seal of the Court, may be proven by parol testimony to be a true
copy of the record. An exemplification of a record is of no higher
authority than a sworn copy.

Porter v. Cox, 494.

REDEMPTION.

1. A mortgager whose mortgage has been foreclosed, has a right of re-

demption under the act of February 17, 1842, and may remain in
possession of the land sold under the mortgage fifteen months, the
term allowed to redeem the same.

Jennison v. Foltz, 490.

REMEDY.

1. Where a rule of decision relative to the remedy is changed by stat-

ute, the new rule will be applicable to all cases subsequently tried,
although they may have been commenced prior to the enactment of
the statute.

Ballard v. Ridgly & Billon, 27.
2. Where a statute changes the practice, all subsequent proceedings in
cases then pending must be in accordance with such statute.

Inghram v. Dooley et al. 28.
3. A statute which authorizes proof of the failure of consideration on a

note arising from a breach of warranty or otherwise, passed after the
execution of the note, would operate so as to admit the evidence, as
it would only relate to the remedy. But such statute could not
operate upon a note previously given, so as to cut off the equities of
the maker, inasmuch as that would effect his rights.

Griffey v. Payne, 68.
4. A statute which changes the practice operates upon pending cases,
&c.

Davidson v. Wheeler, 238.
5. Statutes of limitations apply to the remedy. Sleeth v. Murphy, 321.
6. Where a rule of practice is cianged by statute, without any saving
clause, the new law is applicable to all cases pending.

Meigs v. Parker, 378.
See Bills OF EXCHANGE, 40; LIMITATIONS, 1, 3, 5, 6.

REMITTITUR.

See JUDGMENT, 4,

REPLEVIN.

See Costs, 5; JURISDICTION, 4.

RESPONDEAT OUSTER.

1. Where there is a plea to the jurisdiction of a justice sustained, the
judgment should not be in chief, but respondeat ouster.

Van v. Manning, 491.

RIGHT.

3. The writ of right does not lie to recover the possession of a claim
upon the public lands.

Doolittle v. Harrington, 226.
See CONTRACT, 2; JUDGMENT, 3.

RIOT.

1. A riot cannot be justified to remove a trespasser, even if the rioters
have a just right to the possession of the land trespassed upon.

Scott et al. v. United States, 142.
2. To constitute a riot, two or more persons should be actuaily engaged
in some physical act of violence.

ib.

SCHOOL LANDS.
1. The act making it indictable to cut timber off the school land is not

contrary to the organic law. Chalfont v. United States, 214.
2. The legislature has power to punish all injuries to real estate, as
misdemeanors, even though the lands belong to the United States.

ib.
Same point, Hodgen v. United States, 218.

1. A service on a defendant on a petition under the mechanics' lien

law, by posting a copy of the summons on the property to which the
lien attached, is not a good service, unless the defendant cannot be
found to receive personal service. And the sheriff should first en-
dorse “ Not found."

Colcord & Sprague v. Funk, 178.
2. The mere certificate of a person not a sworn officer is not a sufficient

return to a summons; and if it was a service by copy, the return
should state that it was left at the defendant's residence.

Romaine v. Commissioners Muscatine County, 357.
3. A special deputy sheriff is a legal and proper officer to serve pro-
cess, and an attorney for plaintiff may be that deputy.

SHERIFF.

1. The sheriff is the proper officer to receive and execute process in all

cases, unless there is an affidavit of partiality, prejudice, consanguin-

ity, or interest existing in him or his deputy. Chord v. M'Coy, 311.
2. If a coroner execute process without such affidavit having been pre-
viously filed, the service is void.

ib.

SIGNATURE.

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 4; EVIDENCE, 2; RECORD, 4; JUDGMENT, 1.

SIMILITUR.

See PLEADING; 4.

SIMPLE CONTRACT.

See CONSIDERATION, 1.

SLANDER.

1. To call another "thieving" is actionable. Pierson v. Stoertz, 136.
2. By statute, fornication and adultery are made punishable by fine and

imprisonment; consequently, to call a woman a "whore” is action-
able without proof of special damages.

Cox and wife v. Bunker and wife, 269.
See PLEADING, 6; Costs, 3.

SLAVE.

1. Wbere a slave goes, with the consent of his master, to become a per-
manent resident of a free state, he cannot be regarded as a fugitive.

In the matter of Ralph, &c. 1.
2. The act of 1820, for the admission of Missouri into the Union, which

prohibits slavery north of 36 degrees, 40 minutes, was not intended
merely as a naked declaration, requiring further legislative action to
carry it into effect, but must be regarded as an entire and final pro-
hibition.

ib.
3. The master who, subsequently to this act, permits his slave to be-

come a permanent resident here, cannot afterwards exercise any acts
of ownership over him, within this territory.

ib.

STAMPS.

1. It is not necessary to set out the stamps or devices on bills as part

of the description in the declaration, or in the copy appended ; and
an omission to do so will not prevent the plaintiff from sending the
originals to the jury.

Knight v. For, 305.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

See Equity, 20, 23.

STATUTES.

1. A statute may take effect prior to its promulgation.

Temple v. Hays & Hendershott, 9.
2. A statute may be operative in part, and inoperative in other respects.

Harlan & Duncan v. Sigler, 39.
3. It is contrary to the spirit of our institutions to revive without notice

a penal statute, grown obsolete by long disuse; especially when the
general current of legislation shows the statute to have been regard-
ed by the legislature as no longer in force. Custom can repeal a
statute.

Hill v. Smith et al. 70.

See REMEDY, 1, 2, 3; LIMITATIONS, 1, 2; PRACTICE, 4.

SUMMONS.
1. The provisions of the statute rendering it necessary to furnish the

defendant with a copy of the summons, was intended for his own
benefit, and may be waived by him. Chapman et al. v. Allen, 23.

See DEFAULT, 2; SERVICE, 1, 2, 3, 4.

TENDER.

See EQUITY, 20.

TIME.

1. The time fixed for performance is deemed the essence of the con-

tract; and if the seller is not ready and able to perform on the day,
the purchaser may elect to consider his contract at an end.

Benedict v. Weston, 490.
Same point, Shuffleton & Pitzer V. Jenkins, 427.

TITLE.

See FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, 1 ; EQUITY, 18; PLEADING, 11,

12; HALF-BREED, 3.

TREATY.

See HALF-BREED, 1, 2.

TRESPASS.

1. The action of trespass quare clausum fregit being local, must be in-
stituted in the county where the trespass was committed.

Switzer v. Goudy, 248.
2. In an action of trespass, the defendant may properly introduce

evidence to prove that the plaintiff had originally taken possession

of the house by disseizin and trespass on the defendant, and that he
had a right to the possession of the house at the time of the force
and arms complained of by plaintiff; to go in mitigation of damages.

Donald v. Lightfoot et al. 450.
3. In an action of trespass for cutting timber on a tract of United States

land, occupied as a claim, unless the evidence goes to show that such
claim is so marked out that the boundaries can be readily traced,
and the extent of the claim easily known, the plaintiff should be
non-suited.

Jones v. Donahoo, 493.
See EQUITY, 22; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, 4; PLEADING, 11

12; CLAIM, 5; CONSTABLE, 1.

TRUST.

1. A fund arising from the sale of lands pre-empted for seats of justice,

is a trust fund to be specially applied to the purpose contemplated
by the grant, and is not subject to the ordinary drafts upon the
county treasurers.

Davis & Whicher v. Commissioners of Muscatine, 161.

See Equity.

VARIANCE.

1. In debt on judgment, where the declaration described the judgment

to be for $834.41, damages and costs, and the record produced in evi-
dence showed a judgment for $834.41 damages, besides costs, held to be
a fatal variance.

Hight v. White, 45.
2. Although the variance may be such as would, in this particular in-

stance, operate beneficially to the plaintiff in error, this will not cure
the defect.

ib.
3. Where there is a variance in the declaration as to the amount due,

it is only available on special demurrer. Phillips v. Runnels, 391.
See Bills OF EXCHANGE, &c. 6, 35, 41; DATE, 1; Copy, 1; IN-

TEREST, 1.

VENUE.

1. It is no grounds of error that the venue in the declaration is laid in
the wrong county.

Holmes v. Wright, 100.
2. The venue may be changed, by consent of parties, in all cases where
the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Davidson v. Whetler, 238.
3. The order of the Court cha ing venue is pr ptive of its own

regularity, and conclusive, unless something to the contrary be
shown by the record.

M'Cauley v. United States, 486.