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opinion of the Supreme Court, if it can be regarded as an adjudiction upon matters of fact, is not binding upon others not parties to the case in which the opinion is rendered. Gage v. Busse et al., 433

4. Opinion not a judgment.-An opinion filed by a court upon the decision of any question pending upon it, is not a ju lgment, and becomes no part of the record; but is merely a statement or discussion of the grounds or principles upon which the judgment of the court is based. Gage v. Busse et al.,





1. Must be sworn.--To sustain a conviction for a crime, it is essential that the record show affirmatively that the grand jurors were sworn. No inference in this respect can be drawn from the use of the word "empaneled" in the record. Lyman v. The People, IMPRISONMENT.


2. Act of 1879.-The proviso in the act of 1879 in regard to imprisonment of offenders for failure to pay fines, is only a limitation upon the time for which they may be imprisoned. Town of Sheffield v. O'Day,


3. Means of enforcing judgment for fine.-Imprisonment of an offender for a failure to pay a fine imposed for violation of an ordinance, is not in satisfaction of the judgment, but only a means of enforcing its payment, and is no defense to a scire facias against the sureties upon the appeal bond of such offender. Town of Sheffield v. O'Day, INDICTMENT.


4. Assault with intent to murder.-An indictment for an assault with intent to commit murder is fatally defective if it fails to charge that the assault was committed with malice aforethought. Hungate et al. v. The People, 101

5. Cannot be tried for another offense.-Under an indictment for an assault with intent to murder, it is error to place the defendant on trial for an assault with intent to do bodily injury. Hungate et al. v. The People,


6. Recitals. The indictment must appear in its recitals to have been found upon the oaths of the grand jurors, but this requirement was not intended as record evidence that the grand jury was properly impaneled and sworn, and such recitals cannot supply the want of a record in essential matters. Lyman v. The People, 345


7. What is. In order to constitute the offense of keeping open a tippling-house on Sunday, it must appear that the keeping open was for tippling purposes. Merely opening the house and permitting people to resort there, no tippling being intended or permitted, will not be enough. Weidman v. The People,





1. By court. In a suit upon a guardian's bond, the damages may be assessed by the court. The People v. Steele et al., 20 2. Remittitur.-An assessment of damages in excess of the ad damnum is cured by remittitur entered in the appellate court. The People v. Steele et al.,



3. Must be against all.-In actions of trespass a recovery of exemplary damages must be against all the defendants found guilty, and if a plaintiff makes a case of exemplary damages against one defendant, but not against others, he should dismiss as to the latter, and take his recovery against the former. Pardridge et al. v. Brady, 639

4. Not against one who ratifies trespass.-Although a subsequent ratification of a trespass by one who was not present and did not authorize it, will make him liable to the extent of the real injury, it will not authorize the infliction of exemplary damages upon him. Pardridge et al. v. Brady, 639 GENERALLY.

5. Breach of appeal bond.-Where the judgment appealed from has been reversed by writ of error, only nominal damages can be recovered in a suit upon a bond given for appeal for a breach of such bond in failing to prosecute the appeal. Cook v. King et al., 549

6. For pain and suffering.-The question whether a plaintiff used ordinary care in being cured of an injury may, with great propriety, be left to the jury, and if they should find that the pain and suffering endured by him has been aggravated by his own want of care, he should not be allowed to recover damages for additional pain occasioned by his own negligence. City of Gilman v. Haley, 349

7. In actions for injuries occasioned by negligence.-In actions of this character, damages can only be given for compensation for the injuries received. Evidence of the poverty of the plaintiff is inadmissible upon the question of damages. City of LaSalle v. Thorndike,


8. In replevin-Title in mitigation.-The plaintiff in replevin, when sued upon his replevin bond, may show title to the property in mitigation of damages. Title to crops derived through a sale under a mortgage of the land on which the crops were grown, is sufficient. Rankin et al. v. Kinsey, 215


9. Diversion of surface-water upon servient estate.—In cases of the collection of surface-water by artificial channels, and discharging it upon the servient estate in a manner different from its natural flow, proof of the wrongful act entitles the plaintiff to recover nominal damages, at least, and where the evidence shows actual damage, he is entitled to recover therefor. Mellor v. Pilgrim, 306

10. In suit on replevin bond.-Where a plaintiff, in a suit upon a replevin bond for failure to return the property, has received the proceeds arising from a sale of the property replevied, the amount so

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received should be deducted from the judgment for the value of the property recovered in this action. Ledford et al. v. Weber,


11. License by city.-Where a city gave consent to a bridge company to construct approaches to their bridge along a certain street, the city became liable for such damages to owners of adjacent property, only, as are the natural, necessary and usual results of the license granted, and such as might reasonably have been foreseen. City of East St. Louis v. Lockhead et al.,


12. Master and Servant-Death of Servant.-In estimating damages for the death of a servant by reason of the negligence of his master, the jury may take into consideration the amount of earnings by the deceased; but the question whether his minor children had or had not other means of support after his death, is wholly immaterial, and cannot be considered. Heyer et al. v. Salsbury, 93

13. Refusal to receive property sold.-The measure of damages for a failure by a vendee to receive property purchased by him, is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property at the time and place of delivery. Thurman v. Wilson,


14. Wrongful sale of lands by executor.—Where an executor wrongfully sold lands belonging to the estate, and included in the same sale, as a part of it, was land held by the executor in his own right, a gross sum being received for the whole; but the land held in his own right was the most valuable, and was the inducement for the sale, this fact should be considered in fixing the amount in damages for which he should account to the estate for the land sold by him as executor. McDonough v. Hanifan,



15. Public works-adjacent property.-In constructing and operating works of a public character, such as railroads, etc., it is not necessary, in order that the owner of adjacent property may recover damages, that such property should lie along or front upon the line of such railroad. If the premises are adjacent, and lie so near that 'a direct physical injury is done them, this is all the rule requires. City of East St. Louis v. Lock. head et al.,








1. After re-marriage.-The fact that a divorced wife has re-married, is no ground for entering a decree relieving the former husband from payment of alimony, it being shown that her husband by re-marriage is unable to support her, nor is it a sufficient reason for an order reducing the alimony to a mere nominal sum. Stillman v. Stillman,




1. What is. In order to constitute the offense of keeping open a
tippling-house on Sunday, it must appear that the keeping open was for
tippling purposes. Merely opening the house and permitting people to
resort there, no tippling being intended or permitted, will not be sufficient.
Weidman v. The People,



1. Generally.-Where goods are sold and the title vests in the vendee
by delivery to a common carrier, the vendor is from that time in no posi-
tion to determine whether he will or will not assert title to the goods,
and hence the doctrine of election will not apply. Bliss et al. v.




1. Apportionment of damages.-In condemnation of land held by a
tenant for a term, the public power seeking the condemnation has such
an interest therein that it may insist upon a proper apportionment of
damages between the landlord and tenant. City of Chicago v. Garrity
et al.,


2. Good-will in business.—Whether a tenant would be entitled to
damages for loss of good-will in business is not decided. If the jury
were of opinion that the evidence established any damages of that char-
acter, they might, possibly, have assessed them in a separate item, but evi-
dence of such damages cannot be resorted to in support of a general as-
sessment of damages. City of Chicago v. Garrity, et al.,

3. To whom paid.-The compensation for which the public is liable in
condemning land, must go to those who are entitled to the property itself,
in proportion to their several interests. A tenant is entitled to receive full
compensation for so much of his leasehold estate as is appropriated to the
public use, and the compensation to the landlord should be diminished by
reason of the existence of the leasehold estate only by such an amount as
the actual rental value exceeds the rent reserved. City of Chicago v.
Garrity et al.,


4. Does not extinguish lease.-As between landlord and tenant, the
condemnation of land to a public use does not operate as an extinguish-
ment in whole or in part of the lease. The tenant still remains liable for
the entire rent according to the terms of the lease. City of Chicago v.
Garrity et al.,


5. Estate of tenant.-The estate of a tenant for years is liable to be
taken by the public by virtue of the right of eminent domain, upon pre-
cisely the same terms upon which any other estate in lands may be taken;
viz: compensation by the public for the property taken. City of Chicago
v. Garrity et al.,
6. Interest on condemnation money.—The rights of the land-owner

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and party seeking condemnation being correlative, and the change of title being dependent upon payment of the condemnation money, it follows that no interest can be collected for delay in paying condemnation money. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs,


7. Right to condemnation money.—In condemnation proceedings, the land-holder acquires no vested right to the condemnation money until possession has been taken of the land by the party condemning, and he can maintain no action therefor until that time. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs,


8. Right to relinquish land condemned.-The board of park commissioners in condemning land for park purposes may abandon the condemnation proceedings at any time before taking possession of the land. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs,


9. When title vests.-In proceedings to condemn land for public use, the party seeking condemnation acquires no vested title in the land until possession is taken, the land appropriated to the use for which it was condemned, and the damages are paid. Beveridge et al. v. West Chicago Park Com'rs,





1. By acts. Where an executor, assuming to act under a power contained in the will, sold lands and received the money therefor, he and his personal representatives, in an action against his administrator for the money received, are estopped from asserting that the will gave him no power to sell the land. Having asserted this power and received the consideration of the sale, he must account for the proceeds. McDonough v. Hanifan,


2. By acts in pais.—Where an execution creditor was present at the time a sale was postponed, and made no objection as to the time of postponement, and was likewise present at the adjourned sale, bid upon the property and received the proceeds, it is too late for him, when sued upon the indemnifying bond, to say that the sale was improperly adjourned. Stanton v. McMullen, 326

3. List of creditors under voluntary assignment.—In proceedings under the assignment law, where the debtors, being a firm, make a statement of their creditors, they are estopped from afterwards asserting that a person named in such statement was not a firm creditor. The other creditors of such firm are also estopped to deny the statement unless it was falsely made for the purpose of defrauding such creditors, or reducing their pro rata share. McCracken v. Milhous, 169

4. Receipt of money.-The fact that a plaintiff, in a suit upon a replevin bond for failure to return the property, has received the proceeds arising from a sale of the goods replevied, does not estop him from recovering damages for a failure to return the property; it only affects the measure of his damages. Ledford et al. v. Weber,


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