Hunter v. Hunter. it was the duty of his wife to go with him wherever he thought proper to go. Babbitt v. Babbitt, 69 Ill. 277. The appellant was certainly greatly in the wrong in sending so outrageous an insult to his father-in-law, Friday, Oct. 4th. There was no systematic course of ill-treatment on the part of the husband, such as the law requires, to justify the wife in leaving him. In fact, she had not thought of leaving him, or at least had not determined on it till on Friday or Saturday, October 4 and 5, 1878. Nothing occurred after his return to justify such a course. In fact, in talking of the inatter with Mrs. Morrison on Christmas night after the separation, in answer to the question put to her by Mrs. Morrison, "What does it mean that you and Jim do not live together?" Bursting into tears, she says: "I cannot tell." This appears to be a natural answer to such a question. The Supreme Court lays down as a rule "that to authorize a decree for separate maintenance of the wife, other than for causes for which a divorce will be granted, it ought at least to be proved that there was a reasonable danger of personal violence to her, or a persistent, unjustifiable course of conduct on the part of the husband, which would necessarily render her miserable if she continued to remain with him, and that the conduct of the husband was not in any considerable degree induced by her fault." Wahle v. Wahle, 71 Ill. 510. Tested by this rule, the evidence shows no such cause. Perfect harmony existed between the appellant and appellee, during all their married life, except for a few weeks in the month of July and August, and three or four days in October, 1878, and this was not of such a character as to show that appellee would be in the least danger of personal violence, or that her husband persistently abused her without her fault. We see no good reason in this case why the appellee may not live with the appellant as his wife, and be as happy in her married life as she was prior to the affair between James Bailey and Miss Eliza Hunter at the ball. The decree of the court below we regard as final. It fixes the status of the husband and wife, and is as final as a decree of divorce would be. The decree of the court below is reversed, Bloomfield v. Bloomfield. and cause remanded, with directions to the court to dismiss appellee's bill. Reversed and remanded. WILLIAM BLOOMFIELD, Ex'r, etc., V. JOHN L. BLOOMFIELD. 1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-This was an action begun in 1878, for money loaned and goods sold in 1861, and money borrowed in 1867. The claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and the court is of opinion the evidence fails to show a promise sufficient to remove the statutory bar. 2. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT.-An acknowledgment of indebtedness made to a third person is not sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. 3. NEW PROMISE.-A mere statement by the debtor that he wanted to settle, coupled with a request to know the amount of his indebtedness, without an adjustment and settlement of the account, comes far short of such a promise or acknowledgment as will take the case out of the bar of the statute. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed December 4, 1880. Mr. P. II. SANFORD and Mr. L. DOUGLASS, for appellant; that a receipt is evidence of the highest character, and the testimony to rebut it should be clear and convincing, cited Walrath v. Norton, 5 Gilm. 437; Winchester v. Grosvener, 44 Ill. 425; Marston v. Wilcox, 1 Scam. 270. To take a case out of the Statute of Limitations there must be an express promise to pay, or an unqualified admission that the debt is due: Keener v. Crull, 19 Ill. 189; Carrol v. Forsythe, 69 Ill. 127; Ayers v. Richards, 12 Ill. 146; Wachter v. Albee, 80 Ill. 47. An acknowledgment made to a third person will not remove the bar of the statute: McGrew v. Forsythe, 80 Ill. 596. Mr. F. S. MURPHY, for appe'lec. Bloomfield v. Bloomfield. LACEY, P. J. Judgment in this case was rendered in the court below for the sum of $172, in favor of appellee. It appears that appellee was one of the sons of the deceased, Isaac Bloomfield. The claim of appellee was for money loaned and for goods sold in 1861, and for borrowed money in 1867. This account was filed against appellant in the County Court of Knox county, April 29, 1878; the cause was heard by the county court, and the claim disallowed, and an appeal taken to the circuit court. In November, 1879, this judgment was rendered, the jury finding a verdict for three hundred dollars, when appellee remitted down to the amount of the judgment. This claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations unless the appellee made out, by proof, a subsequent promise to pay the claim, within the Statute of Limitations. This we do not think he has done. There was some evidence going to show that the deceased, some time in the year 1877, had acknowledged to various parties that he owed appellee, and that he intended to pay him, and sometimes amounts, or proximate amounts, were stated; but these parties were not the agents of appellee to collect or demand the claim, and had no authority to receive any promise. Any such acknowledgment of indebtedness made to third parties would not be sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. McGrew et al. Ex'r, etc. v. Forsythe, SO Ill. 596. The only other evidence tending to show a subsequent promise, in which appellee may claim that the case was taken out of the Statute of Limitations, was at the latter's house, in the fall and winter of 1867. The only witnesses present were William, appellee, and his two sons, Marion and Edward. The testimony of these witnesses differ, but taking the strongest, that of appellee himself, we think it is not sufficient. The testimony of appellee is, that deceased said to him at his house, in 1877: "I came down to settle. I want to pay you off, so there shan't nothing come against the estate after my death;" and asked what the claim was. The appellee, according to his testimony, told him it was for borrowed money, $200; $100 at two separate times in 1867. Ilis father proceeded to deny Clark and Bowton v. Callison. one of them, and while appellee was trying to refresh his memory, the latter and his brother William got into an altercation, and his father left. They came to no settlement. This falls far short of the evidence necessary to take the case out of the statute. What, if anything, was owing by deceased to appellee, was an undetermined amount. The claim, whatever it was, had to be adjusted and settled. It was not even an unequivocal acknowledgment that deceased owed him anything. The only item they discussed was disputed. Here is no unqualified admission that any debt was due. Wachter v. Albee, Adm'x, etc. 80 Ill. 47. For these reasons, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded. BUFORD CLARK ET AL. and D. R. BOWTON ET AL. V. MARY E. CALLISON. PROMISSORY NOTE-FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION— -NOTICE TO ASSIGNEE. -An indorsee of a promissory note who receives it by equitable assignment without indorsement before maturity, and without notice of defenses, but who, while he holds it, and before maturity, receives notice of defenses, will not be protected if he afterwards takes an indorsement of the note to himself. He holds the note subject to all the defenses existing against the assignor. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed December 4, 1880. Messrs. WILLIAMS & LAWRENCE, for appellants; that the equitable assignee of a note takes it subject to all defenses against the assignor, cited Daniell on Negotiable Instruments, 553. Mr. R. H. SANFORD and Messrs. WILLOUGHRY & DOUGHERTY, for appellee; cited Van Buskirk v. Day, 32 Ill. 260; Daniell Clark and Bowton v. Callison. on Negotiable Instruments, 555; Southard v. Porter, 43 N. H. 380. LACEY, P. J. By agreement, the above two cases were tried in the circuit court, and are to be tried in this court in the same manner, the facts being the same. These suits were brought to recover on two promissory notes, dated October 30, 1877, due twelve months after date, with ten per cent. after maturity, one for $45, signed by Buford Clark and Dennis Clark, one for $76.66, signed by James and D. R. Bowton, both payable to the order of G. G. Morrison, and both indorsed to appellee. The defense set up to the notes was failure of consideration and notice to appellee before indorsement. The evidence tends to show that the payee of the note Morrison had warranted the hogs for which they were given, to be sound, and it also tends to show that they had the cholera, and were unsound, and that after the purchase the hogs died, or nearly all of them, and that the consideration of the notes had wholly failed, or nearly so. It appears from the evidence that prior to the sale, the appellee had a claim against Morrison, the payee of the notes, for rent, for the sum of $281.86, and had levied a distress warrant on some of his property, when the following agreement was entered into between them, to-wit: "I hereby agree, for value received, to deposit at Union Bank, Abingdon, Ill., with G. Givens, sale notes with approved security to the amount of $281.86 in payment of rent. Said notes to be made equal to bearing interest from March 1st, A. D 1878. "G. G. MORRISON." The evidence tended to show that the notes were actually delivered to Mrs. Callison, the appellee, or to her agent, the bank, before she had any notice of any defense by appellants to them, if they had any. That at the time they were first so deposited, they were not indorsed by Morrison. The evidence tended further to show that after the notice to the appellee that there was a defense to them, they were duly indorsed by the payce to her; that this notice was given to her by the appellees. Under this state of the evidence, the counsel for |