CHAPTER XIV.

Remarks on the Prospects of the Rebellion.

I HAVE, in the preceding chapters, traced the Taeping rebellion from its first outbreak in Kwang-si to the present time, and it is now my purpose to devote a few concluding pages to the examination of its bearing with regard to the future of China and the reigning dynasty.

In the event of this particular rebellion becoming triumphant, the empire will be revolutionized on a point of the highest moment, not only to itself, but also to other nations; the success of the Taepings will ensure the fall of Buddhism, and the normal religious belief of the Chinese will become totally changed. It is this exceptional speciality that marks its distinction from the ordinary insurrections, for, in other respects, the end aimed at by all is identical, viz., the subversion of the Tartar rule, and the reconstruction of a government similar to what existed at the time of the Mings, the emperors being, as then, natives and not aliens.

That out of all the rebellions, great or small, now existing throughout the empire, one will be ultimately successful, is more than probable. The annals of China unmistakably give strong grounds for this presumption. In this, as in other deductions of a similar nature, the

past history of a country is the only trustworthy guide towards judging of its future. All the principal dynastic changes that have taken place during the last ten centuries have been preceded by internal revolts, together with severe famines and inundations. In the eleventh century, the northern provinces were lost by the Sung emperors, more through the insurrection of local malcontents than by the Tartar forces. In the fourteenth century the Mongols, who had maintained, for a long period, a most powerful sway over the whole country, were totally overthrown by a man named Chû, a servant in a Buddhist monastery, who, becoming the head of an army of revolters, kept up a constant struggle against the government for twenty-three years, which ended in his own elevation to the throne. Chû was the first emperor of the Ming dynasty; the tactics followed by him appear to have been, in many cases, adopted by the present Taeping chief. It is remarkable that during the early years of the Ming rebellion, their leader confined himself to the possession of the central provinces, and it was not until his march northwards, with his whole army, that the Tartars were overcome, and their emperor forced to fly into his Mongolian territory. The reign of the last of the Mings was marked by a continuous series of insurrections, robberies, and famines. The overthrow of this dynasty, in the seventeenth century, was, as in the previous instance, occasioned by a number of local revolts that had merged into a considerable rebellion. A native of the name of Li, who commanded the principal rebel force, seized the throne, and would have retained it, had not the

Chinese general called the Manchu Tartars to his aid, the result of which step was the usurpation of the reigning dynasty, whose emperors very soon obtained complete mastery over the entire empire. The present circumstances of China offer so many points of resemblance to its state at the periods of these changes, that it would be unreasonable to overlook them when judging of its political future. At no time has the country been more rife with revolt, and more subject to privations caused by famine and flood, than during the last twenty years. The Pekin Gazettes have been filled with reports from the provincial governors relative to these events.

There are at this moment so many independent bodies of insurgents unconnected with the Taepings that it is necessary to enumerate some of them separately. In Honan the latest returns state that there are not less than one hundred thousand men up in arms against the authorities. These appear to be little better than common marauders, and are chiefly composed of the populations bordering on the Yellow River, who have been rendered homeless through that stream overflowing its banks. During the operations of the Taepings in Nganhwui the armies of the latter were frequently increased by large bodies of these "Honan thieves." In the province of Shan-tung the local rebels present a more important mass and have shown themselves to possess some degree of organization. The imperialist troops, even under their best generals, have found it a matter of great difficulty to overcome them, and many of the actions fought during the last year in the eastern

districts have been severe and well contested.

In

Sz-chuen, in addition to numerous petty bands of malcontents, Shih-ta-kae, a Taeping chief, is at the head of an army of seventy thousand men, and is said to be obtaining a series of successes. It is probable that he will set up his own standard and separate himself from his proper leader.

Yunnan is also in great commotion; but the outrages in this province are mainly committed by the Mahometan population, and there is no organized rebel force.

Kwang-si and Kwang-tung are in their normal state of disaffection. In the former province, besides the constant troubles occasioned by the Miao-tze, the country is overrun by very considerable armed bodies of insurgents. Some notion may be formed of their strength by the fact that, early in 1861, above seventyfive thousand of them, unable to overcome the government troops and set up their own independent rule, formed themselves under one general and marched three hundred miles north to join the Taepings. The greater portion of the Si-kiang (Western River), the most important commercial river in the south of China, is entirely under rebel control; and many of the cities on its banks are the ever-recurring scenes of capture and recapture. From other provinces there are reports of numerous revolts, but, without alluding to these, enough instances have been brought forward to evidence the terribly disorganized condition of the country.

Not the least extraordinary circumstance connected with the present government is that it has been able, with but very few exceptions, to levy the taxes and

carry on the provincial administration during this period of troubles and wars, both internecine and foreign, with the most perfect and systematic regularity; the exceptions were only in those instances where the people, rendered desperate by misery, refused to pay the demands of the tax-gatherers. The government found itself frequently obliged to remit the taxes in Hoo-peh and Hoo-nan on this account.

It is customary among Europeans to decry the Chinese administrative system: the ministers are presumed to be rapacious and selfish, commonly working for private ends; and the provincial governors, with their subordinates, are supposed to represent a gigantic system of fraud. The acknowledged facts do not seem to me to coincide with this view. The means adopted to ensure the fidelity of officials are those of checks and censorates, each officer acting as a check upon another. It is no part of the question to find fault with the method followed; nothing can be more degrading to European notions than this plan of espionage, and it might naturally be supposed that this distrustful policy would lead to every description of jobbery. Such information as can be gleaned from the Gazettes and from the letters lately found in the Yuen-min-yuen Palace point to a different result. Many of those residents in China who have had the best means of judging of the working of the provincial government are of opinion that it would be difficult to devise any better method; and, lastly, if any unprejudiced mind will consider for a moment the enormous extent of territory governed, it will afford subject for thought to conceive how the government of