. Dr. Seaborg, you have a prepared statement, I understand, and I think it would be well to hear you on that now. A copy is before each member of the committee. Mr. Smith, do you have a prepared statement? Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir. Chairman STENNIS. After Dr. Seaborg completes his statement, we will hear your statement. Then we will question you together. For the record, there is no one in this executive session except the witnesses, the consultants, and our own immediate staffs. At these sessions we do not bring in our own personal staffs, and I think that is far the better rule, so there is no one representing some other department of Government here. That is our uniform rule. Doctor, please proceed. STATEMENT OF DR. GLENN T. SEABORG, CHAIRMAN, Dr. SEABORG. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, the central purpose of the Nonproliferation Treaty is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states which have not already acquired such weapons. Articles I and II of the treaty contain the basic undertakings of the parties to prevent the "proliferation" of nuclear weapons. The prohibitions of article I on the transfer by nuclear-weapon states of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, or the transfer of control over them, to others, parallel the existing prohibitions of U.S. law-the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The further prohibition in article I against nuclear-weapon states assist |