We shall therefore demonstrate to our readers as matters of pure Commercial Law-(1.) That all Negotiable Instruments are subject to the same Law regarding their transfer and property as MONEY. (2.) That it is from this property exclusively that the name CURRENCY has been derived; and (3) that all Negotiable Instruments are CURRENCY as well as Money.

1. To shew that all Negotiable Instruments have the attribute of CURRENCY, i. e., are subject to the same Law regarding their transfer as Money.

BANK NOTES.-(Anonymous, 1 Lord Raymond, 738.) A Bank bill was payable to A or bearer. A gave it to B. B lost it, C found it, and assigned it over to D for valuable consideration. D went to the bank and got a new bill in his own name. A brought trover against D for the former bill. And ruled by HOLT, C. J., at Guildhall, 1698, that an action did not lie against D because he had it for a valuable consideration.

The leading case, however, on the subject is that of Miller v. Race (1 Burr., 452). Finney, the true owner of a Bank Note, sent it by post to a friend in the country. The mail was robbed, and on the next day the note came into the possession of the Plaintiff, Miller, for a full and valuable consideration, and in the usual course and way of his business, and without any notice of the robbery. Finney stopped the note at the Bank. A short time after Miller applied to the Bank for payment of the note, and delivered it to Race, the defendant, a clerk in the Bank. Race refused either to pay, or return, the note to Miller; and Miller brought this action to recover possession of the note. Lord Mansfield ruled, with the unanimous concurrence of the Court, that Miller had the right to have the note given back to him as his property, because Bank Notes have the Credit and the CURRENCY of money, to all intents and purposes. An action would lie against the finder; that no one disputed: but not after the note had been paid away in CURRENCY. Lord Mansfield said that in the preceding case just cited, the action did not lie against the defendant because he took it in the course of CURRENCY ; and therefore it could not be followed in his hands. It never shall be followed into the hands of a person who bonâ fide took it in the course of CURRENCY. A bank note is constantly and universally, both at home and abroad, treated as money, as cash; and it is

necessary for the purposes of commerce, that their CURRENCY should be established and maintained.

So in Clarke v. Shee (Cowp., 200), Lord Mansfield said— "Where notes or money are paid bonâ fide, and upon a valuable consideration, they shall never be brought back by the true owner; but where they come malá fide into a person's hands, they are in the nature of specific property: and if their identity can be traced and ascertained, the party has a right to recover." And this doctrine is such firmly established law that there is no need to cite any more cases to support it.

CHEQUES. In the case of Grant v. Vaughan (3 Burr., 1516), Vaughan gave a cash note (i. e., a cheque) upon his banker to B in these words, "Pay to ship' Fortune' or bearer." B lost the cheque. The finder, or the possessor of it, four days afterwards came to Grant's shop, and offered the cheque in payment of some goods he bought. Grant took the cheque in the usual course of business, and gave the balance in cash. Vaughan, hearing that the cheque had been lost, stopped the payment of it. Grant brought an action against him for the amount. Lord Mansfield held that the same rule applied to cheques payable to bearer as to bank notes. WILMOT, J., said that such bills or notes as this are by law negotiable. So also Yates, J., said—“ nothing can be more peculiarly negotiable than draughts or bills payable to bearer. It is just the same as a Bank Note." Hence this case established that Cheques possess the attribute of CURRENCY, exactly in the same way as Bank Notes: and this doctrine is so firmly established that it is needless to quote any

more cases.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.-In Peacock v. Rhodes (2 Douglas, 633), a Bill of Exchange indorsed in blank was stolen and negotiated. The innocent indorsee for value was held entitled to recover against the drawer. Lord Mansfield said "The holder of a Bill of Exchange or Promissory Note is not to be considered in the light of an assignee of the payee. An assignee must take the thing assigned subject to all the equity to which the original party was subject. If this rule applied to Bills and Promissory Notes, it would stop their CURRENCY. The law is settled that a holder, coming fairly by a note or a bill, has nothing to do with the transactions between the original parties. I see no difference between a note indorsed blank, and one payable

to bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves property in both cases."

The same doctrine was again enforced in Collins v. Martin (1 B. & P., 648), where a banker pledged some of his customer's bills indorsed in blank with another banker, who advanced money on them honestly in the usual course of business. EYRE, C. J., delivering the judgment of the Court, said-"For the purpose of rendering Bills of Exchange negotiable, the Right of Property in them passes with the bills. Every holder with the bills takes the property, and his title is stamped upon the bills themselves. The property and the possession are inseparable. This was necessary to make them negotiable, and in this respect they differ essentially from goods of which the property and the possession may be in different persons." And this rule of law is so firmly established, that we need not quote any more cases in support of it.

FOREIGN BONDS.-In Gorgier v. Mieville (3 B. & C., 45), the plaintiff deposited a Prussian bond in the hands of his agent, to receive the interest on it for him. The bond was made payable to any person who at the time should be the holder of it. It was proved that these bonds were sold in the market, and passed from hand to hand daily like exchequer bills. The plaintiff's agent pledged the bond with the defendants. The Attorney General tried to draw a distinction between bank notes, bills of exchange, and exchequer bills, because such instruments constitute a part of the circulating medium of the country, but that rule did not apply to the bond of a foreign country. ABBOT, C. J., said ledgment by the

But

"The instrument, in its form, is an acknowKing of Prussia that the sum mentioned in the bond is due to every person who shall for the time being be the holder of it, and the principal and interest is payable in a certain mode, and at certain periods mentioned in the bond It is, therefore, in its nature precisely analogous to a bank note payable to bearer, or to a bill of exchange indorsed in blank. Being an instrument, therefore, of the same description, it must be subject to the same rule of law, that whoever is the holder of it, has power to give title to any person honestly acquiring it."

We have now sufficiently established our first point, that all Negotiable Instruments are subject to the same rule as money

VOL. II.

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will make no difference, if the property in the bill passes by delivery." Best, J., then agreeing with Collins v. Martin, cited above, gave his opinion against the plaintiff.

HOLROYD, J.-"It has been long and fully settled that bank notes or bills, drafts on bankers, bills of exchange, or promissory notes, either payable to order and indorsed in blank, or payable to bearer, when taken bonâ fide, and for a valuable consideration, pass by delivery, and vest a right thereto in the transferee, without regard to the title, or want of title, in the person transferring them. This was decided as to a bank note in the case of Miller v. Race; as to a draft on a banker in Grant v. Vaughan: and as to a bill of exchange indorsed in blank, in Peacock v. Rhodes. Those cases have proceeded on the nature and effect of the instruments, which have been considered as distinguishable from goods. In the case of goods, the property, except in market overt, can only be transferred by the owner, or some person having either an express or implied authority from him; and no one can, by his contract or delivery, transfer more than his own right, or the right of him under whose authority he acts. But the Courts have considered these instruments, either promises or the orders for the payment of money, or instruments entitling the holder to a sum of money, as being appendages to money, and following the nature of their principal. In the one case they are payable to the person, whoever he may be, who is the bearer or holder of the instrument; and so also in the other case, unless the payment is restrained by a special indorsement." After quoting the judgments in Peacock v. Rhodes and Miller v. Race, given above, he said-"These authorities shew, that not only money itself may pass, and the right to it may arise by CURRENCY alone, but further, that these mercantile instruments, which entitle the bearer of them to money, may also pass, and the right to them may arise, in the like manner, by CURRENCY or DELIVERY. These decisions proceed upon the nature of the property (viz., money) to which such instruments give the right, and which is itself CURRENT; and the effect of the instruments, which either give to their holders, merely as such, the right to receive the money, or specify them as the persons entitled to receive it. The question, then, is whether these principles apply to the present case, or whether this exchequer bill and the right thereto, follow the nature of goods, which, except in market

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overt, can only be transferred by the owner, or under his authority? In order to ascertain that, we must consider the nature and effect of the instrument, both as to the property which it concerns, and as to its NEGOTIABILITY or CURRENCY by law. In its original state it purports to entitle the holder to the sum of £100 and interest; and the original holder may, if he pleases, secure it to himself; but it is payable to the bearer until some name is inserted, and when that is done it becomes payable to such nominee, or his order. But if the original holder parts with it or keeps it in blank, he by that very act, or by his negligence if he loses it, authorises the bearer, whoever he may be, to receive the money; and so if he were to insert his own name, but indorse it in blank, instead of restraining its negotiability, either by not indorsing it at all or by making a special indorsement, he thereby authorises and empowers any person who may be, the holder bona fide, and for value, to receive it and he cannot revoke that authority when it has become coupled with an interest. The instrument is created by the Statute 48 Geo. 3, c. 1, and is thereby made NEGOTIABLE and CURRENT. By § 2 the Commissioners of the Treasury are to make out exchequer bills, in such manner and form as they shall direct and after certain things are done to put them into CIRCULATION. By § 5 they may be paid in to the receiver of taxes; and in § 13 are these words-And for the better supporting the CURRENCY of the said exchequer bills, and to the end that a sufficient provision may be made for circulating and exchanging the same for ready money, during such time as they or any of them are to be CURRENT, the Commissioners of the Treasury are empowered to contract with persons who will undertake to circulate and exchange them for ready money. An exchequer bill is therefore an instrument for the repayment of money originally advanced to the public, purporting thereby to entitle the bearer to receive the money put into circulation, and made CURRENT by law. It is not, therefore, like goods saleable only in market overt, and not otherwise transferable, except by the owner or under his authority, but is in all those several respects similar to bills of exchange and promissory notes, and transferable in the same manner as they are. The case, therefore, stands thus: this exchequer bill was a CURRENT and NEGOTIABLE Instrument for the payment of money. Now money passes from

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