infinite in goodness, wisdom, and power, is irreconcilable with nature as we know it. Nature, as we know it, is neither the embodiment of the Absolute Reason, as the metaphysicians say, nor a didactic summary of intended adaptations, as the theologians of the school of Paley

assert.

CHAPTER IV.

SPECIAL ADAPTATIONS.

FROM our review of the presumed indications of a Creative Intelligence as the cause of the order and general adaptation observable in the universe, we proceed to an examination of the marks of design, of particular ends, of special adaptations, supposed instances of intelligent purpose, either as exhibiting organic order or as promoting a desirable end.

Of all arguments adduced to demonstrate the existence of the Deity, the most popular, the most intelligible, and the most interesting is the argument from Design, the proof derived from the resources of Physical Theology. It is, says Kant, the oldest, the clearest, the most adapted to ordinary human reason.. On the other hand, its insufficiency and limited applicability are so apparent, that even the theistic reasoner is compelled to record its shortcomings. Thus the Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford,1 objecting to the comparison of the Creator's work to a work of art, complains of the

1 The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans. With Critical Notes and Dissertations. By the Rev. Benjamin Jowett, M.A. In 2 vols. Vol. ii. p. 476.

want of freedom and luxuriance in the latter, and insists that the problem of life derives no illustration from the handicraftsman's command of his chisel, the processes of nature being wholly unlike the processes of art. If the universe sometimes exhibits design, it sometimes exhibits absence of design. Unlike a table, or even a watch, the world is not a regular and finite structure, but rather infinite in irregularity, and far from appearing the best possible, its construction falls short of our reasonable expectations.

With this opinion of Mr. Jowett coincides that of Dr. Caird, as expressed in the Introduction to his Philosophy of Religion. The attractiveness of this argument to the popular mind is, he says, just what impairs its force to the scientific mind. The notion of a designer comes far short of perfect wisdom and power. It has essential limitations, and is inapplicable to a Being hypothetically infinite. A human contriver is restricted by the nature of the materials in which he works, and displays his ingenuity by conquering "their intractableness, or in taking a dexterous advantage of their natural qualities, so as to impose on them an ideal form foreign to their nature." The Divine Designer, on the other hand, must be held responsible for the intractableness of the materials which he has created. "Our idea of power," says another theologian in the Westminster Review,1 "has, it is evident, a correlative in that of opposition and resistance; the effort in human power is to overcome some obstacle which is

1 Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, No. xvi. p. 522.

placed in its way against the man's will, at least without it and thwarting it." If matter were supposed to be self-existent, and in origin not dependent upon God, "He might be considered to exhibit power in reducing it from chaos to regularity and form, but not otherwise." Moreover, the combination of infinite power with infinite wisdom is a contradiction in terms; for where the agent has unlimited power, he has no need to resort to the contrivances, evasions, compensations of the artificer, whose materials are given him, and who works in the fetters of restricting conditions, and limited powers and capacities.

The existence of adaptations, congruities, collocations in nature is a patent fact. The question is not whether these harmonious relations exist, but whether they are the result of intrinsic qualities and forces, or are designed by an extra-mundane intelligence. Paley in his Natural Theology, Mr. Vansittart Neale in his ingenious Analogy, Oersted in his Soul of Nature, and more recently Dr. Flint in his Theism, have all argued that the elaborate structure of the world is a realised revelation of a creative or presiding Mind. In astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, in biology, indications have been discovered or imagined of divine order and purpose. Air and water, sun and star, flower and tree, the wing of the bird and the eye of man, have all been laid under contribution, and forced to yield abundant, and often very plausible testimony to the presence in nature of an overruling Reason. We need not, therefore, adduce fresh instances of design in

this place, since every reader is, or may easily become, sufficiently familiar with the subject.

We will assume, then, that the world which we inhabit is the work of a Being infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness. To this Infinite Being there can be no opposition offered. All the conditions requisite for the realisation of the Divine Idea are present. But is that idea realised? Is the character of a Being having such attributes revealed in his "creation”? Do we find perfect wisdom, perfect goodness, absolute power, embodied in the fabric of the universe? Is the earth the abode of virtue, of wisdom, of happiness? There are undoubtedly provisions for affording pleasure to animate beings, but there are also provisions which issue in pain. The fundamental statute of the Creator is the ordinance of death. For the lower animals, or for many of them, the law of their existence is the reciprocity of destruction. If for a moment we accept the popular belief of the Fall of man and the inclusion of the fate of animals in the consequences of that fall, we are suddenly confronted with the objection that death by violence preceded the creation of Adam. Ages before man trod the earth, it was a scene of conflict and carnage. Nor did it become so by some unforeseen accident, if such a supposition be admissible. The evidence of design proves that it was the end contemplated by the Creative Mind. "For the variety, the beauty, the polish, the sharpness, the strength, the barbed perfection, the effectiveness in every way of lethal weapons, no armoury can compete with that of