JOHN MARSHALL 1755-1835 John Marshall was born at Germantown, Fauquier County, Virginia, September 24, 1755. His family had emigrated from England during the reign of Charles I and had settled in Virginia about 1650. Marshall's lack of a college education was fully supplied by the careful instruction of a private tutor, so that at the age of eighteen-an age when most boys are preparing to enter college-his classical education was completed and he was able to devote himself entirely to the study of law. But the times were heavy with great events, and before he had completed his studies the Revolution broke out, and he became a soldier. His father had been appointed major in a regiment of minute men, and he was appointed a lieutenant under him. During the campaign that followed Marshall was often employed as deputy judge advocate, which brought him into intimate relations with Washington and Alexander Hamilton, to whom he became sincerely attached. He was admitted to the bar in 1780, and he quickly rose to high distinction in his profession. From 1782 to 1788 he was a member of the Legislature of his State. In the latter year he was elected a delegate to the State convention called to consider the adoption of the Federal Constitution. In spite of the powerful opposition to its adoption, represented by such men as Patrick Henry and Monroe, the arguments of Marshall and Madison finally triumphed and resulted in the acceptance of the constitution by Virginia. Marshall became a strong supporter of Washington's administration while serving two terms immediately after the organization of the government, and again in 1795 and 1796, and it was due to his remarkable power of argument and exposition that in the Jay treaty controversy no stronger resolution was carried than one declaring the treaty to be inexpedient. At the age of forty Marshall was at the head of the Virginia bar and a recognized authority on questions of public and international law. He had steadfastly refused any appointment under Washington, but in 1797 he was selected by Adams as one of the envoys to France to reestablish friendly relations with the government of that country. His conduct of affairs was highly creditable to himself and his country, but the mission proved barren of immediate results. In May, 1799, Marshall was appointed Secretary of State in John Adams's Cabinet, and, while still in this office, was, on the twentieth of January following, appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and confirmed unanimously. The remainder of Marshall's life was passed in fulfilling the duties of his high office. In the trial of Aaron Burr for treason and misdemeanor he observed the most rigid impartiality. In private life Marshall was a man of the highest integrity, greatly beloved by his own family and by his fellow-citizens. He was unassuming in his manner and amiable in his temper. Of his power as a speaker and forensic debater, the documents recounting the events of the times give ample and sufficient proof. His oration On the Federal Constitution" embodies in its arguments the whole theory of Federal Union, as adopted by the friends of the constitution. He died in Philadelphia, whither he had gone for medical advice, on July 6, 1835. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION Delivered in the Virginia Convention, June 10, 1788, the preamble and the first and second sections of the first article of the Federal Constitution being under consideration M R. CHAIRMAN: I conceive that the object of the discussion now before us is, whether democracy or despotism be most eligible. I am sure that those who framed the system, submitted to our investigation, and those who now support it, intend the establishment and security of the former. The supporters of the constitution claim the title of being firm friends of the liberty and the rights of mankind. They say that they consider it as the best means of protecting liberty. We, sir, idolize democracy. Those who oppose it have bestowed eulogiums on monarchy. We prefer this system to any monarchy, because we are convinced that it has a greater tendency to secure our liberty and promote our happiness. We admire it because we think it a well-regulated democracy: it is recommended to the good people of this country: they are, through us, to declare whether it be such a plan of government as will establish and secure their freedom. Permit me to attend to what the honorable gentleman, Mr. Henry, has said. He has expatiated on the necessity of a due attention to certain maxims-to certain fundamental principles, from which a free people ought never to depart. I concur with him in the propriety of the observance of such maxims. They are necessary in any government, but more essential to a democracy than to any other. What are the favorite maxims of democracy? A strict observance of justice and public faith, and a steady adherence to virtue. These, sir, are the principles of a good government. No mischief, no misfortune, ought to deter us from a strict observance of justice and public faith. Would to Heaven that these principles had been observed under the present government! Had this been the case, the friends. of liberty would not be so willing now to part with it. Can we boast that our government is founded on these maxims? Can we pretend to the enjoyment of political freedom or security, when we are told that a man has been, by an act of Assembly, struck out of existence without a trial by jury, without examination, without being confronted with his accusers and witnesses, without the benefits of the law of the land? Where is our safety, when we are told that this act was justifiable, because the person was not a Socrates? What has become of the worthy member's maxims? Is this one of them? Shail it be a maxim that a man shall be deprived of his life without the benefit of law? Shall such a deprivation of life be justified by answering, that the man's life was not taken secundum artem, because he was a bad man? Shall it be a maxim that government ought not to be empowered to protect virtue? The honorable member, after attempting to vindicate that tyrannical legislative act to which I have been alluding, proceeded to take a view of the dangers to which this country is exposed. He told us that the principal danger arose from a government which, if adopted, would give away the Mississippi. I intended to proceed regularly, by attending to the clause under debate; but I must reply to some observations which were dwelt upon to make impressions on our minds unfavorable to the plan upon the table. Have we no navigation in, or do we derive no benefit from, the Mississippi? How shall we retain it? By retaining that weak government which has hitherto kept it from us? Is it thus that we shall secure that navigation? Give the government the power of retaining it, and then we may hope to derive actual advantages from it. Till we do this, we cannot expect that a government which hitherto has not been able to protect it, will have the power to do it hereafter. Have we attended too long to consider whether this government would be able to protect us? Shall we wait for further proofs of its inefficacy? If on mature consideration, the constitution will be found to be perfectly right on the subject of treaties, and containing no danger of losing that navigation, will he still object? Will he object because eight States are unwilling to part with it? This is no good ground of objection. He then stated the necessity and probability of obtaining amendments. This we ought to postpone until we come to that clause, and make up our minds whether there be anything unsafe in this system. He conceived it impossible to obtain amendments after adopting it. If he was right, does not his own argument prove that in his own conception, previous amendments cannot be had? for, sir, if subsequent amendments cannot be obtained, shall we get amendments before we ratify? The reasons against the latter do not apply against the former. There are in this State, and in every State in the Union, many who are decided enemies of the Union. Reflect on the probable conduct of such men. What will they do? They will bring amendments which are local in their nature, and which they know will not be accepted. What security have we that other States will not do the same? We are told that many in the States were violently opposed to it. They are more mindful of local interests. They will never propose such amendments as they think would be obtained. Disunion will be their object. This will be attained by the proposal of unreasonable amendments. This, sir, though a strong cause, is not the only one that will militate against previous amendments. Look at the comparative temper of this country now, and when the late Federal Convention met. We had no idea then of any particular system. The formation of the most perfect plan was our object and wish. It was imagined that the States would accede to, and be pleased with, the proposition that would be made them. Consider the violence of opinions, the prejudices and animosities which have been since imbibed. Will not these operate greatly against mutual concessions, or a friendly concurrence? This will, however, be taken up more properly another time. He says, we wish to have a strong, energetic, powerful government. We contend for a well-regulated democracy. He insinuates that the power of the government has been enlarged by the convention, and that we may apprehend it will be enlarged by others. The convention did not, in fact, assume any power. They have proposed to our consideration, a scheme of government which they thought advisable. We are not bound to adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in this community a right to tender that scheme which he thought most conducive to the welfare of his country? Have not sev |