133. Chief provisions of the Act

134. Act to prohibit the Bank making advances to Government

.

135. Enthusiastic adoption by Parliament of the principles of the
Bullion Report in 1819

136. The Bank of England resists the principles of the Bullion
Report for eight years longer, but finally adopts them in
1827 .

137. Cause of the fallacy which so long deceived the public on this
subject

138. The principles of the Bullion Report are not matters of
OPINION but of DEMONSTRATION.

Table shewing the chief variations in the market-price of

Gold Bullion from 1790 to 1819, and the real value of the

£1 Bank note during the Restriction

CHAPTER X.

FROM THE ACT FOR THE RESUMPTION OF CASH PAYM

IN 1819, TO THE BANK ACT OF 1844.

§ 1. Great disturbance in the proportions of supply and demand

in several articles after 1819

2. High prices of corn in 1818 .

3. Market-price of gold at par with Mint-price in 1819

4. Great fall in the price of corn at the end of 1822

5. The Bank resumes cash payments 1st May, 1821.

6. Corn Act of 1815 to secure price of wheat at 80s. a quarter

7. Committee on Agricultural distress in 1822 .

8. Prolongation of the issues of the £1 country bank notes

9. Mr. Western's attack on the Currency Act of 1819, in June

1822

10. Proposal for the "equitable adjustment" of contracts

11. The price of agricultural produce more depressed on the con

tinent than in England

12. THE CURRENCY ACT OF 1819 PRODUCED

OF THE CURRENCY

of the Currency Act of 1819

NO CONTRACTIO

13. Sir Robert Peel is entitled to neither the merit or the blame

14. Fallacy of the supposition that the increased prices of agri.

15. Second attack by Mr. Western on the Currency Act in June,

cultural produce in 1823 were owing to increased issues

16.

1823

Speech of the Marquis of Titchfield

17. The Marquis of Titchfield's description of "Currency"

. 103

. 104

18. Fallacy of alleging that the paper currency was depreciated
during the whole of the Restriction from 1797 to 1819

19. General revival of prosperity in 1823

20. Origin of the disaster in 1825 began at the close of 1824

§ 21. Great speculation caused by the recognition of the independ-

ence of the South American colonies of Spain by Great

Britain in 1824

PAGE

108

22.

Great apparent prosperity at the beginning of 1825

23. Description of the speculative mania of 1825

24. Fatal conduct of the Bank of England at this period

25. Collapse of Credit in the autumn of 1825

26. Rapid efflux of Bullion from the Bank of England in 1824

and 1825.

27. Banking panic in the autumn and winter of 1825

112

112

28. General run upon the London and country bankers

29. Description of the great crisis of December .

30. Policy of the Bank

113

113

114

31.

The great pressure in the money-market turns the exchanges

in favour of England

114

32. Sudden change of policy by the Bank-profuse issue of

£5,000,000 Bank Notes in four days.

33. Issue of £1 notes by the Bank, which stays the panic in the

country

34. This crisis an example of the truth of the principles of the

Bullion Report .

35. The speculative mania not attributable to the Bank or to the

country banks

36. Speculative manias have occurred both before and afterwards,

not attributable to the Bank

37. The bold policy of the Bank saved it from bankruptcy

38. Determination of Government that the monopoly of the Bank

must be modified

39. Discussion in Parliament on the commercial crisis in

1826

40.

Abolition of £1 and £2 Bank notes

41. Mr. Baring's condemnation of the small notes

42. Speech of Mr. Huskisson

118

119

. 120

120

43. Opinion of Sir John Newport

44. Speech of Sir Robert Peel

. 122

. 123

. 124

45. Provisions of the Act suppressing small notes in England

46. Intention of the Government to suppress the small notes in

Scotland abandoned, in consequence of the recommenda-

tion of Committees of both Houses

47. ADOPTION BY THE BANK OF ENGLAND OF THE PRINCIPLES

OF THE BULLION REPORT THE RESOLUTION OF 1819

48. The circulation of Scotch £1 notes in England forbidden

49. Run on the Bank in 1832 during the discussion on the Reform

Committee of the Commons on the Bank Charter

51. The inquiry left incomplete

52. Principal points inquired into

§ 53. Mr. Horsley Palmer's description of the method adopted by

the Bank, to carry out the principles of the Bullio

Report

54. Opinions of the Witnesses

57. Resolutions of the House of Commons, renewing the Bank

55. First appearance of the heresy, that bills of exchange form

no part of the circulating medium

56. Mr. Attwood's attack on the Currency Law of 1819

59. The Bank's privilege held not to exclude the formation

joint stock banks of deposit

xi

28

29

60. Provisions of the Act renewing the Bank Charter in 1833

61. Depression of the price of wheat in 1834-5-6.

62. Rise of speculation, and joint stock companies

63. Position of the Bank in 1833-4-5

64. Decline of bullion in the Bank in 1836.

65. Negotiation of American securities in England

66. The Bank of England refuses to discount any bill indorse

by a joint stock bank of issue

67. Difficulties of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank i

Ireland

68. Failure of the Northern and Central Bank

69. Position of the Bank in March, 1838

70. Failure of the Bank of Belgium in 1838

71. The Bank sends a million of sovereigns to America

72. Rapid drain of bullion from the Bank in 1839

73. The Bank rate of discount much below the market rate

74. On the 13th July, 1839, the Bank offers annuities for sale

75. The Bank is obliged to create two foreign credits.

76. Appointment of the Committee on Banks of Issue in 1840

77. Lord Overstone points out the fundamental vice of the Bank

principle of 1832

78. Unsatisfactory character of the Inquiry

79. State of the country from 1838 to 1844.

CHAPTER X*.

FROM THE BANK ACT OF 1844 TO THE PRESENT

§ 1. Sir Robert Peel's views regarding the currency on

the Bank Act of 1844.

2. Errors committed by him

3. Continuation of Sir Robert Peel's speech

4. Unfairness of his illustration

introducing

42

43

-145

145

146.

TIME.

5. Opinion of President Van Buren regarding the Bank of the

150

152

12. The Act authorises a violation of its own principle

157

13. Incorrect to say that the Act of 1844 is the complement of

14. The Act of 1844 is a combination of two very erroneous

theories of currency

15. Unusual accumulation of Capital in 1844

. 158

158

16.

17.

18.

Great errors of writers who think that prices must vary

exactly with the amount of the currency

Variations in the Bank rate of discount after the Act of 1844 159

Rapid drain of bullion in the Autumn of 1846 and Spring

of 1847

159

160

20.

long

19. The Bank Act shewn to be subject to the same radical vice
as the Bank principle of 1832
Monetary pressure in April, 1847

21. Passes off after the first week of May

22. Error of the Bank in keeping down the rate of discount too

23. The Chancellor of the Exchequer notices the pressure in
Parliament

24. Corn speculations in the summer of 1847

25. Great failures in the autumn of 1847

. 165

26. Unsound state of commercial credit in 1847-the panic

. 165

27.

The Government letter authorising the Bank of England to

issue notes beyond the limits prescribed by the Act of 1844 167

28. Extraordinary aid afforded by the Bank of England to Com-
mercial houses in the Autumn of 1847

29. Meeting of Parliament in November, 1847

Speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on moving for a

Committee of Inquiry into the Commercial distress, 30th

November, 1847.

33. Opinion of the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank

. 169

. 172

. 173

35. Mr. Loyd's opinion

36. Mr. Glyn's opinion.

37. Reports of the Committees

Mr. Herries' motion

38. Drain of bullion in the Autumn of 1855

39. Comparative view of the bullion, and the rate of discount of
the Bank of England during 1855

§ 40. Judicious conduct of the Bank during this drain

41. The Bank of England allowed to increase its issues on securi-

PAGE

179

179

. 180

. 180

. 181

. 182

. 183

183

. 184

. 186

. 187

. 187

. 188

. 188

192

Evidence of the Governor

46. Increase of the panic

47. SECOND SUSPENSION OF THE BANK CHARTER ACT.

48.

54. THIRD SUSPENSION OF THE BANK CHARTER ACT

55. Great Bank failures

56.

Remarkable difference between the rates of discount of the

Banks of England and France

CHAPTER XI.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF

BANKING IN SCOTLAND.

§ 1. Foundation of the Bank of Scotland in 1695.

9. The Bank of Scotland increases its Capital

10. Great Commereial Crisis in 1793

11. The Scotch Banks suspend payments in cash in 1797

12. The Commercial Bank founded in 1810.

. 209

16. The circumstances of this failure prove the solidity of the

. 217

. 218