opinion of the Supreme Court, if it can be regarded as an adjudiction upon matters of fact, is not binding upon others not parties to the case in which the opinion is rendered. Gage v. Busse et al., 433 4. Opinion not a judgment.-An opinion filed by a court upon the decision of any question pending upon it, is not a julgment, and becomes no part of the record; but is merely a statement or discussion of the grounds or principles upon which the judgment of the court is based. Gage v. Busse et al., CREDITOR'S BILL.-See CHANCERY. CRIMINAL LAW. GRAND JURORS. 433 1. Must be sworn.--To sustain a conviction for a crime, it is essential that the record show affirmatively that the grand jurors were sworn. No inference in this respect can be drawn from the use of the word "empaneled" in the record. Lyman v. The People, IMPRISONMENT. 345 2. Act of 1879.—The proviso in the act of 1879 in regard to imprisonment of offenders for failure to pay fines, is only a limitation upon the time for which they may be imprisoned. Town of Sheffield v. O'Day, 339 3. Means of enforcing judgment for fine.-Imprisonment of an offender for a failure to pay a fine imposed for violation of an ordinance, is not in satisfaction of the judgment, but only a means of enforcing its payment, and is no defense to a scire facias against the sureties upon the appeal bond of such offender. Town of Sheffield v. O'Day, 339 INDICTMENT. 4. Assault with intent to murder.-An indictment for an assault with intent to commit murder is fatally defective if it fails to charge that the assault was committed with malice aforethought. Hungate et al. v. The ↑ People, 101 5. Cannot be tried for another offense.-Under an indictment for an assault with intent to murder, it is error to place the defendant on trial for an assault with intent to do bodily injury. Hungate et al. v. The People, 101 6. Recitals. The indictment must appear in its recitals to have been found upon the oaths of the grand jurors, but this requirement was not intended as record evidence that the grand jury was properly impaneled and sworn, and such recitals cannot supply the want of a record in essential matters. Lyman v. The People, 345 KEEPING OPEN TIPPLING-HOUSE. 7. What is.—In order to constitute the offense of keeping open a tippling-house on Sunday, it must appear that the keeping open was for tippling purposes. Merely opening the house and permitting people to resort there, no tippling being intended or permitted, will not be enough. Weidman v. The People, CROSS-BILL.-See CHANCERY 38 DAMAGES.-See EMINENT DOMAIN. ASSESSMENT. 1. By court. In a suit upon a guardian's bond, the damages may be assessed by the court. The People v. Steele et al., 20 2. Remittitur.-An assessment of damages in excess of the ad damnum is cured by remittitur entered in the appellate court. The People v. Steele et al., EXEMPLARY. 20 3. Must be against all.-In actions of trespass a recovery of exemplary damages must be against all the defendants found guilty, and if a plaintiff makes a case of exemplary damages against one defendant, but not against others, he should dismiss as to the latter, and take his recovery against the former. Pardridge et al. v. Brady, 639 4. Not against one who ratifies trespass.-Although a subsequent ratification of a trespass by one who was not present and did not authorize it, will make him liable to the extent of the real injury, it will not authorize the infliction of exemplary damages upon him. Pardridge et al. v. Brady, 639 GENERALLY. 5. Breach of appeal bond.-Where the judgment appealed from has been reversed by writ of error, only nominal damages can be recovered in a suit upon a bond given for appeal for a breach of such bond in failing to prosecute the appeal. Cook v. King et al., 549 6. For pain and suffering.-The question whether a plaintiff used ordinary care in being cured of an injury may, with great propriety, be left to the jury, and if they should find that the pain and suffering endured by him has been aggravated by his own want of care, he should not be allowed to recover damages for additional pain occasioned by his own negligence. City of Gilman v. Haley, 349 7. In actions for injuries occasioned by negligence.-In actions of this character, damages can only be given for compensation for the injuries received. Evidence of the poverty of the plaintiff is inadmissible upon the question of damages. City of LaSalle v. Thorndike, 282 8. In replevin-Title in mitigation.-The plaintiff in replevin, when sued upon his replevin bond, may show title to the property in mitigation of damages. Title to crops derived through a sale under a mortgage of the land on which the crops were grown, is sufficient. Rankin et al. v. Kinsey, 215 MEASURE OF. 9. Diversion of surface-water upon servient estate. In cases of the collection of surface-water by artificial channels, and discharging it upon the servient estate in a manner different from its natural flow, proof of the wrongful act entitles the plaintiff to recover nominal damages, at least, and where the evidence shows actual damage, he is entitled to recover therefor. Mellor v. Pilgrim, 306 10. In suit on replevin bond.-Where a plaintiff, in a suit upon a replevin bond for failure to return the property, has received the proceeds arising from a sale of the property replevied, the amount so received should be deducted from the judgment for the value of the · property recovered in this action. Ledford et al. v. Weber, 87 11. License by city.-Where a city gave consent to a bridge company to construct approaches to their bridge along a certain street, the city became liable for such damages to owners of adjacent property, only, as are the natural, necessary and usual results of the license granted, and such as might reasonably have been foreseen. City of East St. Louis v. Lockhead et al., 83 12. Master and Servant-Death of Servant.-In estimating damages for the death of a servant by reason of the negligence of his master, the jury may take into consideration the amount of earnings by the deceased; but the question whether his minor children had or had not other means of support after his death, is wholly immaterial, and cannot be considered. Heyer et al. v. Salsbury, 93 13. Refusal to receive property sold.-The measure of damages for a failure by a vendee to receive property purchased by him, is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time and place of delivery. Thurman v. Wilson, 312 14. Wrongful sale of lands by executor.-Where an executor wrongfully sold lands belonging to the estate, and included in the same sale, as a part of it, was land held by the executor in his own right, a gross sum being received for the whole; but the land held in his own right was the most valuable, and was the inducement for the sale, this fact should be considered in fixing the amount in damages for which he should account to the estate for the land sold by him as executor. McDonough v. Hanifan, 50 PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE. 15. Public works-adjacent property.-In constructing and operating works of a public character, such as railroads, etc., it is not necessary, in order that the owner of adjacent property may recover damages, that such property should lie along or front upon the line of such railroad. If the premises are adjacent, and lie so near that 'a direct physical injury is done them, this is all the rule requires. City of East St. Louis v. Lockhead et al., DECREE.-See CHANCERY. DEP UTY-SHERIFF.—See Officer. DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY.-See NEW PROMISE. DIVERSION OF SURFACE-WATER.-See WATER-COURSES. DIVORCE.-See SEPARATE MAINTENANCE. ALIMONY. 83 1. After re-marriage.-The fact that a divorced wife has re-married, is no ground for entering a decree relieving the former husband from payment of alimony, it being shown that her husband by re-marriage is unable to support her, nor is it a sufficient reason for an order reducing the alimony to a mere nominal sum. Stillman v. Stillman, 524 DRAM SHOPS. KEEPING OPEN TIPPLING-HOUSE 1. What is. In order to constitute the offense of keeping open a ELECTION. DOCTRINE OF. 38 1. Generally.-Where goods are sold and the title vests in the vendee EMINENT DOMAIN. COMPENSATION. 612 1. Apportionment of damages.-In condemnation of land held by a 2. Good-will in business.-Whether a tenant would be entitled to 3. To whom paid.-The compensation for which the public is liable in CONDEMNATION OF LAND. 4. Does not extinguish lease.—As between landlord and tenant, the 474 5. Estate of tenant.-The estate of a tenant for years is liable to be and party seeking condemnation being correlative, and the change of title being dependent upon payment of the condemnation money, it follows that no interest can be collected for delay in paying condemnation money. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 460 7. Right to condemnation money.-In condemnation proceedings, the land-holder acquires no vested right to the condemnation money until possession has been taken of the land by the party condemning, and he can maintain no action therefor until that time. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 460 8. Right to relinquish land condemned.-The board of park commissioners in condemning land for park purposes may abandon the condemnation proceedings at any time before taking possession of the land. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 460 9. When title vests.-In proceedings to condemn land for public use, the party seeking condemnation acquires no vested title in the land until possession is taken, the land appropriated to the use for which it was condemned, and the damages are paid. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, ESTATES.-See ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. ESTOPPEL. GENERALLY. 460 1. By acts. Where an executor, assuming to act under a power contained in the will, sold lands and received the money therefor, he and his personal representatives, in an action against his administrator for the money received, are estopped from asserting that the will gave him no power to sell the land. Having asserted this power and received the consideration of the sale, he must account for the proceeds. McDonough v. Hanifan, 50 2. By acts in pais.—Where an execution creditor was present at the time a sale was postponed, and made no objection as to the time of postponement, and was likewise present at the adjourned sale, bid upon the property and received the proceeds, it is too late for him, when sued upon the indemnifying bond, to say that the sale was improperly adjourned. Stanton v. McMullen, 326 3. List of creditors under voluntary assignment.-In proceedings under the assignment law, where the debtors, being a firm, make a statement of their creditors, they are estopped from afterwards asserting that a person named in such statement was not a firm creditor. The other creditors of such firm are also estopped to deny the statement unless it was falsely made for the purpose of defrauding such creditors, or reducing their pro rata share. McCracken v. Milhous, 169 4. Receipt of money.-The fact that a plaintiff, in a suit upon a replevin bond for failure to return the property, has received the proceeds arising from a sale of the goods replevied, does not estop him from recovering damages for a failure to return the property; it only affects the measure of his damages. Ledford et al. v. Weber, 87 |