125. But not for a Bill or Note payable on demand, unless taken in substitution for the other debt.

Forth v. Stanton, 1 Wms., Saunders, p. 210c., note c. Crofts v. Beale, 11 C. B., 172.

126. Cross acceptances for mutual respectively considerations for each other.

accommodation are

Rolfe v. Caslon, 2 H. Bla., 571. Rose v. Sims, 1 B. & Ad., 521. Cowley v. Dunlop, 7 T. R., 568. Buckler v. Buttivant, 3 East., 72. Cardwell v. Martin, 9 East., 190.

127. 1. If the bill or note has been given for an illegal consideration, or has been obtained by fraud, or duress, or lost or stolen, the defendant may call upon the holder to prove the consideration he gave for it.

2. But not otherwise.

Mills v. Barber, 1 M. & W,, 425. Percival v. Frampton, 2 C. M. & R., 180. Whitaker v. Edmunds, 1 A. & E., 638. Jacob v. Hurgate, 1 Moo. & Rob., 445. Edmonds v. Groves, 2 M. & W., 642. Smith v. Martin, 9 M. & W., 304. Fearn v. Filica, 7 M. & G., 513. Bingham v. Stanley, 2 Q. B., 117.

On Presentation for Acceptance.

128. The holder of an unaccepted bill should present it for acceptance as soon as possible.

If the drawee refuses acceptance the preceding parties become liable immediately.

If the holder is a mere agent he will be liable for any loss which may occur through his negligence to present.

A bill payable at sight or presentation is payable on demand. If a bill is payable at any period after sight there is no right of action against any one until presentment for acceptance.

Unless presentment for acceptance is made within reasonable time the holder loses his remedy against the preceding parties. What is reasonable time is a mixed question of law and fact, and depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. The holder may put it into circulation without presenting it. Muilman v. D'Eguino, 2 H. Bla., 565. Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt., 160. Fry v. Hill, 7 Taunt., 395. Strakes v. Graham, 4

M. & W., 721. Mellish v. Rawdon, 9 Bing., 416. Shute v. Robins, 1 M. & Mal., 133. Mullick v. Radakissen, 9 Moore, P. C. Ca., 46. Presentment must be made to the drawee or his authorised agent.

129.

Cheek v. Roper, 5 Esp., 175.

130. The drawee is entitled to have reasonable time, usually 24 hours, to consider whether he will accept or not. If he detains the bill longer than allowed by mercantile usage he is held to have accepted it.

Ingram v. Foster, 2 Smith, 242. Harvey v. Martin, 1 Camp., 425n. 131. If the drawee has changed his residence the holder must use due diligence to find him.

Collins v. Butler, 2 Stra., 1087. Bateman v. Joseph, 12 East., 433.

Of Acceptance.

132. Acceptance is, in general, an engagement to pay the bill when due in money.

Clark v. Cock, 4 East., 72. Russell v. Phillips, 14 Q. B., 891. 133. The acceptance of all bills inland (a), and foreign (b), must be in writing on the bill, signed by the acceptor or some person duly authorised by him.

(a) 1 & 2 Geo. 4 (1821), c. 78, s. 2.

(b) 19 & 20 Vict. (1856), c. 97, s. 6.

134. The term "acceptance " includes delivery or notification of the fact of acceptance to the parties interested.

Cox v. Troy, 5 B. & Ald., 474.
Ex., 186.

Chapman v. Cottrell, 34 L. J.

135. A drawee holding funds of the drawer is now liable to the holder of a bill, after notification or presentment, without acceptance.

36 & 37 Vict. (1873), c. 66, s. 26, § 6.

136. 1. An acceptance once completed, i. e., by writing and delivery or notification, is irrevocable (a).

2. But the drawee may cancel his signature before delivery or notification if he pleases (b).

(a) Clarke v. Cock, 4 East., 57. Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East., 514. Powell v. Monnier, 1 Atk., 611. Mendizabal v. Machado, 3 Moo. & Sc., 841. Fairlee v. Herring, 3 Bing., 625.

(b) Cox v. Troy, 5 B. & Ald., 474. The Bank of Van Dieman's Land v. The Bank of Victoria, L. R., 3 Pr. C., 526.

137. By accepting the bill the drawee admits the signature and capacity of the drawer; and he is estopped from saying afterwards that the signature is forged.

Price v. Neal, 3 Burr., 1354. Wilkinson v. Lutwidge, 1 Stra., 648. Jenys v. Fawler, 2 Stra., 946. Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Camp., 482. Prince v. Brunatti, 1 Bing., N. C., 435. Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & S., 13. Phillips v. Im Thurm, L. R., 1 C. P., 463.

138. The acceptor of a bill or the maker of a note admits the capacity of the payee to indorse (a).

But he does not admit the genuineness of the indorsement (b). Unless he knew of the forgery at the time of acceptance, and intended the bill to be circulated with a forged indorsement (b).

(a) Drayton v. Dale, 2 B. & C., 293. Braithwaite v. Gardiner, 8 Q. B., 473. Pett v. Capellow, 8 M. & W., 616. Taylor v. Crocker, 4 Esp., 187. Jones v. Darch, 4 Price, 300. Halifax v. Lyle, 3 Ex., 446. Ashpitel v. Bryan, 3 B. & Sm., 474: aff. 23 L. J., Q. B., 328. Cotes v. Davis, 1 Camp., 484. Prestwick v. Marshall, 7 Bing., 565.

(b) Smith v. Chester, 1 T. R., 655. Robinson v. Yarrow, 7 Taunt., 455. Beeman v. Duck, 11 M. & W., 251.

139. If the bill is drawn in a fictitious name or is a forgery of a real name, to the knowledge of the acceptor, he undertakes to pay to an indorsement by the same hand.

Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R., 174. Vere v. Lewis, 3 T. R., 182. Minet v. Gibson, 1 H. Bla., 569. Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bla., 187. Bennett v. Farnall, 1 Camp., 130. Schultz v. Astley, 2 Bing., N. C., 544. Taylor v. Croher, 4 Esp., 187. Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & S., 13. Cooper v. Mayor, 10 B. & C., 468. Beeman v. Duck, 11 M. & W., 251. Phillips v. Im Thurm, L. R., 1 C. P., 463. 140. The acceptance of a bill purporting to be indorsed by the payee does not admit the genuineness of the indorsement. Tucker v. Robarts, 16 Q. B., 560. Garland v. Jacomb, L. R., 8 Ex., 216.

141. A person who accepts a bill ostensibly as agent for another person, but without his authority, is personally liable.

Gurney v. Evans, 3 H. & N., 122.

142. A bill can only be accepted by the drawee, and not by a stranger; unless the drawee ratifies and adopts the signature as that of his agent: or for the honour of the drawee.

143.

Nichols v. Diamond, 9 Exch., 154. Lindus v. Bradwell, 5 C. B., 583. Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad., 114. Eastwood v. Bain, 3 H. & N., 738. Davis v. Clarke, 6 Q. B., 16. Jackson v. Hudson, 2 Camp., 447.

There cannot be two or more separate acceptors to a bill not jointly responsible.

But the second acceptance may be held as a guaranty for the first.

144. An instrument drawn, but not addressed to any one, is

yet a valid instrument, if any one accepts it, or it may be inferred who the drawee is intended to be.

Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt., 739. Rex v. Hunter, Russ. & Ry., 511. Shuttleworth v. Stevens, 1 Camp., 407. Allan v. Mawson, 4 Camp., 115. Reg. v. Hawkes, 2 Mood., C. C., 60. Reg. v. Smith, 2 Mood., C. C., 295.

145. If the drawee has once admitted that the acceptance is his writing, he cannot afterwards allege that it is forged (a).

If he pays several bills drawn upon him by a person connected with him in business but who has forged his signature, he is liable to pay other bills drawn upon him in a similar way (b).

But if he pays one bill drawn upon him by a person not connected with him in business, who has forged his signature, that will not bind him to pay similar forgeries in future (c).

(a) Leach v. Buchanan, 4 Esp., 226. Brook v. Hook, L. R., 6 Ex., 89.

(b) Barber v. Gingell, 3 Esp., 60.

(c) Cash v. Taylor, Ll. & Webs., 178. Morris v. Bethell, L. R., 5 C. P., 47.

146. An acceptance is either general or qualified.

A general acceptance is an absolute engagement to pay the bill according to its tenor and effect.

A qualified acceptance is either conditional, i. e., an engagement to pay the bill on a certain condition being fulfilled; or partial, that is, varying from the tenor of the bill.

The holder of the bill is entitled to have a general acceptance; and if the drawee offers a qualified acceptance, the holder may refuse it; note the bill; and give notice of dishonour to the preceding parties.

If he intends to receive it he must give notice to the other parties, and obtain their consent, or they will be discharged (a).

But he must not note or protest the bill, or give general notice of dishonour, as by doing so the acceptor would be discharged (b). Whether an acceptance is absolute or conditional is a question of Law.

(a) Sebag v. Abitbol, 4 M. & S., 462. Rowe v. Young, 2 Bligh, 391: see answers of the Judges to question three. Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Camp., 177. Boehm v. Garcias, 1 Camp., 425n.

(b) Sproat v. Matthews, 1 T. R., 182. Bentinck v. Dorrien, 6 East., 200.

147. A bill domiciled at a particular place is a general acceptance unless made payable there only, and not elsewhere. 1 Geo. 4, c. 78. Siggers v. Nichols, 3 Jur., 341.

On the Alteration of a Bill or Note.

148. A Bill or Note may be altered by the consent of the parties before it is issued, i. e., passed away for value.

Kennerly v. Nash, 1 Stark., 452. Downes v. Richardson, 5 B. & Ald., 674. Tarleton v. Shingler, 7 C. B., 812. Marson v. Petit, 1 Camp., 82n.

149. After a Bill or Note has once been issued it cannot be altered in any material part, i. e., so as to alter the responsibility of the parties.

Except only to correct a mistake, and to fulfil the original intention of the parties.

Bowman

Trapp v.

Knill v.

Master v. Miller, 4 T. R., 320; affirmed 2 H. Bla., 141. v. Nicholl, 5 T. R., 537. Kershaw v. Cox, 3 Esp., 246. Spearman, 2 Esp., 57. Cardwell v. Martin, 9 East., 190. Williams, 10 East., 431. Cowie v. Halsall, 4 B. & Ald., 197. Tidmarsh v. Grover, 1 M. & S., 735. Cock v. Coxwell, 2 C. M. & R., 291. Catton v. Simpson, 8 A. & E., 136. Burchfield v. Moore, 3 E. & B., 683. Macintosh v. Haydon, Ry. & Mo., 362. Desbrowe v. Wetherby, M. & Rob., 438. Taylor v. Moseley, 6 C. & P., 273. Hamelin v. Bruck, 9 Q. B., 306. Rodge v. Pringle, 29 L. J. Ex., 115. Outhwaithe v. Luntley, 4 Camp., 179. Watton v. Hastings, 4 Camp., 223. Bathe v. Taylor, 15 East., 412. Ry. & M., 37. Jacob v. Hart, 6 M. & S., 142. Dea. & Ch., 334. Byrom v. Thompson, 11 A. & Tattershall, 2 M. & G., 890. Mason v. Bradley, 11 M. & W., 590. Hirchman v. Budd, L. R. & Ex., 171. Warrington v. Early, 23 L. J., Q. B., 47.

Brutt v. Pickard,

Ex parte White, 2 E., 31. Cariss v.

150. An alteration which is not material, i. e., which does not vary the responsibility of the parties will not vitiate it.

Trapp v. Spearman, 3 East., 57. Walter v. Cubley, 2 C. & M., 151. Aldous v. Cornwell, L. R., 3 Q. B., 573.

151. An accommodation bill may be altered by the parties to it before it is issued, i. e., before it is passed away for value.

Downes v. Richardson, 5 B. & Ald., 674. Atwood v. Griffin, 2 C. & P., 368. Tarleton v. Shingler, 7 C. B., 812.

152. An alteration by the drawer or payee of a bill, or the payee of a note, does not extinguish the debt (a): unless the bill or note was taken in satisfaction of the debt (b).

(a) Sutton v. Toomer, 7 B. & C., 416. Atkinson v. Hawdon, 2 A. & E., 628. Sloman v. Cox, 1 C. M. & R., 471.

(b) Macdowall v. Boyd, 17 L. J., Q. B., 295.

153. An alteration by the indorsee not only makes the instrument void as against all parties, but also extinguishes the debt due from the indorser to the indorsee.

Alderson v. Langdale, 3 B. & Ad., 660.