1. The sheriff is the proper officer to receive and execute process in all
cases, unless there is an affidavit of partiality, prejudice, consanguin-
ity, or interest existing in him or his deputy. Chord v. M'Coy, 311.
2. If a coroner execute process without such affidavit having been pre-
viously filed, the service is void.
ib.
See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 4; EVIDENCE, 2; RECORD, 4; JUDGment, 1.
2. By statute, fornication and adultery are made punishable by fine and
imprisonment; consequently, to call a woman a "whore" is action-
able without proof of special damages.
Cox and wife v. Bunker and wife, 269.
See PLEADING, 6; COSTS, 3.
1. Where a slave goes, with the consent of his master, to become a per-
manent resident of a free state, he cannot be regarded as a fugitive.
In the matter of Ralph, &c. 1.
2. The act of 1820, for the admission of Missouri into the Union, which
prohibits slavery north of 36 degrees, 40 minutes, was not intended
merely as a naked declaration, requiring further legislative action to
carry it into effect, but must be regarded as an entire and final pro-
hibition.
ib.
3. The master who, subsequently to this act, permits his slave to be-
come a permanent resident here, cannot afterwards exercise any acts
of ownership over him, within this territory.
1. It is not necessary to set out the stamps or devices on bills as part
of the description in the declaration, or in the copy appended; and
an omission to do so will not prevent the plaintiff from sending the
originals to the jury.
Knight v. Fox, 305.
See EQUITY, 20, 23.
STATUTES.
1. A statute may take effect prior to its promulgation.
Temple v. Hays & Hendershott, 9.
2. A statute may be operative in part, and inoperative in other respects.
Harlan & Duncan v. Sigler, 39.
3. It is contrary to the spirit of our institutions to revive without notice
a penal statute, grown obsolete by long disuse; especially when the
general current of legislation shows the statute to have been regard-
ed by the legislature as no longer in force. Custom can repeal a
Hill v. Smith et al. 70.
See REMEDY, 1, 2, 3; LIMITATIONS, 1,2; PRACTICE, 4.
1. The provisions of the statute rendering it necessary to furnish the
defendant with a copy of the summons, was intended for his own
benefit, and may be waived by him. Chapman et al. v. Allen, 23.
See DEFAULT, 2; SERVICE, 1, 2, 3, 4.
1. The time fixed for performance is deemed the essence of the con-
tract; and if the seller is not ready and able to perform on the day,
the purchaser may elect to consider his contract at an end.
Same point, Shuffleton & Pitzer v. Jenkins, 427.
See FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, 1; EQUITY, 18; PLEADING, 11,
12; HALF-BREED, 3.
1. The action of trespass quare clausum fregit being local, must be in-
stituted in the county where the trespass was committed.
2. In an action of trespass, the defendant may properly introduce
evidence to prove that the plaintiff had originally taken possession
of the house by disseizin and trespass on the defendant, and that he
had a right to the possession of the house at the time of the force
and arms complained of by plaintiff; to go in mitigation of damages.
Donald v. Lightfoot et al. 450.
3. In an action of trespass for cutting timber on a tract of United States
land, occupied as a claim, unless the evidence goes to show that such
claim is so marked out that the boundarics can be readily traced,
and the extent of the claim easily known, the plaintiff should be
non-suited.
Jones v. Donahoo, 493.
See EQUITY, 22; FORCIBLE Entry and DetaINER, 4; PLEADING, 11
12; CLAIM, 5; CONSTABLE, 1.
1. A fund arising from the sale of lands pre-empted for seats of justice,
is a trust fund to be specially applied to the purpose contemplated
by the grant, and is not subject to the ordinary drafts upon the
county treasurers.
Davis & Whicher v. Commissioners of Muscatine, 161.
1. In debt on judgment, where the declaration described the judgment
to be for $834.41, damages and costs, and the record produced in evi-
dence showed a judgment for $834.41 damages, besides costs, held to be
a fatal variance.
Hight v. White, 45.
2. Although the variance may be such as would, in this particular in-
stance, operate beneficially to the plaintiff in error, this will not cure
the defect.
ib.
3. Where there is a variance in the declaration as to the amount due,
it is only available on special demurrer. Phillips v. Runnels, 391.
See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 6, 35, 41; DATE, 1; COPY, 1; IN-
TEREST, 1.
1. It is no grounds of error that the venue in the declaration is laid in
the wrong county.
Holmes v. Wright, 100.
2. The venue may be changed, by consent of parties, in all cases where
the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Davidson v. Wheeler, 238.
3. The order of the Court changing venue is presumptive of its own
regularity, and conclusive, unless something to the contrary be
shown by the record.
M'Cauley v. United States, 486.
1. The District Court may direct such change in the verdict of the
jury as to correspond to the usual forms, where such change does
not alter the evident meaning of such verdict; and this may be done
without the consent of the jury, and, of course, after the separation.
Gordon & Washburn v. Higley, 13.
2. The technical phraseology of a verdict is not material, provided the
intention is evident.
Harrell v. Stringfield. 18.
3. If the jury fix the imprisonment in petit larceny, it will be regarded
as surplusage to the verdict of guilty, and the sentence considered as
the act of the Court.
Cropper v. United States, 259.
4. If a verdict does not exceed the principal and interest of the note
sued on, it is good, although it may be for more than the damages
laid in the declaration.
Phillips v. Runnels, 391.
5. Where, by an agreement of the parties, the jury had leave, after
agreeing on their verdict, to seal the same and separate, which was
done, and eleven of the jurors returned said sealed verdict, it was
held to be a waiver of all cxceptions because of such separation.
Woods v. Com'rs of Van Buren, 441.
6. As a general verdict of guilty would be defective, so is a general plea
of guilty indefinite as to the degree of crime until ascertained by
evidence.
M'Cauley v. United States, 486.
See NEW TRIAL, 2; COMMON COUNT, 1; JURISDICTION, 5; Costs, 4.
1. Although the legislature has not the power to destroy vested rights,
it can create or augment them.
Webster v. Reid, 467.
See APPEARANCE, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7; NEW TRIAL, 4; VERDICT, 5.
1. The law will not permit a witness to be interrogated upon a collat-
eral matter merely for the purpose of afterwards contradicting such
immaterial statements.
Wau-kon-chau-neek-kaw v. United States, 332.
See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 17; EVIDENCE, 5; NEW TRIAL, 4;
AGENT, 1.
See BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS, 7.
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